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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of copper cable theft within the 
Gauteng Province of South Africa. Data was collected from literature sources as 
well as from security professionals combating copper theft.  
There are five primary objectives in this research:  
1. To explore and to describe the extent and the impact of copper cable 
theft.  
2. To gain insight into the profile and the modus operandi of the offender. 
3. To evaluate current intervention measures used to combat the copper 
cable theft.    
4. To describe the general factors limiting the success of combating copper 
cable theft.  
5. To recommend probable intervention measures with which to combat 
copper cable theft.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with responsible security officials of 
victim stakeholder groups in Gauteng. It was established that copper cable theft 
is currently a very serious crime that deserves both attention and quick 
intervention before it does irreparable damage to the utility infrastructure of 
Gauteng, in particular, and in fact to all these infrastructures in South Africa. 
Key terms: Crime prevention; copper cable theft; copper theft; copper thieves; 
security measurements; Second-Hand Goods Act`s; Non-ferrous metal.    
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GLOSSARY 
ASIS:  American Society for Industrial Security.   
BACSA:  Business Against Crime South Africa. 
BAC:  Business Against Crime. 
CID:  City Improvement District. 
CJS:  Criminal Justice System.  
CPF:  Community Police Forum.  
Copper:  A Non-ferrous Metal used as general electricity conductor. 
CPTED:  Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. 
CPO:  Close Protection Officer 
CPP:  Certified Protection Professional (ASIS). 
CSO:  Chief Security Officer. 
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IDO:  Intelligence Driven Operations. 
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ISS:  Institute for Security Studies. 
MBA:  Metal Brokers Association. 
Measurements:  Methods or Techniques utilised to mitigate crime. 
PRASA:  Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa, also Metrorail. 
Mitigation: Elimination, reduction and minimising exposure to risks and 
severity.  
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NFM:  Non-ferrous Metal. 
NFMT:  Non-ferrous Metal Theft. 
NFMCCC:  Non-ferrous Metal Crime Combating Committee.  
NFTCC:  Non-ferrous Theft Combating Committee. 
NPA:  National Prosecuting Authority. 
PSP: Physical Security Professional 
PSIRA Private Security Regulatory Authority 
SACCI:  South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
SARPA:  South African Revenue Protection Association.  
SAPS:  South African Police Services. 
Telkom:  Parastatal, Largest integrated communications company in Africa.  
Transnet:  Parastatal responsible for the national freight transport  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Communications, Sikhumbuzo Kholwane, said; „Copper cable theft is indeed, a 
national crisis.‟ (February 2012), while Natasha Michael, DA spokesperson on 
Public Enterprises, (March 2012), stated; „The time has come to take serious 
action to put a stop to copper theft.‟ 
It is the expectation of a nation that the governing bodies must secure the 
national assets, which ensure the necessities of daily life, for example; assets 
that provide telecommunications, electricity, transport and revenue. These 
essential supporting services are in fact non-negotiable.  
If crime threatens life preserving assets and causes citizens and the National 
Security of the country to become vulnerable and at risk, it will undermine the 
core governance and security in the country.  
During a one-on-one interview with Van den Berg (2010) he stated that since 
2000 the high levels of copper cable theft had become a noticeable 
occurrence. But it was only over the past 10 years that it received specific 
attention. He is the Senior Corporate Security Manager, responsible for a 
major electricity stakeholder and for many years he was the chairman of the 
Non-ferrous Theft Combating Committee (NFTCC).  
Interestingly, relatively very little, if any, scientific academic research was found 
during this research, especially published research concerning the impact this 
economic related crime has on organisations and on the country as a whole. 
However, on a non-academic level this research found many people and 
organisations with good, yet unpublished ideas on how to fight this crime.     
The shortage of relevant academic literature has compelled the researcher to 
source the limited available data mostly from media publications, articles, 
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journals, reports and publications from various organisations known to have 
been reporting, investigating and combating copper theft. It must, therefore, be 
noted that secondary literary sources, such as found in the printed and 
electronic media, were mostly consulted for published information relevant to 
copper theft.  
When referring to `copper theft` in this research it predominantly implies 
`copper cable theft`. Copper cables constitutes more than 90% of all copper 
thefts, the remainder consists of copper items in direct support of the copper 
cable network, for example; transformer parts and even small moving parts like 
train wheel bearings.  
1.2 THE RATIONALE 
The purpose of this study was to gather relevant data to underpin and to 
identify the nature of copper theft in Gauteng. This research was undertaken 
with the intent of understanding which specific factors inhibit the mitigation of 
copper theft, and to find out what were the perceptions of experts in the non-
ferrous metal theft environment, especially their views concerning the risk 
factors involved. They highlighted their needs and gave their advice on how to 
combat these risk factors successfully. A comprehensive literature study was 
undertaken to gather the relevant data for this research.  
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
The objective of a study, as stated by Fouche (2005:14), refers to the plan of 
action, the how, and the aim or the goal to be achieved. Any scientific 
undertaking in the field of social science has atleast one or more of the 
following seven objectives: Explorative, descriptive, explanatory, correlation, 
evaluative, intervention and participatory action research (Fouche, 2005:106-
109). 
This research, on the phenomena of copper theft, has an explorative, 
explanatory and descriptive objective.  
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According to Babbie (2010:268) explorative research is done in a new field of 
study, or a new interest, from which essential information is obtained. This 
study analyses the experience of responsible managers and security officers in 
the non-ferrous metal theft environment. This analysis highlights the copper 
theft measures they considered and the measures that were implemented to 
combat theft. 
The aims of this research are based on the five areas that were investigated 
and individually described as a combination of; a main actuating, 
masquerading question, the specific problem statement and the end goal 
(Smit, 1985:14). 
The first objective was to explore the extent of the impact/damage of copper 
theft in Gauteng. The second objective was to discern the modus operandi of 
copper theft offenders in Gauteng. The third objective was to determine 
whether the current crime reduction activities were being utilised in combating 
copper theft in Gauteng. The fourth objective was to determine the risk factors 
involved in inhibiting the combat of copper theft. The final objective was to 
determine the strategic solutions that security managers could apply to resolve 
the copper theft problem in Gauteng. 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The term „research design‟ refers to: „the options available to researchers to 
utilise certain “formulas” suitable for their specific research goal‟ (Delport & 
Fouche, 2005:268). In the social science context, this research does not apply 
a „pure‟ research method, but rather a pluralistic epistemological approach in 
which the phenomenological approach is dominant.    
According to Hathaway (1995:535-562), a review of the literature revealed 
various distinctions between the paradigms underlying generic quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. All these traditions generally share common 
assumptions about ontology, epistemology and methodology. However, the 
researcher‟s role is different in the paradigms of qualitative and quantitative 
design. The researcher is either a detached outsider in empirical analytical 
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research, or is part of the phenomenological study of interpretive research. The 
investigator, working in the empirical-analytical paradigm (quantitative), pre-
selects categories, known as variables, and states relationships between the 
variables as hypotheses to guide the research.  
Qualitative research procedures are not as formalised or rigid as quantitative 
procedures. The scope is less defined and the researcher looks at subjective 
exploration from the participant‟s perspectives rather than at objective 
quantification (Fouche, 2005:74). 
Thomas and Brubaker (2000:13-8) explain the paradigms underlying 
qualitative and quantitative research as distinguishing between positivism and 
postmodernism with post-positivism lying somewhere in between these two 
extremes. 
According to the positivism approach, the reality of nature can only be 
understood by objectively studying empirical reality. „Post-positivism is a non-
fundamental approach to human knowledge that rejects the view that 
knowledge is erected on absolutely secure foundations, for there are no such 
things, post-positivist accept fallibilism as an unavoidable fact of life‟ (Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000:29). Post-positivism research teaches what reality is from the 
viewpoint of that particular researcher.  
Exploratory and descriptive research involves the use of semi-structured 
interviews as a qualitative data collection tool (Fouche, 2002:19). This method 
allowed the researcher to explore, describe and explain the interactive contexts 
and dynamics underlying copper theft and the possible reduction methods. 
Interviews with selected respondents for specific and/or supplemental 
information, is not viable through quantitative measurement. The potential gap 
of losing the possible richness of information in using only quantitative 
measurements can so be countered (Creswell, 2009:13-14).  
Qualitative attributes are given names or labels rather than numbers and are 
then categorised. As the interview schedule progresses, new knowledge 
shared can subtly change the interview schedule as the data collection 
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progress shows aspects that may not have been anticipated during the 
planning phase of the research (Bailey, 1996:62). Qualitative research is more 
useful for exploring phenomena within specific contexts, articulating 
participants' understandings and perceptions and generating tentative 
concepts and theories that directly pertain to particular environments (Schulze, 
2003:8-20). 
Kvale (1996:70) states that the strengths of the phenomenological approach 
are threefold, namely:  
1. Allowing the researcher an insider perspective of a respondent. 
2. Allowing subjective knowledge and experience to become known. 
3. Showing the context in which the research interacts.  
Based on the nature, the scope, the activities and the needs of all the role 
players, the phenomenological approach is custom made for eliciting 
information in protected and in confidential environments. This combination of 
explorative, descriptive, explanatory, evaluative and intervention research is 
essentially a way of eliciting information from a limited number of individuals 
who are presumed to have the information which is sought after. It further 
focuses on those who are able and willing to communicate and who are 
intended to be representative or in charge of a larger group (Hofstee, 
2006:122). 
However, a combination of both a positivist approach and a post-positivist 
research design were used during this research because the principles 
associated with the positivistic approach had to be utilised to cover the 
phenomenon of copper theft. Thus according to Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and 
Turner (2007:113) this can be rationalised as the mixed methods research; an 
approach used to find knowledge (theory and practice) that allows the 
consideration of multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions and standpoints 
by including the standpoints of both qualitative and quantitative research.  
The mixed method research is a synthesis that includes ideas from both 
qualitative and quantitative research. Denzin (1978:291) called this approach 
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triangulation; „the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon‟. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011:231) a mixed 
methods design is a research design (or methodology) in which the researcher 
collects, analyses, and mixes (integrates or connects), both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or by utilising a multiphase programme of 
inquiry.  
This research will aim to uncover all the information regarding the copper theft 
phenomenon, which will enlighten the goals to the point of saturation. It is 
therefore important to incorporate such knowledge, as described in 
documentations and other positivistic/quantitative observances and measures, 
into this phenomenological research design where it can enhance and support 
the experiences from the sample grouping, allowing for an even deeper 
understanding and knowledge of the research problems stated. The 
„interaction‟ between researcher, respondents and published material was 
exceptional. The published sources became like another qualitative source 
rather than records from a quantitative environment.       
1.4.1 The research paradigm  
Paradigm issues are crucial, no inquirer ought to go about the business of 
inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his 
approach (Nagy & Leavy, 2004:36).    
According to Babbie (2010:34) a paradigm refers to a model or a frame of 
reference that is used when observing, understanding, and influencing what is 
seen and interpreted, to give a researcher direction. According Nagy and 
Leavy (2004:21) once a research problem‟s area of interest has been selected, 
a model needs to be chosen that must be followed. This model must define a 
research paradigm (Model/Pattern=paradeigma in Greek / paradigma in Latin) 
as a basic set of beliefs/philosophies that guides actions, deals with main 
principles, which must be studied, and also shows the researcher‟s perception 
of the world.  
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For this research the respondent‟s mind is invaded so that the qualitative 
researcher can reproduce all the subjective experiences and emotions that the 
respondent is aware of (Ladikos & Kruger, 2006:157). However, no single 
method can apprehend all the incisive variations in actual human experience. 
This necessitates the venture into a wide range of interconnected interpretive 
methods and always seeking better ways of making the worlds of experience 
studied more understandable: „In this sense all qualitative researchers are 
philosophers guided by abstract principles, which combine beliefs about 
ontology, epistemology and methodology‟ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003: 31-36).  
The research or inquiry paradigm in a social research context is explained in 
terms of three fundamental questions which are interconnected with constrains 
for control depending on the answers (Nagy & Leavy, 2004: 21 – 22). The 
three fundamental questions are: 
1.4.1.1 Ontological assumption  
The Ontological Question: What is the form and the nature of reality and, 
therefore, what is there that can be known about it? How things really are and 
really work? (Nagy & Leavy, 2004:21). 
The respondents, the researcher intended to study, each has their own theory 
of real knowledge and, therefore, each one will have their own „real‟ 
interpretation of the particular phenomena. According to Creswell (2009:6-7), 
the details shared by the participants may be different in experience due to the 
post-positivist assumption that there can be multiple realities. The researcher‟s 
epistemological position, regarding this assumption, is that data is contained 
within the perspectives of people that are involved with copper theft mitigation.  
This, according to Aspers (2004), implies the empirical material level; the world 
of First-Order-Construct, from „where the researcher explains the 
participants/actors meaning structures and the ideal types that they use, but 
avoids reading into theories.‟ 
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1.4.1.2 Epistemological assumption  
The epistemological question: What is the nature of the relationship between 
the knower, or would be knower, and what can be known? This level must be 
entered with a clear understanding of what the answer to the Ontology 
question is (Nagy & Leavy, 2004:21). 
The respondents and their experiences will predominantly be studied through 
the phenomenological paradigm. The paradigm can influence the way in which 
the research is conducted, or the strategy of this research. The main 
assumption in the phenomenological paradigm is that all people, in everyday 
life, experience different phenomena, which shape and influence them to make 
conscious sense of the world they see, and this is unavoidable (Creswell, 
2007:58). The knowledge of experiencing the phenomena should be 
constructed and interpreted by the participants, so that the meaning in how 
they view their life can be developed. It refers to understanding the world in 
terms of subjective point of view, based on how something was experienced, 
taking into account the social and the historical context thereof (Creswell, 
2007:20).   
Such theoretical assumptions mean that the researcher produces second-
order-constructs in relation to the participant‟s first-order-constructs. The 
second-order-constructs, the theoretical level, must communicate in two 
directions. On the one hand it must comply with the demand of subjectivism, 
which is understandable to the participants within the field. On the other hand, 
it must be connected with existing scientific theory and be understandable 
within the scientific community. The second-order-constructs, or the „accounts 
of the accounts‟, are the theoretical notions of an existing theory and 
constructs as produced and coined by the researcher (Aspers, 2004:1).  
1.4.1.3 Methodological assumption  
The methodological question is: How can the inquirers, or would be knower, go 
about finding out whatever he believes can be known? Methods must, 
however, be connected to a predetermined methodology based on the 
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Ontological and Epistemological predispositions within the chosen paradigm 
(Nagy & Leavy, 2004:22). 
The research has been conducted to find the essence of what and how 
subjects/respondents experience copper theft, and what the actions are that 
they have taken to mitigate/contain or to reduce it. The experience and 
actions/know-how will be studied by applying a phenomenological strategy. 
Creswell (2007:60) stated that by applying a phenomenological strategy, a 
deep understanding of the phenomena being investigated can be achieved, 
thus enabling the essence of the experience to be founded by the researcher.   
1.5 THE PHENOMENOLOGY PARADIGM 
According to Moustakas (1994:22, 27 and 61), phenomenological research 
returns to the experience of participants to obtain comprehensive descriptions. 
Moustakas further stated that these descriptions then provide the basis for a 
reflective structural analysis to portray the essence of the experiences: „What 
appears in consciousness is an absolute reality while what appears to the 
world is a product of learning. That what appears to be appearing is actually 
appearing, one sees what or who one sees.‟  
According to Moustakas (1994:21), the universal qualities or common bonds of 
the human science research models are: 
1. Recognising the value of qualitative designs, methodologies and studies 
of human experiences that are not approachable through quantitative 
approaches. 
2. Focussing on the wholeness of experience rather than solely on its 
objectives or parts. 
3. Searching for meanings and the essences of experience rather than 
measurements and explanations.  
4. Obtaining descriptions of experience through first person accounts in 
informal and formal conversations and interviews. 
5. Regarding the data of experiences as imperative in understanding 
human behaviour and as evidence for scientific investigations. 
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6. Formulating questions and problems that reflect the interest, 
involvement, and personal commitment of the researcher. 
1.5.1. Justification for selecting the phenomenological paradigm.  
A qualitative research design was considered appropriate for this study since it 
allowed the researcher insight into the perceptions of security managers and 
other senior non-ferrous metal theft role players. The researcher entered the 
subjects‟ „life world‟ in order to understand the phenomenon in its naturally 
occurring state (Fouche, 2005:267-273). The study attempts to understand the 
meanings and the intentions that underpin the everyday actions of the subject. 
Phenomenologists believe that the researcher cannot be detached from his/her 
own presuppositions and the researcher should not pretend otherwise. 
Individual researchers hold explicit beliefs (Mouton & Marais, 1990:12). The 
intention of this descriptive research was to gather data regarding the 
perspectives and the experiences of participants about the phenomenon of 
copper theft and its nature and modes operandi, what mitigates it and what is 
needed to continually do so.    
1.5.2. The empirical phenomenological research method and 
collaboration with other epistemology paradigms 
1.5.2.1 Empirical phenomenology 
The philosophical foundation and practical application of empirical 
phenomenology, as utilised in this research, is based on the phenomenology of 
the philosopher Edmund Husserl and the sociologist Alfred Schütz (Aspers, 
2004:1).  
Moustakas (1994:xii) mentions five human research approaches that utilise 
qualitative methodologies, namely: Ethnography, Grounded Theory, 
Hermeneutics, Empirical Phenomenological Research and Heuristic Research. 
The chosen phenomenological approach for this study is the Empirical 
Phenomenological Research. This will require returning to the experiences to 
obtain comprehensive descriptions. These descriptions will then provide the 
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basis for a contemplative structural analysis to portray the essence of the 
experience (Moustakas, 1994:xii).  
The contexts of the structural factors within which these experiences are met 
are just as important for this research. Fischer (1974:405 - 406), explains that 
the phenomenological method is the work of revealing and making explicit the 
unwritten constitution of everyday life. And according to Moustakas (1994:11-
16), such structural factors will be embedded in the phenomenological 
research through a mixed approach. The original data comprises primary 
descriptions obtained through a semi-structured question schedule and an 
interview type dialogue. The researcher then describes the structure of the 
experience shared, based on the reflection and interpretation of the research 
participant‟s narrative. The aim is to determine what an experience means to 
the persons that have had the experience. From their general observations the 
essence of the research study is then derived; to enlighten the copper theft 
phenomena (Moustakas, 1994:11-16).    
According to Miles and Huberman (in Ladikos & Kruger, 2006:158) empirical 
phenomenology was developed by Amedeo Giorgi. The aim of this approach is 
to research a particular phenomenon, or to research the participants‟ 
experiences and to share these with others. They are further of the opinion that 
for a researcher to successfully make use of empirical phenomenological 
research, he/she must describe a particular incident in detail, as experienced 
by participants and then step by step document how the essential 
psychological elements were extracted from the description. 
According to Aspers (2004:1), empirical phenomenology is most noticeable in 
the way in which the researcher approaches his field. The starting point for 
empirical phenomenology is that the explanation must account for the subjects‟ 
first-order-constructs. The main idea of empirical phenomenology is the 
scientific explanation must be grounded in the first order contructs of the 
participants, which are their own meanings and words. These constructions are 
then related to the second-order constucts of the researcher. Notwithstanding 
the methods and its contrasting factors, they must always safeguard the 
subjective perspective (Aspers, 2004:1). 
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In line with Van Vuuren and Ladikos (1985:2-3), the techniques of empirical 
and phenomenological psychology for this research, were applied to all the 
security expert‟s experiences of copper theft. This was a study of the copper 
theft situation as experienced by these security experts responsible for its 
protection. In this way it was possible to study the „way‟ in which the 
subjects/security officer‟s world is put together and how they experience it. 
In this context „empirical‟ must be interpreted as a meaning which must be 
attributed to the facts. The researcher thus interprets the copper theft related 
events in the way the security managers experienced them. The data and the 
stages of analysis, which led to the findings, were shared with expert 
colleagues to ensure that the phenomenon of copper theft had been faithfully 
considered.  
The challenge of this research, from the viewpoint of a phenomenological 
approach, is that positivistic type sources, for example; various documents and 
data generalisations, were also used in an attempt to achieve saturation of the 
total truth.  
1.5.3 Phenomenology and post positivism interaction 
„The impetus for the development of a phenomenological method for the 
human sciences was a perceived failure by investigators using the methods 
developed by the natural sciences in adequately explaining the phenomenon 
that the human sciences were investigating the human being‟ (Omery, 
1983:53.) 
This research deals with security/legal categories which are rigid and usually 
informative of a structured systems and process approach. This might be 
epistemologically contrary to phenomenology in terms of generalisations and 
extrapolation towards theories and models. The goal of this research is, 
however, to uncover, interpret and to understand the phenomenon of copper 
theft in totality. From a criminology perspective it is about the outcome of the 
essential findings which can be applied in the field of criminology (Davis, 
2012). These requirements manipulated the researcher to cover the evidence 
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and the facts of what have been before, the current status, and the future 
prediction. This implies a clearly combined post positivist and phenomenology 
approach. Knowledge may be gained through qualitative and quantitative 
research methods that may complement each other and move knowledge 
closer to the truth. 
Clark concluded that discovery is welcomed in assisting to determine the 
meanings and purposes that people ascribe to their actions. Such experiences 
or meanings of individuals, such as phenomenology, may be encompassed by 
this paradigm (Racher & Robinson, 2003:464-469). 
This research on copper theft spans the post positivism, empirical- and 
hermeneutic phenomenological ontology -paradigms. The challenge was; how 
to reconcile phenomenology with post positivism. Manen, (in Racher & 
Robinson, 2003:472) stated; „the essence of a phenomenon is a universal 
which can be described through a study of the structure that governs the 
instances or particular manifestations of the essence of the phenomenon‟. 
Therefore, if an essence is adequately described, by comprehensively 
encapsulating the lived experience and the significance, it will receive the 
phenomenological nod. 
 As such phenomenology has been described as a method applicable within a 
post positivist paradigm; „Phenomenology inquiry yields empirical knowledge in 
the form of descriptive and explanatory theory, and of understanding, which 
leads to practical relevant knowledge, and it also contributes to ethical, 
aesthetic, personal and socio-political ways of knowing‟ (Van der Zalm & 
Bergum, 1999:217). In both post positivist and interpretive paradigms, the use 
of quantitative and qualitative methods can be justified in meeting the purposes 
of the research without violating paradigm assumptions (Racher & Robinson, 
2003:477). Davis (2012) stated; „Criminologists do not apply research methods 
in the “pure” sense, but as how they can be used in the applied field of 
criminology.‟    
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1.6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
1.6.1 Sampling 
The respondents all reside in Gauteng. Copper theft security managers, who 
are also copper mitigation specialists, are limited in number. They were 
selected through purposive sampling. This kind of sampling is considered by 
Wellman and Kruger (1999:196) as the most important kind of non-probability 
sampling. The researcher selected the sample based on the purpose of the 
research, looking for those who „have had the most valid experiences relating 
to the phenomenon to be researched‟ (Kruger, 1988:150). 
Delport and Fouche' (2005:328), stated that non-probability sampling is most 
appropriate when the researcher seeks individuals where the particular 
processes or behaviour being studied are most likely to occur. The researcher 
used target sampling in order to collect information specifically relating to 
copper cable theft in Gauteng and the factors that could contribute or mitigate 
such occurrences.  
In order to trace additional participants as sources, or as a second level 
validation for the information received, the researcher used snowball sampling.  
Snowballing is a method of expanding the sample by asking one informant or 
participant to recommend others instead. Groenewald (2004:5) calls those 
through whom entry is gained „gatekeepers‟ (a person of authority who can 
authorise access) and those persons who volunteer „assistance key actors or 
key insiders‟. In this instance the researcher also used professional alliances 
such as; members of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), ISS 
personnel and PSIRA affiliations in the security industry, to identify the „right‟ 
Security Managers for this research.  
Groenewald (2004:9) cautioned that gatekeepers tend to manipulate by 
influencing the course of the research, and therefore the researcher had to be 
alert to the possibility of such occurrences.  
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A unit of analysis is tapped for data until the topic is saturated. This occurs 
when the interviews (subjects or informants) introduce no new perspectives of 
the topic (Groenewald, 2004:11). Boyd (2001: 93-122) regards two to ten 
participants or research subjects as sufficient to reach saturation. Creswell 
(1998: 65 and 113) recommends long interviews with up to ten people for a 
phenomenological study. A sample of four Security Managers was selected. 
They were identified as specialists by their peers and their employers, and 
were not only responsible for, but were also the most knowledgeable of their 
institutions‟ security copper combating programmes. The fifth respondent 
selected was a service provider to the four senior security manager 
respondents, and he was especially knowledgeable in the field of copper theft. 
The researcher extensively contacted referrals within the same environments 
of the respondents until saturation of information was evident.  
A focus group interview of 28 senior security managers was the sixth sample 
entity. The researcher was appointed to serve as moderator at a copper theft 
workshop in Gauteng on 13 and 14 October 2011. At this Workshop about 28 
senior security management delegates, presented themselves at an open 
forum as experts and critical role-players in the copper cable theft environment. 
The transcribed interview schedule was tested on all of them to determine the 
level of saturation achieved.    
1.6.2 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is defined as the person or object from which the social 
researcher collects data (Fouche, 2002:107). The unit of analysis in this 
research is the most senior security officials responsible for mitigating or 
reducing copper theft within Gauteng. Only research participants, 
knowledgeable and with many years of experience in the copper theft 
phenomenon in Gauteng were included in the sample. Gauteng is the 
economical hub of the RSA. The stakeholders most affected by non-ferrous 
metal theft in the RSA reside in Gauteng.  
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1.6.3 Data collection  
Mittman (2001:7) mentioned the following empirical data collection tools: mail, 
telephone surveys, telephone interviews, in-person interviews, collection and 
analysis of documents, archival search, administrative data records, 
observation field notes, etc. However, the specific challenge was to decide on 
the data collection tool that would source the data which this research had as 
its goal. Semi-structured interviews were used as data collection tool for this 
research.  
An interview schedule formed part of the semi-structured process to obtain the 
relevant information. The data gathered for this research should be relevant 
and clear, and the degrees of freedom utilised to gather such data is necessary 
and should be done scientifically (Giorgi, 1985:151).   
1.6.4 Core reasons for utilising Interviews as data collection instrument  
Kvale (1996:1-2) remarked that data capturing during the qualitative interview; 
„is literally an inter-view, an interchange of views between persons conversing 
about a theme of mutual interest, where the researcher attempts to understand 
the world from the subjects point of view, to unfold meaning of peoples` 
experiences.‟   
The experience and the standing of the researcher in the Security Industry was 
known, which created an important rapport with the interviewees and made it 
possible to focus on the topic, especially as non-ferrous metal theft covers a 
broad spectrum. In supporting the rational for this dissertation, the importance 
of formulating correct and relevant guiding questions was needed. Smit 
(1985:14) explains that a guiding question could also masquerade as a 
statement question, which will demarcate the problem area. Therefore, specific 
attention should be given to the meaningfulness of the statement question. The 
interviewer immediately explained or elaborated on any miss constructed 
questions. It was also possible for the researcher to observe non-verbal 
communication more comprehensively. 
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The respondents were informed their anonymity was guaranteed and their 
responses would be treated as confidential and would only be used for 
purposes of this research. The researcher made use of an informed consent 
pledge to ensure an ethical research (see Annexure C).   
All respondents providing in-depth information have been protected by 
referring to them as „respondents‟ and later in this research collectively as „R‟. 
First and foremost it must be reiterated that the current situation in South 
Africa, concerning positions, resources, structures and operations, makes 
critical management opinions highly sensitive. This is also why confidential 
interviews, that guarantee anonymity, were used to obtain information without 
fear of compromising the respondents.  
The value of the interview methodology used in this research lies in the fact 
that it guided respondents in sharing new information.  
1.7 INTERVIEWING PROCEDURES 
Interviews conducted by the researcher were semi structured during which 
open-ended questions were asked in either English or in Afrikaans.  
This interview process gave participants an opportunity to share insights and to 
raise questions that the researcher had not anticipated. Interestingly, this 
approach influenced the scope, the sequence and the content of the 
interviews. These interviews were conducted during 2011 with the selected 
Senior Security Managers and/or Chief Security Officers (CSO‟s) at venues of 
their own choice. Permission was requested from all respondents to be 
interviews and for field notes to be taken and to be taped where possible. On 
completion of each interview these notes, recording and dictated interviews 
were transcribed as a verifying measurement. 
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1.7.1 Interview duration 
The Senior Security Managers who had agreed to participate in this research 
were all involved in various security duties. They were duly informed that to 
obtain sufficient information each interview would be between 60 to 180mim. 
The amount of time spent on the interviews depended on the amount of 
information, experience and personal opinions the respondent provided. This 
often resulted in long in-depth discussions, which sometimes stretched into 
many hours. According to Taylor and Bogdon (in Maree, 1995:88) an interview 
should not take longer than two hours. 
The researcher found that because of the interest in the topic, the discussion 
probes initiated philosophical debates, resulting in up to four follow-up 
meetings before the interview was finalised.  
1.7.2 Focus group interview  
Husserl (1913:86), stated that focus group interviews can also be 
phenomenological where the discussion of topics are sort of bracketed. A 
focus group can single out a phenomenon for careful inspection - it is removed 
from the world where it occurs and then it is examined. This unmasks, defines 
and determines the phenomenon‟s basic elements and essential structure.  
According to Halcomb, Gholizadeh, DiGiacomo, Phillips and Davidson (2007:1) 
the focus group method is a technique of group interviews that generates data 
through the opinions expressed by participants. According to Groenewald 
(2004:5) a variety of methods can be used in phenomenological research 
including; interviews and focus group meetings. As the operative word in 
phenomenological research is „described‟ is endorses the ability to describe 
the phenomenon as accurately as possible and to understand the 
psychological phenomena from the perspectives of the respondents involved. 
Bradbury-Jones, Sambrook and Irvine (2009:1) state that in phenomenological 
research it is actually beneficial that the focus groups are harmonious because 
it stimulates discussion and opens up new perspectives.  
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The use of focus groups actually provided a greater understanding of the 
phenomenon under study, as the successful group interaction and discussions 
on copper theft were extremely informative..  
1.8 THE PILOT STUDY 
According to Bless and Higson-Smith (2000:5), the purpose of the pilot study is 
to ascertain if the required data and information can be obtained from the 
respondents, and if the methodology, the sampling, the instruments and the 
analysis are adequately and appropriately determined in the process. 
According to Holliday (2002:5) qualitative research is more flexible and open-
ended and, therefore, it is difficult to establish a time frame, the costs, 
permission and the number of respondents that would be required to reach 
data saturation. These will become evident during the pilot study that will also 
highlight the early warning signs of problems that will need to be pro-actively 
resolved. 
According to Janesick (1994:213) a qualitative study‟s advantage is that it 
allows a researcher to focus on issues such as, pre-testing certain questions 
and getting greater clarity on certain sections of the planned interview 
schedule. And as Bailey (1987:108) points out; to ensure the interview is fair 
and justified, and that the instruments to be used are tested before application..  
Prior to the formal scheduled interviews the interview schedule was tested on 
two senior security managers and this sampling met the criteria. The 
researcher personally conducted the interviews during which the questions 
were tested for miss-construction and misunderstanding. The main focus was 
to ascertain whether the interest of participants had been sufficiently aroused 
for them to be willing participants so that the required data could successfully 
be obtained.  
1.9 THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Mouton (2001:87) and Newman (1997:89), a literature study is 
conducted to determine the research which has already been done. This 
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information would then act as a guide for the researcher. The literature review 
is important to establish credibility as it demonstrates that the researcher has 
insight, is familiar with the current topic and has the most up to date 
information on that topic. According to Leedy (1997:71), a literature study can 
also provide new ideas. And it can also show gaps that still need to be 
researched (Marshall & Rossman, 1995:29).  
The researcher must demonstrate his understanding of the topic under 
investigation by making use of the most up to date information on the topic. 
Mouton (2001:87) and Newman (1997:89) state that a literature review is 
essential to learn from, and to build on to previous research findings while at 
the same time provide a safeguard against duplicating previous research.  
A comprehensive literature study was undertaken on the issues of copper theft. 
It was found that secondary literature on the topic was scarce and that which 
was available had mostly been indirectly duplicated. The existing formal 
research found on copper cable theft was of little significance.   
This was one of the main reasons why the phenomenological method had 
been chosen. It became clear that data needed to be addressed with 
individuals and their experiences within the day to day reality of mitigating 
copper theft. The fact that not much literature exists about the research study 
referred the researcher back to the origin and reality of the phenomenon of 
copper theft.  
The existing evidence on the current topic in the academic media is indicative 
of the fact that non-ferrous metal theft is a relatively new phenomenon to 
research in the criminological milieu.     
1.10 DATA ANALYSIS  
1.10.1 General analysis.  
Newman (1997:101) is of the opinion that skepticism is an important norm of 
science, and the researcher is not obliged to accept anything at face value. 
This was kept in mind during the selection and the subsequent interpretation of 
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the data. Data from all the sources, as stated in the sample delineation, was 
analysed to distinguish what was relevant. According to Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994:33), the researcher was required to interpret the collected data so that 
the researched phenomenon could be understood. A final report would be 
constructed from data that was collected.  
1.10.2 The empirical-phenomenological data analysis method. 
According to Van Vuuren and Ladikos (1985:2-18) in the empirical-
phenomenological method for qualitative research the process that is followed 
has five steps:  
a. Reduced transcriptions of each interview  
b. Summarising the main points of the interview  
c. Illustrating condensation of the interviewee‟s experience which could 
highlight the problems of copper theft  
d. Describing the psychological structure of the case (the inquiry of 
intimate experiences by the senior security manager regarding 
copper theft) 
e. Relating the „essential‟ psychological structure of all the interviews.  
In using this method, the researcher could analyse the data that had been 
obtained from the participants, based on their experiences of copper theft at 
their premises, and reproduce the data in this research report. 
1.10.3 The methodological implementation 
The data analysis method is supported by eight steps which are used to enable 
the second constructor to make valid interpretations of information as received 
from the first constructor (Ladikos, 2006:161-163).  
Step one: Appropriate questions were formulated for the subjects for them to 
share their specific experiences.  
Step two: Appointments were made with the subjects and interviews were 
conducted. Dictation and recordings were utilised where applicable.  
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Step three: The data collected during the interviews was transcribed.  
Step four: The transcriptions were analysed and notes were made of the 
general themes. The researcher was immersed in the reality portrayed in the 
data of the subjects‟ environment and the real life experiences of copper theft. 
Step five: The transcriptions were re-read. Central themes and/or categories 
were identified and suitable headings were noted. This process is known as 
open coding.  
In step six, the relevant themes, once identified, were grouped together, 
explained and discussed under the central themes with the aid of the empirical-
phenomenological method.  
During step seven, the best interviews were identified.  
Step eight involved the academic writing of the chapter. During this step the 
transcriptions and recordings of the interviews, as well as the resent literature 
reviews, were continuously consulted to prevent the context and the original 
meaning from being omitted or misinterpreted.    
These steps were followed so as to gather information and to make an in-depth 
analysis of this qualitative data, as uncovered in this research. The sequence 
of steps, however, was not strictly followed. Step seven identified the best 
interviews; yet at times these had already been used during the transcription 
and coding period. The researcher found this small change kept the topic focus 
current. In cases where the questions could not be answered clearly, or were 
not understood, these were immediately followed up, until the saturation point 
had been reached.     
1.11 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA  
Maree (1995: 29) stated that the criteria for validity included confidentiality, 
honesty and responsibility. This criterion was necessary for validating the 
responses of the respondents – the completeness of the responses were 
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measured against this criteria According to Lani (2009:03), validity means 
accurate or error free conclusion(s) deducted from the data.  
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985: 308), external validity is achieved 
through a detailed description of the research process allowing the reader to 
see if the results can be transferred to a different setting. In order to enable 
others wanting to apply the findings of this study to their own research so as to 
make an informed decision about whether to do so or not, descriptions of the 
experiences and identity development of the participants, as well as the 
definitive exposition of the researcher, is provided.  
Reliability is used to evaluate the stability of observations by the multiple use of 
the same instrument as required (Miles & Huberman 1994:278). The 
respondents‟ answers were used verbatim to ensure the reliability of the study. 
Each respondent was asked the same questions, using an interview schedule.  
In this study the researcher was able to demonstrate that his focus was on a 
clearly demarcated phenomenon. A similar observation would be possible if 
the same variables existed at the same time and at the same place. The 
quality of information about combating cable theft, that had been obtained from 
the selected specialists in the operational field, supported this observation in its 
entirety proving this research process is thus reliable and totally transparent.  
1.12 PROGRAMME FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter 1 introduces the study and discusses the problem, the rationale for the 
study and the research design and methodology.  
Chapter 2 encompasses the literature review and provides information about 
the impact, the nature and the measurements of the phenomenon of copper 
theft.  
Chapter 3 presents the data collected and its analysis.  
Chapter 4 describes the findings of the phenomenon of copper theft.   
Chapter 5 concludes the study by presenting the recommendations for 
combating copper cable theft and the recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON COPPER THEFT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa copper theft is a national problem especially in the province of 
Gauteng because, being the commercial hub of South Africa it offers the most 
opportunities for copper theft.     
The literature review revealed a paradoxical phenomenon in that most of the 
active initiatives for combating copper theft originated from outside the 
Gauteng borders. 
No academic sources were found in the library that made a direct reference to 
the phenomenon of copper theft. Therefore, all the references acknowledged in 
the list of references are from the Internet and from data found in newspapers, 
magazines, chronicles, journals, departmental publications and in annual 
general  reports.  
Copper theft is a recent occurrence. It is only for the past 10 years that it has 
featured in literature reviews and with all the attention it is currently receiving it 
has become a growing concern.  
2.2 EXTENT AND IMPACT OF THE COPPER THEFT THREAT  
„Decisive action needs to be taken to deal with the theft of non-ferrous metal. 
Unless proper steps are taken, the continuing theft of copper cable will 
continue to undermine economic growth and development in South Africa‟ 
(Van Dalen, 2009:1). He further emphasises the fact that these non-ferrous 
metals are necessary for the provision of essential services such as; transport, 
communication, water and electricity.  
According to U-dingane Senamela ,Transnet Freight Senior Security Manager, 
„Copper theft syndicates were holding the country's economy at ransom, 
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causing the loss of jobs and destabilising operations that affected many 
economic activities across the country,‟ (Mogome, 2008:1). 
Since 1993 the theft of non-ferrous metals in South Africa has escalated to 
unprecedented levels with annual losses running into billions of rand (Venter, 
2008:1).  
In 2007, Mr Bekker, a Member of Parliament, requested „Non-Ferrous Metal 
Theft‟ to be classified a terrorist act with the consequent penalties because this 
phenomenon had become a matter of urgency (Coetzee 2008a:1). Geldenhuys 
(2008:1) supported this request with a warning that copper theft would cripple 
the cities in South, especially when power outages, communication cuts and 
the diminishing railway infrastructure were taken into consideration. This 
request was endorsed by Me Helen Zille, the Mayor of Cape Town, in stating 
that the multi-million rand theft of non-ferrous metal items threatened to bring 
Cape Town to its knees (Van Dalen 2009:1).Sikhumbuzo Eric Kholwane, 
Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications, 
recently stated: „So it has become a national crisis, because people are being 
denied these basic services and this is a problem‟ (Money Web, 2012:1). 
Natasha Michael, DA Spokesperson Public Enterprises (Allafrica.com 2012), 
stated that parliament has indicated that government is losing the war against 
copper theft. The minister of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, confirmed that 
Eskom and Transnet continued to suffer losses of millions of rand as a result of 
copper cable theft. The South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry‟s 
(SACCI) spokesperson, Peggy Drodskie, said the effects of copper theft on the 
South African economy were huge;- from delays in rail transport and shipping, 
to dysfunctional traffic lights (Business Live 2011:1).  
2.2.1 The extent of the problem 
Van den Berg (2004:1) the Senior Consultant and Advisor to Eskom, and for 
many years the Chairman of the Non Ferrous Theft Combating Committee 
(NFTCC), gave a specialist perspective on the broader impact of non-ferrous 
metal theft. He stated that the victims of non-ferrous metal theft did not only 
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suffer direct consequences as a result of financial losses incurred with having 
to replace the stolen material, other people also suffered indirect 
consequences, such as: 
a. The impact on the image of the organisation 
b. The impact on service delivery 
c. The impact on employee morale 
d. Loss of revenue or income 
e. Labour costs to replace and to repair 
f. Overtime costs for staff 
g. Cost of equipment and vehicles 
h. Security costs to protect and to safeguard assets and customers 
i. The cost of electronic equipment, alarms and monitoring.   
2.2.2 The impact of the problem 
The cumulative damage to the economy of this country, its organisations and 
its individuals, is staggering. The previous Public Enterprise Minister, Barbara 
Hogan, said that copper cable theft was so rampant that it costs the South 
African economy approximately seven billion rand a year (Phakathi, 2010a:1). 
According to Geldenhuys (2008:1) the actual loss of copper cable could be 
multiplied tenfold to determine the actual overall economic loss. And then the 
cost imposed on all the victims that were without essential services had not 
even been included in the calculation. 
The threat, however, is not only financial and services orientated, it also has a 
direct life threat capacity. Ben Coetzee, a senior researcher at the Institute for 
Security Studies‟ (ISS) highlights the danger of cable theft from major utility 
providers, saying that it poses, not just a major threat to the economies of the 
country, but also to the safety of the citizens. „One obvious example is the 
mining industry, which relies heavily on a guaranteed electricity supply. If the 
wrong cable is stolen, a deep mine such as one of those found in South Africa 
would be hard-pressed to extract its workers from the mine shaft. Deaths could 
easily result‟ (Hi-Tech Security Solutions, 2009:1).  
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Organised gangs plunder kilometres of cable; the country‟s lifelines, and sell it 
as scrap metal. These copper thieves have an unlimited appetite as copper is 
stolen from basins, bearings, taps, window frames, drain covers, solar panels, 
water meters, overhead lines, substations, signal cables, underground cables, 
transformers, railway carriages.... In fact absolutely anything that has copper in 
it is stolen (Geldenhuys, 2008:1). Every day the safety of the communities is 
clearly at risk as the thieves more brazenly feed the general scrap metal 
industry‟s demand for profit (Van Dalen, 2009:1).  
Initially the security of these non-ferrous type metals had not been taken into 
consideration during installation or construction. In fact 70 years ago, non-
ferrous metals were not a sought after commodity, thus they were placed in 
plain sight for easy maintenance. But today this has made these cables soft 
targets for criminals who seem to be making a lucrative living out of cable theft. 
The complexity of the task at hand is enormous, for example; the challenge 
that Eskom alone faces involves approximately 370 000 plus kilometres of 
exposed electrical cabling that covers vast distances over kilometres of remote 
areas making these cables extremely vulnerable to theft (Hi-Tech Security 
Solutions, 2009:1).  
Transnet faces a similar challenge in securing about 23 000km of rail track 
(News24.Com, 2007:1). Interestingly, what is not regularly reported is the theft 
of non-ferrous metals that severely affects the mining industry, municipalities 
and metropolitan electricity departments (Fin24.Com, 2006:1). The threat to 
municipalities is real, substantiated by the crippling effect it has on 
municipalities such as; the eThekwini Municipality where the perpetual service 
delivery interruptions are costing industries millions of rand in financial losses. 
Sandile Maphumulo, the eThekwini Electricity Head, said that the financial 
resources used to combat these thefts should have been used for social 
upliftment. Furthermore the situation plunders millions of rand from Durban 
municipalities, to the point where it can only be seen as acts of terrorism. 
Copper thieves should be given harsher sentences (Ndlovu & Magwaza 
2008:1).  
28 
The message which should be conveyed to the public, is that; copper cable 
theft holds a specific danger for the entire South African industry infrastructure; 
in that it causes a domino effect that vibrates on all levels, for example; if the 
transports system such as buses, the trains, or ships, were to stop being 
operational, all the supporting and dependant services would follow. The 
indirect impact would be on the people making use of these transport services 
- thousands of people would be late for work, freight deliveries would be 
delayed and business would be without stock, etc. This could escalate into 
striking, angry, frustrated people - complaints and retaliation, vandalism, driver 
threats, hi-jacking of transport, burning of property, overcrowding, possible 
claims and even loss of life (Venter, 2011).  
2.3 ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT  
There are very few publications concerning the current role of law enforcement 
in combating copper cable theft in Gauteng, let alone in South Africa. Business 
Hi Light (2009:1) states that the South African Polices Service (SAPS) has 
identified non-ferrous metal theft as a priority crime. However, there are still 
numerous loopholes within the system that needs to be addressed:   
Law enforcement lacks an understanding of the severity of the crime and 
therefore the slipshod general prosecuting actions and the slack bail 
conditions imposed. For example; after many hours of intense investigation 
several members of a crime syndicate were successfully arrested, and the 
normal prosecution route had been followed accordingly for the suspects to 
appear in court, but without much ado, they were released on bail the very 
next day.  
Bindeman (2011:2), the Technical Advisor of the South Africa Revenue 
Protection Association (SARPA) with many years consulting experienced in 
the copper cable theft environment and frequently reffered to in this section, 
provided documentation at the 2011 National Copper theft Workshop, 
highlighting the loopholes in the old „Second Hand Goods Act‟ of 1955, which 
are continuously exposed in court by the defense legal representatives. The 
courts deal with syndicates and scrap metal dealers who are aware of these 
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loopholes, and who not only understand these laws but they also have enough 
money to get good legal representations  
Bindeman furthermore states that in the industry it was well known that in the 
aspect of crime fighting, the SAPS Crime Intelligence did not regard copper 
cable as an area of focus. Therefore, the type of statistics needed to 
effectively take countrywide proactive action against these cable thieves could 
not be supplied. It seemed that to enable successful prosecution only 
outsourced investigative service providers and/or internal parastatal 
investigators were able to supply accurate statistics with regard to criminals 
who steal copper. „In this type of crime (because it is not seen as a priority 
crime by the SAPS), we have the unique problem that SAPS only respond 
when we put pressure on them‟ (Bindeman, 2011:3). And this response could 
only be achieved either through a well-directed letter addressed to the highest 
level of the entity, or by the SAPS who inflate their crime statistics at station 
level to get the necessary attention.  
SARPA assisted the AMEU (Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings) 
initiative in writing a letter to the National Commissioner asking his assistance 
in this matter (Bindeman, 2011:3). Even thought the SAPS did provide 
support, it was brief and very superficial because the official they allocated to 
take action had little or no knowledge regarding the subject at hand. It takes 
time to train such an individual and then he/she is in all probability transferred; 
„We are currently in one of such "periods" where the new Head of Visible 
Policing is trying to find his feet, after the Head of Organized Crime was 
withdrawn from the initiative after only one year‟ (Bindeman, 2011:3).  
Business Against Crime put some pressure on the National Commissioner, at 
the request of all the role-players of the Non Ferrous Metal Theft Combating 
Committee (NFMTCC) (Bindeman, 2011:3). The Commissioner responded by 
sending out a letter to all the Visible Policing members in the country 
explaining their roles and responsibilities (see Annexure D). According to 
Bindeman (2011:3) it was necessary to once again put „their foot down and 
force some changes‟ to ensure stricter control measures, especially since they 
had already gone through many of these phases over the past few years with 
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issues such as; the implementation of the new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 
of 2009), the possible prosecution for economic sabotage, stricter export 
measures, and the process of getting the SAPS to re-categorise non–ferrous 
metals and to identify non-ferrous metal theft as a priority crime.  
2.4 COPPER CABLE THEFT STATISTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In recent years non-ferrous metal theft has become a serious problem in South 
Africa. And even though the number of incidents and the related costs 
decreased between 2001 and 2004, the occurrence of this type of crime 
increased sharply during the period 2005 to September 2008 (BACSA, 
2009a:1). Advocate Simi Pillay-van Graan, the National project manager of the 
Non Ferrous Metal Crime Combating Committee (NFMCCC) of Business 
Against Crime South Africa (BACSA), stated that this could be attributed to the 
dramatic increase in copper and aluminium prices as a result of the rapidly 
growing demand for these materials. In 2008 the estimated direct cost of 
copper cable theft in South Africa was already 500 million rand a year. But, the 
estimated indirect cost of copper cable theft to the economy was ten times 
higher than the expenditure required replacing these cables. (Pillay-van Graan, 
2008:1). The graph in Figure 2.1 shows the reported costs related to copper 
theft in South Africa from April 2009 to March 2011.   
 
 
Figure 2.1: Compilation of SA Copper theft related costs April 2009 – March 
2011. (Source: Money Web 2011) 
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According to Phakathi (2010a:1), the DA stated that since 2010, South Africa 
has lost about seven billion rand per year as a result of copper cable theft. 
Planting (2011:1) reports that copper cable theft costs the South African 
economy an estimated ten billion rand per year. He emphasises the fact that 
with our National growth limping along at 3% and the National debt set to 
balloon, this problem clearly cannot remain unresolved as it can implode and 
destroy the fragile economy. According to allafrica.com (2012:1), Eskom and 
Transnet have, since 2006, collectively lost 1.2 billion rand through copper 
cable theft. This fact is echoed by Telkom who indicated that the entity had lost 
1.9 billion rand just in repair and replacement costs, due to theft between 2006 
and 2011.   
This increasing concern, about the impact the cost of copper theft has on the 
economy, has prompted the South African Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (SACCI) to develop a barometer that will measure and monitor the 
extent of copper cable theft in the country on a monthly basis. Their objective is 
to create a general awareness of the problem and to engage public 
participation in combating this crime (SARPA, 2011:1). However, the SACCI 
Barometer only addresses the estimated „replacement‟ cost of copper cable 
stolen from the major users, such as Telkom, Eskom and Transnet (SARPA, 
2011:1). Since the SACCI copper theft barometer is the only valid and reliable 
source publicly publishing these damages, the researcher found it a very 
important tool with which to show tendencies and to give possible explanations 
regarding the copper cable theft phenomenon (see figure 2.2).  
The municipalities are possibly the worst affected entities according to Arendse 
(2011a:1). He agreed with the findings of the researcher who pointed out that 
the absence of a holistic status of copper cable theft showing a national copper 
cable theft barometer that incorporates the municipalities, presented a gap in 
understanding the copper threat fully.  
The accumulative copper cable theft losses of Telkom, Eskom and Transnet, 
are shown in Figure.2.2. These statistics are for the purpose of this research 
but should also be utilised to grasp the patterns and tendencies of the copper 
cable theft phenomenon.  
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According to SACCI (2011a:1), in 2010 alone the annual cost for its members 
was 259 million rand. And although these levels were unsustainable they 
would continue to drive up the costs for consumers and business even though 
both were already challenged by the increasing levels of administered prices. A 
consistent downward trend had not yet been achieved. But the breaching of 
the lower bound of 16 million rand a month in May 2011 had SACCI hoping for 
the possibility of reaching contained levels of theft.  
In August 2012 the Copper Theft Barometer (Figure 2.2) decreased from 19.7 
million rand in July 2012 and 17.9 million rand in June 2012, to a level of 17 
million rand. This was the lowest point the Barometer has been since 
September 2011 and a welcome indication of a downward trend in copper theft 
despite, the recent spikes in 2012; most notably the 34.7 million rand spike in 
March 2012. However, for the rest of 2012 the outlook for copper theft 
remained on a downward trend with the possibility of reaching the relative low 
of ten million rand per month (SACCI 2012:1). This `relative low` assumption is 
Figure 2.2: Accumulative Telkom, Eskom and Transnet copper cable theft losses 
between 2011/01 and 2012/08. (Source: SACCI Media Release Wednesday 27 September 2012) 
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a SACCI statement mainly for Telkom, Transnet and Eskom and should not be 
interpret as an acceptable appetite for risk in general.    
2.5 RECORDED COPPER CABLE LOSSES IN GAUTENG  
Eskom, Transnet and Telkom are the largest National Services infrastructures 
in South Africa utilizing and distributing electicity, making them the largest 
consumers of copper, especially in Gauteng, and, therefore, also constantly 
victims of copper cable theft. Their individual losses, as frequently published, 
illustrate the severity and the enormity of the financial impact of copper cable 
theft on these three essential service providers in South Africa.  
2.5.1 Eskom 
According to allafrica.com (2012:1), Eskom lost a total of 350.2 million rand as 
a result of copper related theft for the 2006/7 year, while Business Live 
(2011:1) reports a loss of 14.8 million rand in stolen materials, 38.7 million rand 
in replacement infrastructure and 18.2 million rand in security mitigation for 
2008/09 (up from 10.5 million rand, 21.5 million rand, and 14.5 million rand 
respectively for 2007/08).  
Ndlovu and Magwaza (2008:1) stated that according to Andrew Etzinger, an 
Eskom spokesperson in Durban, the copper cable theft was an ongoing 
problem for Eskom. In fact an increase had been noticed which was costing 
Eskom 25 million rand a year. He attributed the increase in this crime to the 
high price of copper and the depressed economic situation. Etzinger indicated 
they had seen a steady increase; from 446 incidents in 2005, 1 059 in 2007 
and 1 914 in 2008 and it was going to increase. Business Hi Light (2009:1) 
pointed out that for the period 2008-2009, the Eskom Southern Region (EC), 
claimed a 15% increase in cable theft.  
2.5.2 Transnet 
The theft of overhead cables on railway lines has reached unprecedented 
levels, resulting in an average of 10 trains being cancelled per day (TFR, 
2010:1). According to Morwe (TFR 2010:1), the acting CEO of Transnet (2010-
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2011), cable theft remained a chronic problem, as it still contributed about 70% 
of the incidents of theft and vandalism across its network. It experienced a total 
of 1 506 incidents of theft and vandalism in 2009/10, and was consistently 
losing more than 20km of copper cable to criminal syndicates each month 
(Creamer, 2010:1). Cable theft was one of the main reasons why South Africa 
could not export coal to its full capacity. This has had a serious impact on 
South Africa‟s ability to be competitive in the International arena (Dlamini, 
2010:1).  
According to allafrica.com (2012:1), Transnet‟s losses namely; copper loss, 
replacement costs and the cost of increased security measures, incurred for 
2006/7 and January 2012 amounted to 856.71 million rand. This included a 
sum of 80.9 million rand spent by Transnet on increased security costs in 
2011/12 alone. During 2008/09 Transnet suffered losses of 12 million rand in 
stolen materials, 30.1 million rand in replacement infrastructure and 116 million 
rand for security services, up from 8.9 million rand, 22.2 million rand and 91.9 
million rand for 2007/08.  
Arendse (2011a:1), frequently referred to in this research, has been identified 
as an experienced, recognised exponent of combatting copper theft. He is also 
a frequent and official presenter on the copper theft topic, representing Cape 
Town City. He stated that Transnet lost 150 million rand in the 2007/2008 
financial year. In 2010/11 Transnet Freight Rail spent 500 million rand on 
security - a sharp rise on the less than 250 million rand spent on security in 
2004/5. In the meanwhile the number of security guards that have been 
employed will rise to over 3 100 from a mere 1000 five years ago. The direct 
cost to the company – the replacement cost for cables only, is more than 42 
million rand per year and the consequential losses due to the knock-on effect, 
runs into many millions more. Cable theft also often leads to the destruction of 
Freight Rail assets such as locomotives and wagons and can cost the 
company millions of rand in repairs and replacement (TFR, 2010:1).  
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2.5.3 Telkom 
Motlatsi Nzeku, Chief Operating Officer of Telkom, highlighted the fact that the 
increase in copper cable theft was fast creating an environment of a rapidly 
deteriorating service quality. It was also severely affecting the delivery of 
sustainable information communication technology services to customers (Le 
Roux, 2008:1).  
Business Live (2011:1) reported Peggy Drodski of SACCI, stating that in 
2007/2008 Telkom spent 141 million rand on new telecommunications 
infrastructure and 231 million rand on security. Its copper losses drastically 
increased between 2007 and 2009. The situation was as follows for 2007: 571 
million rand; for 2008: 863 million rand; and for 2009: 907 million rand. Arendse 
(2011a:1) reiterated these Telkom findings for the same financial period, 
showing a similar loss, yet still a massive 856 million rand as a result of copper 
cable theft. Vecchiatto (2009:1), reported that Telkom had been hit the hardest 
of all the Parastatals, with a 2008/9 loss of 1,279 billion rand. According to 
Jones (2010b:1), Telkom did not even replace copper cable anymore but 
rather installed wireless and optic fibre connections where possible. And even 
then a 100 million rand worth of damage/theft was reported on the „new‟ Fibre 
Optic infrastructure in the period 2007-2009. It is even rationalised that fibre 
optic can cause a much greater impact when damaged, and the same 
mitigation measurements as used for copper, will still have to be implemented 
(Jones, 2010b:1).  
The Minister of Communications, Siphiwe Nyanda, stated in parliament that in 
the period 2007-2009 Telkom suffered almost 3 billion rand in losses because 
of cable theft. These losses were comprised of the value of the stolen material, 
the cost of security to guard against theft, and the loss of revenue as a result of 
the „non-existence‟ of phone lines (Hamlyn, 2009:1). This report is supported 
by numbers released by Telkom (allafrica.com, 2012:1), which indicated that 
Telkom lost 1.9 billion rand in repair and replacement costs alone due to theft 
between 2006 and 2011, for 2010/11 alone this amount is 382.72 million rand. 
Telkom released the following figures regarding the annual cost of copper 
cable theft.:   
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 2006-07: R340 million.  
 2007-08: R332 million. 
 2008-09: R422.35 million. 
 2009-10: R424.39 million. 
 2010-11: R382.72 million 
The information released also shows that in the 2008/9 year alone, outbound 
revenue losses amounted to 906.8 million rand. (Politicsweb, 2012:1) 
Communications Minister Dina Pule, stated that due to copper cable theft 
Telkom had lost nearly two billion rand in the four years (2007 – 2011). As an 
aftermath she also stated that based on the extent of the „out of control‟ cable 
theft the losses could actually not be accurately determined (Business day 
2012:1).    
2.5.4 The Gautrain and City Power 
It took the theft of a mere 100m of copper cable, at a substation, to put 
Gautrain‟s Pretoria line out of action, disrupting the Gautrain service between 
Hatfield and Centurion the 10th of Aug 2011. An emergency bus service had to 
be implement between Hatfield, Centurion and Pretoria (ITWEB, 2011:1)., The 
Gautrain spokesman Errol Braithwaite, pointed out the fact that this small 
amount of cable that had been stolen had massive repercussion such as; the 
unforeseen costs involved for the Gautrain, and also for every company which 
had lost production time because employees arrived late and product 
shipments had been delayed (Planting, 2011:1). 
Even though the theft of cable is always a negative event, there is some „good 
news‟ embedded in the Gautrain theft incident. „The surge of attention that has 
been generated by the fact that the Gautrain‟s cables were stolen twice in two 
weeks is like “manna falling from heaven”‟ (Bindeman, 2011:4).  
City Power, the Johannesburg power supplier, claims only 8% of power 
outages are caused by equipment failure, while 37% are caused by theft and 
vandalism and 14% are due to third party damage to equipment. If this aspect 
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is interpreted correctly, it means that copper cable theft causes eight times 
more power outages than general maintenance related outages (Tau, 2011:1).    
2.6 PRICE OF COPPER AND ITS ROLE IN COPPER CABLE THEFT 
2.6.1 Copper cable theft and copper price relationship 
Peggy Drodskie, executive advisor to the South African Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, indicated that there seems to be a definite link 
between the international price of copper and copper theft (Arendse, 2011a:1). 
John Cross, chairman of the Copper Producers‟ Association, stated; „The 
consistently high price of copper makes it a valuable commodity for illicit 
business, and what drives the price up is massive demand from China and 
India, whose urbanizing economies are voracious consumers of copper‟ 
(Planting 2011:1). According to Leedy (2011:1), South Africa had no choice but 
to confront the problem, a worldwide one, head on. Geldenhuys (2010:1), 
elaborated on this point, stating that massive increases in cable theft in the 
past year were mostly due to the fact that the price of copper had tripled in 
recent years.  
It is, therefore, logic to conclude that copper theft can be attributed to the 
dramatic increase in the copper and aluminium prices as a result of the 
International growth in demand for these materials (BACSA, 2009b:6). This 
viewpoint is shared by SACCI who states that the variation in the International 
price is directly linked to the theft activity of copper (Bartlett, 2011:1). Theo 
Hess, Telkom‟s head of network field services, stated they have noticed that 
the number of cable theft incidents closely follows the price curve of copper on 
the London Metal Exchange (My Broadband, 2012b:1). Research conducted 
by ISS (Institute for Security Studies) confirms that until recently, the use of 
non-ferrous metals in exterior applications carried little threat with it, but as its 
value has increased, so has the rate of theft. (Hi-Tech Security Solutions, 
2009:1) 
In the following graph (figure 2.3), the growth in copper prices is depicted over 
the last 10 years. 
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Fig 2.3. The 10 year trend of copper prices (Source: “iShares Copper Trust” FORM S-
1/A for the period 2001 up to 2010) 
 
2.6.2 Future copper price predictions 
Jones (2010b:1) stated that while the global recession continued the value and 
the shortage of copper would remain the same for the next few years. Before 
2007, the copper price was reasonably low. In 2008 the price sky rocketed to 
$8685 per metric ton thus boosting the black market value. In 2009 the price of 
copper nearly doubled, thereafter the increase remained steady. Jones also 
indicated that global analysts predicted a shortage of copper in the immediate 
future, while Rio Tinto, the world‟s major copper producer, stated that there 
was little investment in opening new copper mines except the one in Mongolia, 
which would only be built in 2013. Arendse (2011a:1) also mentioned that up to 
five new cities, the size of London, would be built in China in the near future. 
Xstrata Copper predicted that the demand for copper would rise by 3.1% in 
2012, boosted by China‟s continued investment in housing and infrastructure 
that would drive up the demand. This was regarded significant, since China‟s 
demand constituted 40% of the global demand (SAPA, 2012:1).  
According to SACCI (2012:1), the international price of copper increased from 
the $7 509 average in August, to an estimated average of $8 076 per metric 
ton in September 2012. This change could be attributed to a slightly more 
39 
positive economic outlook following negotiations for financial stability in the 
Euro zone. 
2.6.3. Future copper theft predictions based on copper prices 
According to Engineering News (2012:1), because of the high uncertainty 
levels in the global economy, copper showed a sharp price contraction in the 
second half of 2011 Then from October 2011, the copper price fell on a 
monthly basis and only started regaining a positive monthly growth in January 
2012. In general the industry body utilising copper added that a continuation of 
this copper price trend, coupled with the expected resurgence in global 
economic, could put the copper price past $9 000/t, which would have a far 
reaching impact on the replacement cost of stolen copper. This could hold the 
risk of elevating the cost levels of copper in South Africa, in general, and 
particularly that of copper cables (Engineering News, 2012:1).    
According to Business Live (2011:1), SACCI predicted that based on the 
chamber‟s copper theft barometer, copper theft was expected to increase 
because, in April 2011 alone, industries had spent on average over 20 million 
rand replacing stolen cables. SACCI (2011c:1) also pointed out that according 
to recent market reports the copper price was recovering. But the magnitude 
and the pace of this recovery would determine higher levels of theft. SACCI 
reported that copper theft in 2012 was expected to rise due to the increase in 
International demand, which would automatically push local prices up (SAPA, 
2012:1). 
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2.7 ANALYSIS OF COPPER THEFT V/S COPPER PRICE PATTERNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the data analysis recorded in fig, 2.3 it is clear that copper cable theft is 
increasing annually. When fig. 2.4 and fig. 2.5 are compared a definite 
tendency is noted between copper theft and copper price fluctuations - the 
higher the price of copper, the more copper theft is experienced. However, 
according to SACCI (2012:1), in November 2011, an increase in copper theft 
was reported despite a 6 months slump of low prices in the international 
market. This observation proved that criminal activities and opportunism, 
Figure 2.4 20 Months Copper theft losses as recorded by SACCI (Source: 
SACCI Media Release Wednesday 27 September 2012) 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Copper prices on the 
London Metal Exchange.  
(Source:http://www.metalprices.com 
/pubcharts/Public/Copper_Price_Charts.asp) 
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involving copper theft, did not necessarily follow the specific hikes in the price 
levels of copper. It should thus be noted that even though the value of specific 
copper losses may decrease because of a fall in the general copper price, the 
volume of copper theft cases may still increase, with the potential of an 
increase in consequential damages brought around by copper cable theft, as 
copper thieves try to make up the losses they may experience,.  
2.8 THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXPORT MARKET ON COPPER THEFT 
2.8.1 The export status 
There are many opinions about the export of copper from South African shores 
and its influence on copper theft. Some of the questions being asked are:  
a. Is copper export a major role player in creating an opportunity for copper 
thieves to make easy money?  
b. Does the export market have a direct influence on copper stolen in 
South Africa and especially in Gauteng?  
c. Will control of the export process have any real impact on copper theft 
inside the boundaries of South Africa?   
According to SACCI (SAPA 2011a:1) exporting copper was not illegal, 
however, exporting stolen copper was. SACCI also noted that weak export 
control measures and the weak container inspection measures were factors 
that contributed to the difficulty in combating non-ferrous metal theft; a problem 
South Africa has in common with the US and Canada. (SAPA, 2011b:1).South 
Africa is not a large producer of copper, but it is a huge exporter of copper 
waste. It contributes 2.1% of the international market share (SACCI 2012:1).  
According to Theo Hesse, Telkom‟s head of network field services, copper 
usually leaves our shores from Cape Town and Durban and goes to the East. 
Hundreds of tons of scrap metal, including stolen copper cables and pipes, are 
shipped out of Durban harbour to Eastern countries, where there is a 
substantial demand (My Broadband, 2012b:1). According to a Durban scrap 
dealer, (Singh & Omar 2011:1), he earned about R60 to R70 per kilogram of 
copper sold on the International market, while he paid locals R40 to R50 per a 
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kilogram. Some dealers exported about 15 containers per month, each 
weighing 25 tons. The SAPS indicated that in two separate incidents police 
recovered, in Isipingo, one and a half tons of stolen cable at a scrap dealer, 
and at the harbour in Durban they recovered two containers with cables 
belonging to Telkom and to Eskom that were destined for the export market.. 
Police are still investigating the origins of the two containers they found in 
Durban. (Singh & Omar 2011:1). 
2.9 COMPARISON BETWEEN COPPER THEFT AND EXPORT FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show that even though a general increase is noted in the 
export of copper scrap, it does not immediately follow the same sharp trends 
as seen in the movement of copper prices, it shows a much flatter curve with a 
subdued wave-like movement. What can be deducted from this pattern is that 
most of stolen copper is not exported, and if it is exported then it happens over 
a longer period of time, long after the crime had occurred. Figure 2.6 
graphically illustrates the values and the volumes of copper waste and scrap 
Figure 2.7. Copper Prices compared for same period as Figure 2.3. (Source: Copper 
price at the London Metal Exchange). 
Figure 2.6. SA exports of copper waste and scrap from Jan 2009 to Sept 2011. 
(Source: SACCI October 2011 copper theft barometer, SA DTI Trade Statistics) 
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exports from South Africa. Figure 2.7 illustrates the International copper price 
in comparison to copper theft tendencies. 
 2.10 EXPORT REGULATING INITIATIVES  
DA, MP, Pieter van Dalen emphasised just how critical it had become to take 
note of the export side of copper, especially when there was possibly far more 
illegal copper leaving the country than realised because there was only one 
operational container scanner at Durban harbour. He suggested that a possible 
solution would be to place a moratorium on the export of scrap copper or 
alternatively to propose a 40% duty on copper exports. (Leedy, 2011:1)    
„Export is a key focus area,‟ according to advocate Simi Pillay-van Graan, 
BAC‟s Strategic Executive. She explained that the unregulated export of scrap 
metal was one of the biggest contributing factors to organised crime. South 
Africa exported about 350 000 tons of copper scrap each month and criminal 
activity are hidden with ease. (Leedy, 2011:1) She also mentioned the 
following three export strategy points that should be taken into consideration: 
1. The implementation of export taxes on scrap metals across the board,  
2. Amending the International Trade Administration Act to tighten up 
export/import controls, and 
3. Criminalising the export of stolen copper. 
The South Africa‟s International Trade and Administration Act does not allow 
for the policing of these processes. Thus syndicated criminal activity has an 
open door opportunity for stolen goods and non-ferrous metals leave the 
country without interference. And unfortunately, law enforcement agencies and 
International trade administration authorities do not have the resources to 
check every container that leaves South Africa (Webb, 2011:1). 
Business Against Crime South Africa is the major driver attempting to control 
the export market. (BACSA 2009b:4-5) stated their specific goal was to 
improve the Criminal Justice System (2009b:1-m) and not to only act as a 
deterrent to crime but also to close down the market for non-ferrous metal 
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theft. They have proposed two objectives, which in a way have become the 
backbone of the formal sectors‟ approach to copper theft: 
1. The first is to design a strategy to effectively deal, not only with 
subsistence thieves, but also to detect and to prevent organised 
crime, both locally and across South African borders. 
2. The second strategy is to seek and to address the market for stolen 
ferrous metal through the export market and the associated export 
control processes. 
Van Dalen (2009:1), also personally involved in physical activities in combating 
copper cable theft, suggested that to mitigate the exportation of stolen copper 
the following counter actions should be implemented:  
1. The institution of an export duty on non-ferrous metals. The funds 
generated from this export duty could be channelled into a fund from 
which businesses could claim against for the losses incurred as a 
result of non-ferrous metal theft. For example, if a business suffered a 
loss of 1 million rand during the course of one financial year, it should 
be able to submit a claim to the export duty fund to recover either the 
full amount or a portion thereof.  
2. Greater export controls for non-ferrous metals. Currently, customs 
inspection for non-ferrous metals was outsourced to private 
businesses, which were not required, in terms of their contracts, to 
inspect each and every container containing non-ferrous metals. As a 
result it could be expected that stolen non-ferrous metals were leaving 
ZA ports bypassing the required checks.  
3. All contracts for private businesses performing customs duties must 
include the obligation for each and every container to be thoroughly 
inspected. Failure to inspect every container must carry some form of 
sanction, either in terms of the dereliction of duty or the failure to 
comply with legislation.  
SARS, DTI, Customs and Excise all have pertinent roles to play in regulating 
this export supply chain.  
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2.11 THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXPORT MARKET ON COPPER THEFT  
Pillay-van Graan (in Webb, 2011:1) was positive about the planned export and 
import processes and believed these would probably have the highest impact 
on curbing non-ferrous theft. She reiterated that the International demand for 
copper, particularly from developing economies like India and China, as well as 
Saudi Arabia, were driving organised syndicated crime in South Africa and 
increasing the level of incidents of theft.  
The involvement of organised groups and syndicates as well as the absence of 
appropriate regulations that controlled the processing, sale, import and export 
of non-ferrous metals, were important issues to be looked at. However, SACCI 
(2011b:1) followed up this concern by stating that the local recycling industry 
primarily remained the market for stolen non-ferrous metals. Approximately 
75% of all scrap metal generated in South Africa was handled by the formal 
sector and the remainder by a large number of informal businesses. The 
estimated turnover of the recycling industry was currently estimated to be in 
excess of 15 billion rand per annum. SACCI hoped that the new Second-Hand 
Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) would plug the gaps used by the recycling industry 
as the export market was a major creator for copper cable theft opportunities.  
Advocate Pillay-van Graan from BACSA stated that in order to control the 
export market: „The copper export market deserves much more attention 
should the NFTCC wish to combat nonferrous-metal theft more effectively. The 
export market and the associated processes have not been a focus of the 
NFTCC, resulting in an attempt to treat the symptoms of the crime, and a 
failure to address the core of the problem. This is clear in the escalating 
numbers of incidents in recent years. If the number of thefts is to be reduced, 
the market into which the stolen cable is disposed must be addressed, and 
more effective response mechanisms from both government and business 
need to be put in place‟ (Venter, 2008:1).  
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2.12 PROMINENT ROLE PLAYERS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST COPPER 
THEFT 
After achieving qualified success in combating copper theft Neil Arendse 
(2011a:1), for many years the Head of Cape Town‟s Metal Thefts Unit, , 
mentioned that the following role players needed to form a collaborative front 
because even though they were all actively involved in combating copper theft 
crimes, they still worked in uncoordinated silos; 
1. NFMCCC/NFTCC: With the increase in Public/Private partnerships 
this sector benefited through the establishment of the Non-Ferrous 
Theft Combating Committee (NFTCC), today it is known as the Non-
Ferrous Metals Crime Combating Committee (NFMCCC). This 
committee involves all relevant stakeholders. Although previously 
chaired by the private sector, in 2008, the then deputy minister for 
Safety and Security decided that the SAPS should take over the 
chairmanship of the NFTCC. The SAPS or Government 
representative; a high ranking (brigadier or higher) police official now 
had to chair the NFMCCC. The idea behind the NFMCCC is to 
involve all stakeholders in a concerted effort to stamp out metal theft 
(specifically copper and aluminium) by focusing on the markets both 
internally and externally. Although this could/should be a vital 
strategy in the fight against copper theft, it is according to Arendse 
(2011b:1) „disheartening that the SAPS only recently, after many 
years, issued a national directive on the structure of the NFMCCC.‟ 
The SAPS directive (See Annexure D) seeks to explain the structure 
and mandate of the Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating 
Committee. It is also against this backdrop that this research will 
seek to understand the level of collaboration amongst agencies 
fighting copper theft. According to Arendse (2011a:1), „the success 
of the NFMCCC is thus still undecided‟. 
2. South African Police Service (SAPS): It is the mandated 
responsibility of the SAPS to lead the fight against copper theft and 
thus they also preside over the NFMCCC. (See Annexure D for the 
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formal directive explaining the SAPS role and structure to combat 
copper theft). 
3. Parastatals:  They are those most severely affected by copper cable 
theft in their electrical, telecommunication and electrified rail track 
infrastructure. Parastatals referred to in this research are Telkom, 
Transnet, PRASA and Eskom and they are better known as the 
„stakeholders‟ in this research.   
4. National Prosecuting Authority (NPA): The role/purpose of the NPA 
in this industry is to ensure successful prosecution of cases involving 
the theft of copper. In this capacity they would also have an advisory 
role and thus ensure that combating copper theft should be partly a 
prosecution-led approach. 
5. South African Revenue Service (SARS): SARS has the mandate to 
conduct life style audits, since it is clear that syndicates are involved 
in this type of crime. Together with asset forfeiture, this is a crucial 
part of investigating this industry. 
6. Municipalities (service providers): As a Service Provider, 
municipalities are facing crippling onslaughts on electrical 
infrastructure and have a clear vested interest in the fight against 
copper theft.  
7. Business: Currently Business Against Crime (BAC) and the 
Chambers of Commerce, provide avenues for discussion and co-
ordination. Their roles are crucial in creating momentum where 
needed. They should be the forums, under which industries and 
service providers should mobilise; alternatively the businesses 
affected could create their own platform.   
8. The Second Hand Goods Industry: whether knowingly or 
unknowingly, they create the market for stolen goods to be filtered 
through..  
9. Research Institutions: Since copper theft is a global phenomenon, it 
stands to reason that the global industry is coming up with better 
practices and new benchmarks on a daily basis. These should be 
researched and incorporated to create a knowledge base for all role 
players.  
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10.  Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU): In conjunction with the NPA, SAPS and 
SARS the AFU could initiate the forfeiting of the assets of culprits 
involved in this illegal trade. It stands to reason that the more 
criminal „high flyers‟ start forfeiting their assets, the clearer the 
message will be sent out that criminal activity will cost perpetrators 
dearly. 
11.  SARPA (South African Revenue Protection Association): SARPA is 
a late participant in this research, which was discovered at a copper 
workshop where the researcher and SARPA jointly were requested 
to moderate a National copper theft workshop. The reasons for 
SARPA being an unknown and late entrant, is also indicative of how 
isolated Gauteng copper theft victims have become. SARPA is 
primarily focused on supporting ailing municipalities through a 
revenue recovery strategy, of which copper theft related losses form 
an integrative part. SARPA has focused on training the personnel in 
the Criminal Justice system and especially police officers within the 
copper theft environment. SARPA claims to have been instrumental 
in many successes in combating copper theft in the other provinces, 
especially in the Western and the Eastern Cape.  
2.13 AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON COPPER THEFT  
It is important to compare the South African copper theft occurrences with 
international occurrences just to place the South African losses in perspective. 
Maj-Gen Shadrack Sibiya, the South African Police Service Deputy Provincial 
Commissioner in Gauteng, reported that in 2011 there were 72 533 reported 
incidents of copper cable theft, but only 10 736 arrests were made (Phakathi, 
2012:1). If the abovementioned South African figures are to be compared with 
the copper theft incidents in the USA, the largest economy in world, it does not 
make for good reading from a South African perspective. The state of Ohio 
was declared by the „National Insurance Crime Bureau‟ as the number one in 
the USA for copper theft. During the period 2009 to 2011 there were 2 398 
reports of metal theft in Ohio, Texas came in second with 2 023 thefts, followed 
by Georgia with 1481 (NBC4, 2012:1).  
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These statistics highlight the seriousness of the South African copper theft 
situation when you realise that over a period of three years only 2 398 
incidents, involving all types of copper theft, were reported in the worst affected 
state of the United States of America, while in Gauteng 72 533 cases of copper 
cable theft were reported during the year 2011 - a period of one year.     
2.14 MODUS OPERANDI OF COPPER THIEVES   
2.14.1 Types of thieves 
According Natasha Michael, DA Public Enterprises spokesman, copper theft 
continued to be a highly co-ordinated professional crime against which our 
public enterprises were failing to mount an effective defense (allafrica.com, 
2012:1).  
Torkelson (2010:1), a researcher of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
Organized Crime and Money-laundering Programme, who produced the only 
specific copper theft related publication this research found and frequently 
referred to in this section, stated that petty crime criminals comprised the first 
group benefiting from copper cable theft. She further stated that petty crime 
criminals were often already involved in collecting scrap metal for subsistence 
purposes. Geldenhuys (2010:1) confirmed that copper thieves‟ fell into two 
groups: organised crime syndicates, who tended to export their loot; and 
subsistence thieves who stole a couple of metres of cable at a time.  
This second group, as mentioned by Torkelson (2010:1) and Geldenhuys 
(2010:1), were the scrap metal dealers. Not all scrap metal dealers were 
involved in crime. Their work was deemed necessary and it was legal. 
However, the illegal trade was far more lucrative than the legal trade and 
consequently the opportunities were for most too attractive to say no. 
According to Torkelson (2010:1), scrap collectors were often tempted to 
supplement their earnings by stealing a few meters of copper cable from 
sources close to home. Therefore, scrap metal merchants were more often 
than not, the central figures connecting and/or servicing petty and organised 
thieves alike, as they sold most of their copper to their local scrap dealers who 
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had connections with foreign export agents, primarily of Chinese and Pakistani 
origin. These tough, certified, scrap dealers were not meant to buy copper from 
such questionable sources, but for many the financial incentive was high 
enough to look the other way.  
Fortunately, after analysts had called for better regulation of the second hand 
goods industry, a new law was passed to address these issues. However, 
disreputable scrap dealers always found innovative ways of dodging 
legislation. Some of these innovative ways were; sponsoring 'mobile scrap 
yards; buying illicit copper from traveling vehicles; establishing smelters at peri-
urban farms; changing the appearance of illicit copper, and opening 
unregulated bucket shops to 'clean' the copper before supplying licensed 
agents (Torkelson, 2010:1) 
A third group was also identified. This group consisted of organised crime 
networks. These syndicate type of criminal groupings were implicated in the 
theft of kilometers of cable from peri-urban or rural areas in Gauteng, the North 
West and KwaZulu-Natal. In this group foreign or International organised crime 
elements such as; the Chinese Triads and other Asian groups, were 
mentioned. These foreign groups were so arrogant that they bypassed local 
scrap agents altogether in response to the increased scrutiny. One Pakistani 
syndicate, with an address in Hillbrow, was using shipping containers in 
deserted areas as drop-off points for stolen copper. These containers were 
then driven to Durban and shipped abroad with falsified customs paperwork 
(Torkelson, 2010:1).  
A fourth group, possibly also benefitting from copper cable theft was the private 
security industry. This was by implication and mostly in an indirect way. They 
were reluctant to help combat copper theft for reasons of job security. And 
even though some had been awarded large contracts to help combat this crime 
and to protect state assets there was very little evidence of this attempt having 
been successful. (Torkelson, 2010:1).  
In supporting the Torkelson research, Peggy Drodskie (Business Live, 2011:1) 
Executive Advisor to the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
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states; „Copper theft seems to be driven by syndicates‟. Arendse (2011b:1) 
supported her viewpoint by using the example mentioned by the City Power 
CEO; that most of the entities stealing from City Power, had to be linked in 
some way or another to several syndicates in the Gauteng area.  
Bindeman (2011:2) mentioned that syndicates could consist of any amount of 
members (mostly around 20 and more members). It also had to be 
remembered that one could never say a syndicate had been caught and then 
expect the crime to stop: „First of all, in at least 90% of the cases we will only 
catch the runners, cutters or transporters. In the few cases where we do 
manage to catch the big fish, they would either force one of the minor 
members to take all the blame on themselves, or with their lawyers‟ help, be 
back on the street the following day and operate again the very next night‟. He 
used as an example the Langa syndicate who were still very active even 
though they had been harassed by Western Cape investigators for 11 years. 
Some of them had received up to 3 years imprisonment, but were back on the 
streets all too soon again after having being released for good behaviour.  
According to Le Roux (2007:1), Telkom spokesman „Mvelase‟ said that based 
on Telkom‟s experience most of the repeat offenders were illegal immigrants 
who, when caught, were deported to their countries of origin, only to return 
(almost immediately) to South Africa to commit the same crime again. These 
illegal immigrants mostly fell in the subsistence group, but some of them were 
military personnel using their special traits. 
2.14.2 Natural opportunities utilised by copper thieves.     
According to Yorke-Smith (2010:1), „natural‟ opportunities were created mostly 
by the remoteness of the targets where repair-work was in progress and the 
technicians and workers were unprotected. Many remote sites were also 
difficult to secure as they comprised of areas that were often without power or 
communication lines. These areas were ideal targets for stealing copper items 
found in the plumbing, wiring, generators, materials, air conditioners, cables, 
copper grounding bars, sprinkler systems and cooling systems. In fact for the 
resourceful copper theft criminal the opportunities were never ending.  
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These „remote‟ sites included, for example; construction sites, vacant buildings, 
communications towers, electrical sub-stations and foreclosed properties 
(Yorke-Smith, 2010:1). Hi-Tech-Solutions (2009:1) supported the remoteness 
factor which thieves took full advantage of. Isolated sites were even more 
vulnerable when these did not have access to electricity or a means of 
communication, such as; a fixed line or a radio transmitter to transmit alarm 
signals. The uncertainty of the country‟s power supply exacerbated the 
problem by often rendering CCTV (closed circuit television) systems 
inoperable.  
2.14.3 Modus operandi of copper cable thieves.  
Venter (2008:1), one of the most regular reporters on the copper theft 
phenomenon, reported that the typical small-time copper thief was a 
subsistence criminal who was financially underprivileged. The despondent 
disposition of these subsistence entities were capitalised on by the organised 
crime elements that employed them to steal. They were, however, in the 
minority as gangs were responsible for most of the copper cable theft while in 
the scrap trade large cartels were at work. Copper was the metal of choice 
among metal thieves, followed by steel, brass water meters as well as palisade 
fencing. 
In many high-theft or hotspot areas, the same copper cables were repeatedly 
stolen, sometimes within days of having been replaced or repaired. This 
implied that local repeat offenders were involved. They knew precisely what 
the weaknesses and the strengths of security were, and what their calculated 
chances were of being caught (Le Roux, 2008:1). 
Copper thieves generally worked at night. Organised criminals were armed 
with trucks, pulleys, industrial cutting tools and tractors, to flatten the pylons 
and poles to get hold of the metal. These syndicates were highly sophisticated. 
They used state of the art equipment and also „employed‟ both internal and 
external specialists for their own safety and security. They stole and sold in 
bulk. The personal risks for inexperienced thieves were very high. Thus it was 
under great stress that they stripped and sold the cables. Whereas subsistence 
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thieves were the small and on foot criminals who claimed they stole for survival 
and their tools of trade were rudimentary at best (Geldenhuys, 2008:1).  
In the Western Cape it was found that perpetrators, who had been arrested, 
were in 75% of the incidents, under the influence of drugs when committing 
cable theft. Many of the thieves, who were indeed substance dependents, had 
been hired by the syndicates to steal copper cables. They stole from „fix to fix‟. 
During a research conducted to determine why these criminals were so 
effective in what they did, it was found that their strong points were; their great 
teamwork and their information-sharing network. Every day the thieves 
became more brazen and the safety of the communities was more at risk. 
Many people were killed because of the unsafe conditions created by people 
who did not care about their fellow human beings. Law enforcement officers 
had to risk their lives on a daily basis trying to prevent these dangerous 
situations and bring the criminals to book (Van Dalen 2009:1). 
The South African Actuality Television Programme, Carte Blanch (2005) 
reported that cable thieves gathered information and determined hotspots. 
They usually focussed on specific cables in specific areas derived from the 
experience they had gained over years. Every scenario was different, but the 
way in which the thieves cut the cables stayed the same. Their tools were quite 
rudimentary, but incredibly effective. For overhead cables they used a hacksaw 
or bolt cutter attached to a specific length of pole with rubber tubing, and then 
with a rope and tube rubber they controlled the leverage.  
In a transcribed investigative programme presented by Carte Blanche (2005) 
as part of a sting; they spoke to captured thieves who revealed interesting 
information about their Modes Operandi. They operated mostly at night, and 
therefore night-sight was important. Infra red was used, but thermal imaging 
was being utilised more and more by law enforcement. Cable thieves preferred 
remote areas as they knew here cable alarms might not have been attached; 
they worked with military style precision. There was always a night watch 
positioned to sound the alarm in case of a possible ambush or patrols. Thieves 
even regarded the theft of copper as their job. A single team member earned, if 
lucky, only about R500 for a good night‟s „work‟. They usually did not „work‟ 
54 
when it rained as there was always the risk of being captured and/or 
electrocuted. 
The stolen material was sold to scrap dealers, from there it was recycled back 
into the industry, and it landed back in the manufacturing industry at the end of 
the day. Scrap dealers were prepared to turn a blind eye, because cable 
thieves changed the configuration of the stolen copper so that it was not easily 
identifiable, yet it could still be transformed into marketable scrap (Carte 
Blanch, 2005). The easiest and most used manner was stripping and/or 
burning the cables in a furnace. The new Second-Hands Goods Act no 6 of 
2009, however, prohibited trading in burnt copper. 
Venter (2008:1) stated that it was quite possible to replace the stolen cable the 
one day, only for it to be stolen the next day. So instead of doing the much 
needed maintenance the personnel were running around replacing cables, 
while large parts of a city were without power until such cables had been 
replaced. Van Dalen (2009:1), a city councillor, spoke of many of the strange 
incidents he had come across during the first year the „Copper Heads‟ (The 
Cape Town specialist Non-ferrous Metal Theft Unit) were operational. One was 
the arrest of a contractor, also a well-known pastor, for the alleged theft of 
copper cable. Another involved a persistent 16-year old, who the „Copper 
Heads‟ had arrested three times. The first time he was nabbed he had been 
tracked down in intensive care where he spent two months after being shocked 
while trying to steal copper cables. Since then he had received so many 
shocks that his hands were completely disfigured (Van Dalen, 2009:1).  
Venter (2008:1), reported that stolen copper could sell on the street or at a 
scrap dealer for between R40 and R60 per kilogram, depending on the copper 
price. It was quick and easy cash.  
The copper cables targeted the most were those used for street lighting. 
Thieves came at the night and at first dug a pilot hole to determine the depth of 
the cable and the direction in which it ran. The next night they would return to 
dig up the cable. This proved that cable thieves did not only do reconnaissance 
they even did dry runs before the actual action. The stolen cable was typically 
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dragged into the bushes, where it was stripped for the copper inside (Venter 
2008:1).  
In their report on non-ferrous metal theft Ndlovu and Magwaza (2008:1), stated 
that thieves even removed mounting bolts on an electricity pylon, plunging 
businesses and thousands of homes into darkness. According to them the 
eThekwini Electricity Head, Sandile Maphumulo, said the copper cable theft 
hot spots were no longer confined to certain areas as theft occurred where 
ever the opportunity presented itself. 
Vecchiatto (2009:1) found that the use of fibre optic cable in Communication, 
seemed to have a positive effect in that the thieves dug it up and then left it 
behind. However, it was stated that damage to the fibre optic cable could have 
much greater implications as it carried much more „signal‟ capacity than 
copper. The rumour persisted that the Kevlar housing of Fibre Optics was 
taken by thieves for its body armour potential. Where copper cable mitigation 
had been successful, it also had a direct positive impact on fibre optic cables.  
Jones (2010a:1) stated that copper thieves were blatantly processing copper 
cables in plain sight. Thieves would strip the copper of its insulation and roll it 
up, despite patrols in the near area.  
Phakathi (2010b:1) stated that the Mpumalanga Department of Health saw two 
of their paramedics hide stolen copper cables to the value of R57 000, in their 
ambulance. They met the cable thieves near a mine and loaded the copper, 
after transporting it under siren. A tip-off had the police pull them over. This 
was indicative of all the different avenues copper thieves utilised. He also 
mentioned that in Mpumalanga, two Mozambican men had been confronted by 
members of a local village when carrying bags with copper cable. The villagers 
severely assaulted them until the police intervened.  
2.14.4 Modus operandi and role of the scrap metal vendors. 
A Member of Parliament, Mr Pieter van Dalen, the DA Shadow Minister of 
Public Enterprises, stated that in the Western Cape alone, there were 3500 
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„bucket shops‟ (informal subsistence scrap metal dealers, and nomadic 
pavement dealers), where people literally slept on the copper. From these 
bucket shops or the scrap dealers, the copper – by this time untraceable – 
went to one of the big five scrap dealers, from where it was exported to the 
East. Ironically he mentioned that even though there was not a single copper 
mine in the Cape, Cape Town had exported copper waste to the value of R77 
million rand in 2007 and; „You don‟t have to be a genius to figure out where this 
comes from‟ (Venter 2008:1).  
Richardson (2011:1) suggested that even though copper did not fetch the 
same prices as gold it was still considered a valuable metal and therefore its 
sale and resale should be regulated. He explained that if scrap dealers were 
forced to register as legal dealers, opportunists would not find cable theft so 
lucrative and they would less likely be role players in the disruption of major 
services. It was evident that copper theft remained one of the most serious 
challenges facing economic growth and development in South Africa. And yet 
in most instances it was still regarded, even wrongly so, as a crime of petty 
theft. He firmly believed there was a definite need for the implementation of a 
control paradigm for scrap metal vendors and markets.  
The South African actuality television programme Carte Blanche recorded an 
incident in which police had arrested a major scrap merchant as well as a 
number of municipal employees, in connection with stealing several thousand 
rand worth of council cables and drain covers. The irony was that this specific 
scrap merchant had attended the summit where Mayor Helen Zille was 
appealing to the industry to get rid of dealers trading in stolen metals.  
Van Dalen (2009:1) stated that after thieves had removed all identifying marks 
on copper, the copper was sold to a scrap dealer, or a so-called bucket shop; 
an unregistered scrap dealer specialising in stolen metal creating a criminal 
economy for perpetrators, usually operating within a residential area. It was 
clear that the key to any non-ferrous metal theft solution would be to 
incorporate the entire scrap metal industry; from the registered scrap metal 
vendors down to the small bucket shops as, they all bought the metal and kept 
the thieves in business (Witbooi, 2007:1).  
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2.14.5 Modus operandi of the copper syndicates/organised Crime.  
Drodskie of SACCI stated; „Scrap metal dealers actively participate in 
syndicates that steal copper‟ (Business Live, 2011:1)  
According to Pillay van Graan (Venter, 2008:1), before any renewed effort to 
combat non-ferrous metal theft was attempted, it was essential to understand 
that copper theft had also become a favourite among crime syndicates and that 
it had to be treated as a planned, well executed and organised crime. 
Drodskie from SACCI stated that Telkom, Eskom and Transnet were the 
targets of an organised network of copper thieves who stole around 16 million 
rand worth of copper a month with dire consequences to the larger economy 
(Business Live, 2011:1).  
Arendse (2011b:1) said that within organised crime in South Africa, copper had 
been earmarked as a commodity, which even served as a money laundering 
product. The legitimisation of stolen copper began with the mixing of stolen and 
„honest‟ scrap, which was then smelted, liquefied and out of this process 
copper cathode was produced; the commodity that was traded on the London 
Metals Exchange.  
Crime syndicates were embedded in industry and these provide copper thieves 
with an organised capacity exploiting the same sources of information that 
security personnel would use to apprehend criminals. Criminal undercover 
operatives were thus able to infiltrate both the security divisions and the 
general work force, even targeting management positions, to acquire 
information about the security measurements that were used and the weak 
points in the security procedures (Coetzee & Horn 2006:1). Syndicates then 
tested a potential victim„s security measures until ways were found around 
them. The information was passed on to the syndicate management where it 
was used to make informed decisions regarding the product theft.  
Copper theft syndicates were highly organised business units that would use 
all the resources at their disposal to infiltrate where the rewards were high 
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enough. The recruitment of employees would take the form of willing 
participation (for many reasons like reward or grudge), unwitting participation 
or coercion. Syndicates even used fronts like local shebeens, (unregulated 
areas for social eating and drinking, mostly unlicensed and illegal) for 
information gathering. Passive sources of information like building plans, aerial 
photo‟s etc., were also valuable in the hands of criminals. Security-related 
personnel therefore always had to take into consideration the possibility that 
their security might have been compromised (Coetzee & Horn 2006:1). 
Syndicates were bona fide employers, they hired people to steal copper 
(Witbooi, 2007:1). According to News 24 (2007:1), in an interview with 
Likhethe, the Transnet Spokesman, it was reported that Transnet loses millions 
of rand each year to syndicate type operations that were run like a business.  
According to Security Info Watch (2008:1) syndicates were highly 
sophisticated. Not only did they have state-of-the-art equipment, such as; 
trucks with pulleys, they were also experts at cutting off the electricity, thus 
they were able to steal the cable without being electrocuted. But being greedy 
they also made use of inexperienced individuals to steal copper cables and 
pipes at great personal risk. These individuals were not only desperate for an 
income they were desperate enough to take the risk of being electrocuted..  
In most instances the modus operandi was; a reconnaissance team would 
scout the area during the day. The team did its `duty` during the night and 
before sunrise the loot was removed from the scene. The cables were then 
stripped and sold as scrap metal to the dealers. Given that in some rural areas 
as much as eight kilometres of cable was stolen in one go, it was clear that 
trucks were used to remove the cable from the scene. The cable was either 
taken to a second hand goods dealer, or to a scrap yard dealer, where it was 
either sold it to national or international tenders or melted it down for other 
uses (Security Info Watch, 2008:1).  
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2.15 MEASURES TO COMBAT COPPER THEFT  
A previous Non-Ferrous Theft Combating Committee Chairperson, van den 
Berg maintained that South Africa was, at the time of his chairmanship under 
facilitation of BACSA, a world leader in mitigating non-ferrous theft (Fin24.com, 
2007:1). Van den Berg (2004:1) suggested the following measures to combat 
non-ferrous metal theft in South Africa:   
1. To be able to police the scrap metal market, companies had to 
negotiate a national scrap metal contract with one contractor who 
would purchase all legally generated copper and aluminium scrap.  
2. This should be followed up by communication actions aimed at the 
metal scrap industry. Posters with illustrations and specifications of 
the most commonly used material in the different companies had to 
be handed to every known scrap metal merchant in South Africa. 
The receivers of the posters had to sign on receipt, an undertaking to 
inform the SAPS if material with the described specifications was 
offered to them. 
3. The material of most of the companies should be marked and had to 
be identified as property of any of the said organisations. 
4. Most networks should be fitted with specially developed alarms. 
5. Regular pro-active operations, supported by members of the Non- 
Ferrous Theft Combating Committee, should be carried out on 
specific identified scrap metal merchants by the SAPS.   
6. Several awareness campaigns should be launched to create 
awareness, and to obtain the assistance of the general public in 
addressing the theft problem. 
7. Rewards could be offered for positive information. 
8. Prominence had to be given to the problem during several SABC TV 
and radio programs. 
The effectiveness of current options, such as the physical guarding of assets or 
the presentation of awareness programmes, was not enough to effectively 
negate copper cable theft successfully. The four main categories identified 
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during this literature research were; guarding; awareness; technology and 
crime Intelligence driven operations. 
2.15.1 Guarding 
According to U-dingane Senamela, Transnet‟s freight and rail senior security 
manager during 2007-2009, Transnet suffered huge losses. He stated that the 
copper theft syndicates were often more capable than the ordinary guard. 
Senamela implied that guarding was a static exercise and copper criminals 
continuously changed their tactics. He compared the current security measures 
as: „fighting a war with kids gloves‟ (Magome, 2008:1).  
The limitations and the frustrations regarding guarding are discussed in detail 
in chapter four. 
2.15.2 Awareness 
If communities were aware of copper crime thefts occurring, and if they could 
assist the law enforcement, then the crime of copper cable theft could perhaps 
be controlled. According to Le Roux (2008:1), Mvelase of Telkom, called for an 
intensified national campaign, including greater legislative powers, to clamp 
down on cable thieves. Coetzee (2008b:1) supported Mvelase, stating that a 
good effort in packaging a solution for non-ferrous metal theft, at that point, 
was to raise public awareness. The public had to be continuously informed of 
the imminent threat and the consequences of copper cable theft. 
The SAPS joined this drive enticing the public not to hesitate in reporting 
copper cable theft as this type of crime was having a devastating impact on the 
economy of the country (SAPS Journal, 2007:1).  
Telkom spent more than 100 million rand per year on security awareness 
measures, and running a series of TV inserts about copper cable theft 
(Geldenhuys 2008). These inserts re-enacted how the cables were stolen, the 
most common method used was cutting the cable at two manholes and then 
pulling it out with a truck. In 2007 the South African Rail Commuter Corporation 
(SARCC) spent almost five million rand on road shows, safety workshops and 
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media campaigns to educate the public and to initiate dialogue (Geldenhuys, 
2008:1). 
Van Dalen, Cape Town councillor and DA MP, mentioned that it was important 
to work with the media, highlighting successes, which provided positive 
feedback and won the support of the community. Media campaigns were an 
ideal way of getting messages across to the communities and to business 
partners. In the City of Cape Town they embarked on such a campaign to 
counter non-ferrous thefts and the results were outstanding. They had nearly 4, 
8 million rand worth of exposure in the media for 12 months during 2008. This 
powerful awareness tool did up to 50% of their work for them, as the major 
scrap yard dealers were contacting the City of Cape Town, without spending 
time and money to find out what they had do, to sensitise such scrap metal 
dealers (Venter, 2008:1).  
2.15.3 Technology 
The Technology that was being used did not introduce anything substantial 
enough to make an impact on the threat of copper cable theft. In Gauteng a 
major victim of copper cable theft was the municipal power suppliers. The 
Technologies that had been investigated and applied were successfully 
demonstrated by the CEO of City Power, Silas Zimu (Zimu, 2010:1). This 
research found Zimu to be the only excecutive who has publicly made 
knowledgable contributions to the debate on copper cable theft and he is 
referred to in depth in this section. He gave the following pro active 
measurements that were being utilised by City Power:   
a. Monitoring of power installations. 
b. A pylon protection programme. 
c. Cable Safe using old car wheels to embed rubber covering around 
the cable - it took the offenders too long to remove the rubber 
covering. 
d. A commercial product which prevented cables from being dragged 
out of trenches.  
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e. Power monitors were being installed to indicate an act of theft on 
mini-subs, these also monitored a variety of parameters, such as the 
voltage drop on cables. 
f. Sensors and seismic transducers were being fitted to pylons to detect 
any unusual activity which could be related to theft. 
g. Sensors were placed on manholes to detect movement. 
h. Seismic sensors above cables.  
i. Monitors on public lighting. 
j. Physically guarding and patrols. 
k. A successful project was; the marking of cables with dyes that 
respond to UV light – making it possible to identify stolen cables that 
had been recovered by police.  
Zimu (2010:1,) argued that the community took theft seriously and suspected 
thieves had on occasions been attacked by community members. It was thus 
an important factor to get the end users - the community involved. 
He also recognised the importance of joint operations to combat cable theft. 
Close collaboration had been undertaken with the National Planning 
Commission (NPC) to this effect. City power encountered numerous cases 
where heavily armed thieves threatened staff. In this instance City Power 
formed partnerships with security companies in an effort to combat theft as 
they had a presence in most areas and could easily report any suspicious 
activities. 
Zimu noted: „that to combat criminals you need to think like criminals, even in 
the boardroom‟. Crime intelligence was very important to City Power. Many 
suspects were arrested as a result of information derived from crime 
intelligence operations. Experience showed that one person caught, led to the 
names of ten others. Investigations showed that copper theft in general and 
copper cable theft in particular, was the work of syndicates – well organised 
gangs that planned the theft and the disposal of the stolen cables. A number of 
these syndicates had been identified by the police, and a number of their 
members were arrested as a result of the work done by City Power. (Zimu 
2010:1). 
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2.15.4 Crime intelligence driven operations  
According to Transnet Freight Rail (TFR, 2010:1) between May and August 
2010 they implemented crime intelligence operations and reduced the length of 
cable stolen from its rail network by 77%. The company also decreased its 
monthly average of stolen cable by 52%, compared to the monthly averages in 
2009. In May 2010, the company recorded 47 kilometers of stolen cable, which 
had since steadily declined to 11 kilometers in August 2010. All of these 
successes and improvements had been accredited because of the concept of 
crime intelligence operations (Crime-IDO) implemented by the company.  
2.16 CONCLUSION  
It was evident that copper theft was a very serious threat to the critical 
infrastructures which provided essential services to the country. If this was 
continuously overlooked and allowed to continue, the quality of life off all 
citizens would be influenced. What was disturbing was the alleged ignorance of 
this crime within the law enforcement environment and its policy makers. It 
seemed as if there was very little or no SAPS involvement. It was as if the 
SAPS were leaving this problem to the industries and to the security industry to 
resolve.   
The strategic infrastructure role players/stakeholders; Eskom, Transnet and 
Telkom were clearly the major „victims‟ in the copper theft onslaught. However, 
the municipalities and other smaller stakeholders were just as severely 
affected and the unreported municipal losses were of great concern. But they 
seemed to be depending on the government to take up the fight.   
It was also clear that this crime of copper cable theft was a very broad subject 
matter. Thieves ranged from the subsistence criminals -the poorest of the poor, 
to drug addicts, and to the very advanced syndicate driven operators. The 
range of thieves included illegal immigrants, internal personnel and 
contractors. The market demand ranged from „bucket-shops‟ on the street 
corners, to big business scrap-metal merchants syndicates. The target area 
from which thieves selected the copper ranged from the highly populated city 
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areas to the remote and uninhabited vastness of the urban areas. Damages 
could involve a small area that was vandalised for a few meters of copper 
cable, up to whole infrastructures that were decimated. The modus operandi 
was to work mostly at night utilising quick hit-and-run operations.  
A very sophisticated, yet integrated approach was necessary to mitigate a 
multi-facetted crime threat within a wide range that mostly had high impact 
consequences when targeted. What appeared to be very frustrating, to all the 
victim parties/stakeholders, was that they knew precisely how they were being 
plundered, but they appeared to be unable to counter the threat within their 
current security configurations and resources. They also did not seem to have 
the capacity to pro-actively mitigate the threat and to identify the criminals.  
According to Dianne Kohler Barnard, MP (Safety and Security) and Adv. 
Hendrick Schmidt, MP (Minerals & Energy), unless decisive action was taken, 
it was likely that copper metal theft would place even further strain on the 
economy. They strongly believed that from both a formal and an informal 
sector viewpoint there was a great deal that could be done to deal with this 
scourge (DA Discussion Document, 2008). 
Currently a great deal was being said and done to mitigate the copper theft 
phenomenon, but the problem still remained and it was clearly continuously 
escalating. 
In the next chapter the data derived from the interviews with the respondents 
will be interpreted and discussed. The scheduled interview probes were 
designed to encapsulate the experiences of the respondents based on the 
questions encountered during the literature review.   
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one, the methodological principles, used in this research, were 
discussed in detail. In Chapter three the implementation of the chosen 
phenomenology method, graphically shown in Figure 3.1, is demonstrated.   
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In the empirical phenomenological methodology implemented in this chapter, 
as shown in Fig 3.1, the following core guideline is given by Van Vuuren and 
Ladikos (1985:1), stating;  
„Research within the human-sciences implies mainly the functioning and 
quantifying of the research topic in the search for order and laws as it is 
revealed, by the amount or grade a single factor changes, when other 
interacting factors are altered‟..  
This implies that mathematical preciseness is not focussed on. The focus is a 
more comprehensive grasp of the non- experimental, non-measurable world of 
human experience. Interviews, as a tool for this research, formed the basis of 
the methodology where the respondents shared, with the researcher, their life 
experiences regarding copper cable theft. According to Sephton (in Van 
Vuuren & Ladikos 1985:1), it was not about tabulating and classification, but 
rather about the interpretation of the human life experience. Giorgi (1985:86-
88) put this into perspective, by stating that the analyses of the respondents 
protocol was to try and determine the natural meaning of specific units as 
expressed by the subject, and that maximum openness was required as 
attitude. The transcribed interviews presented in this chapter prescribe to the 
above-mentioned requirements.  
3.2 THE INTERVIEW PROCESS AND THE SAMPLING UNITS      
Appointments were made with the participants and the interviews were 
conducted. At the onset of the interview the aim and modes operandi were 
explained. In most cases the researcher was familiar with the participants as 
they were in the same safety and security industry. The participants held no 
antagonism towards the researcher and were willing to participate. However, 
their confidentiality and anonymity was important, mostly for the reason of not 
being perceived as criticising either their employers and/or the political powers.  
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Each participant was assured that his/her particular contribution was important 
in making this study possible. The assurance was also given, that the 
responses of the participant would be treated in the strictest confidence and 
that their anonymity would be maintained at all times. A tape recorder was 
used if no objections were made, otherwise dictation was done, which resulted 
in the interview sometimes extending over three hours, resulting in more 
follow-up discussions where needed. The recordings and dictations were used 
as the primary data collection aids during the interviews. This was an 
advantage in that the researcher was able to identify themes that immediately 
formed the blue print of the interview on paper. With the recording the 
researcher focussed more on the narration. Themes were identified only when 
the transcription took place. In both cases the opportunity for interpretation and 
translation immediately presented itself where needed. Interviews certainly 
gave the participant more „telling how it is‟ time. 
The interview schedule was mainly used to guide the respondents in focussing 
on the copper theft phenomena at hand. The topics of the interview schedule 
were constituted by the literature review, the pilot study, and the researcher‟s 
personal experience. These topics became natural bracketing instruments from 
where themes and sub-themes could be coded, making every relevant theme 
identifiable from the transcripts of the interviews.    
The respondents could at any time add more topics for discussion. The 
interview schedule was open-ended and the total field of copper cable theft, 
and not just that of an individual, was placed within the methodological context. 
The achievement of making the higher level of abstract visible was reached in 
this way. 
The study sample, in this research project, consisted of the contribution made 
by four senior security managers or CSO‟s of the leading copper vendor 
organisations in Gauteng. A specialist Crime-IDO service provider to all these 
security managers was the fifth subject. These respondents were all working 
for the most seriously affected „victim‟ stakeholders; those in the railway 
industries (freight and passenger), the electricity providers and in the 
telecommunication industries. These were the benchmarking and the leading 
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role players in fighting copper theft in Gauteng and in South Africa. The sixth 
subject involved twenty eight senior delegates from scrap yard dealers and 
stakeholder representatives at a copper cable theft workshop. The same 
interview schedule was used as for the individual respondents.    
All the interviews were transcribed within the scheduled time framework and 
notes were added where necessary. The interviews were then analysed as per 
the empirical-phenomenological method (see fig. 3.1).  
3.3 REDUCED TRANSCRIPTIONS  
The collective and corresponding experiences of respondents‟, as recorded 
during the interview schedule, were transcribed. All the respondents were 
subject to the same rigorous empirical phenomenological method.  
3.3.1 Probe 1: The extent/impact of copper theft  
Question: What are your personal experiences and/or perceptions 
regarding the extent and impact of copper theft in general and more 
specifically in your particular industry? 
All the respondents described their experiences as being frightening. 
According to them, this crime had the potential of bringing the country to its 
knees. They felt that business and strategic infrastructures were being 
gambled with and if this crime was not controlled soon it could become 
catastrophic. „Every indication is there that copper theft is quickly starting to 
become uncontrollable‟. 
The respondents all stated that copper theft was an international problem. 
South Africa was perhaps the most aware of this problem. According to the 
respondents, this kind of theft, (outside South Africa) occurred mostly in the 
Far East with Thailand being the most affected. The USA did not have the 
same negative problems facing them, but they did seem to be escalating 
quickly. It was claimed that SADEC countries had started a network to monitor 
the crime. The researcher could not substantiate this, but the respondents 
seemed to have information of such individual networks. One such respondent 
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claimed that the networks within Zimbabwe and Mozambique had improved 
since South Africa had started supporting them with guidance and advice. 
One of the respondents said: „The worst thing that we fear is loss of life and we 
are very frustrated as these incidents just happen over and over again‟. The 
respondents felt that there was no real cost effective, physical security solution 
for curbing subsistence thieves. The quick response operations, where urgent 
and were needed, but these were not properly planned. The organisations 
these represent were not either flexible in their resources and knowledge, thus 
making it impossible to manage and to control. 
The respondents all felt that most of the South African copper cable crime 
operations were being run or planned from Gauteng. In Gauteng itself the 
belief existed that it was mostly the subsistence thieves who operated here, 
and that the rural areas from other provinces were mostly trespassed by 
organised crime elements controlled from Gauteng. 
The respondents were not negative towards the SAPS in acknowledging their 
role and mandate: „They (the SAPS) are really trying their best and some 
pockets of excellence can be found‟. But the respondents felt that in general 
the SAPS did not have the knowledge, capacity or resources to fight copper 
cable theft. Specialised police structures, such as; the Railway Police could not 
be expected to provide a protection security function. They had too small a 
capacity, and since their recent inception they had just disappeared in the 
bigger justice system. All respondents were of the opinion that successful 
visible policing. in the copper environment. had not been achieved by the 
SAPS or any other specialised police. This was clearly evident in that some of 
the respondents had to appoint their own limited policing capacity to visit scrap 
dealers and to train local police and prosecutors.  
What was also problematic was that some of the respondents were waiting for 
a return on the recent policing promises and capacities, even reducing their 
own security capacity expecting the SAPS/Railway police to deliver on their 
promises, which they to date had not. This situation resulted in the 
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respondents feeling that not only did they have less protection their security 
strategies were also dated.  
The respondents pointed out that copper theft on its own was not the biggest 
problem or threat to the economy in general; it was the consequential damages 
that had become the biggest problem. And this loss was much higher than 
what the actual reported incidents showed. The respondents all had knowledge 
or experience of people going on a rampage vandalising and destroying critical 
infrastructure, because of frustrations regarding bad service delivery that had 
indirectly been caused by copper cable theft. Commercial and public transport 
ran within specific intervals, if one area stopped the rest had to follow. When 
this happened thousands of people could be late and inconvenienced, which 
again led to many complaints, vandalism, driver threats, hi-jacking of trains, 
torching of trains, overcrowding, possible claims and loss of life. The burning 
down of the Pretoria Railway Station on 19 February 2001 is a classic example 
of this.  
Just one metre of stolen copper cable could cause the stand still of a total 
operational area, blocking whole sectors for long periods. However, the direct 
cost of theft was also high, especially the replacement cost. One of the 
respondents‟ stated; „we can‟t just replace a small piece, we must replace 
whole conductor spans, and sometimes full infrastructures are indirectly 
damaged‟. These repair costs also included unplanned labour, after hours 
labour and security for the maintenance teams. 
3.3.2 Probe 2: The modus operandi of copper cable theft 
Question: What is the modus operandi of copper cable thieves?  
One of the respondents said that, „They (copper thieves) have many targets to 
choose from at will. Copper theft in general is very difficult to anticipate as 
thieves operate mostly unstructured and at will.‟  
According to some of the respondents, small and subsistence copper thieves 
traditionally use any kind of rudimentary tool which they modified to their 
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requirements, for example, to steal overhead cables they used metal saws 
attached to a long wooden pole that had previously been cut and dried out (wet 
wood conducts electricity), or they attached a bolt cutter to the point of the pole 
with rubber strips, a rope was attached to the bolt cutters, one arm which, if 
pulled down provided the leverage to snap copper cables.  
Some of the responses stated that, if possible, all metal would be stolen, not 
just copper, anything from masts to rails; absolutely any metal would be 
removed if possible. For bulk type metals, blow torches and other industrial 
types of tools were used whilst working behind custom made constructed 
shelters to hide their activities. For underground copper cables anything from 
shovels to motorised graders were used to excavate it. A power cable, if live, 
was then tripped or shorted by either shooting into the cable, or by driving any 
object into the cable to realise the desired effect. In most cases only the new 
naïve thieves were electrocuted, the experienced thieves‟ knew what to do. 
Some thieves poured petrol into signal distribution cases to short out the 
power, and then they commenced stealing everything they could. This „theft 
operation‟ would then expand to other secondary infrastructure streams for 
example; goods trains were brought to a stop and their cargo was plundered..  
According to a respondent from the telecommunications environment, 
underground cable had of late become the biggest problem. At first manholes 
were the problem but to counteract this they were locked; now they just dug 
out the cables, from what was called „dug-outs‟. All respondents agreed that 
copper cable thieves did excellent reconnaissance; they even did „pilot‟ dug-
outs and kept them under surveillance. If nobody acted they would then steal 
all they could lay their hands on.  
Some of the thieves were previous employees who had become part of the 
organised crime or copper cable theft syndicates. According to the 
respondents these former employees were knowledgeable, they knew where 
to cut the power; how the systems worked and where the copper cables were 
most vulnerable. The respondents even found evidence of high volume theft 
where thieves used paid labour. In certain areas rail lines were totally 
decimated, only dirt roads remained. Unprotected and abandoned regions in 
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turn created areas that could be vandalised by thieves, as these were not 
regarded as hotspots and therefore were not protected. The respondents were 
concerned about this state of affair as the thieves were empowered by this 
„free for all‟ situation. Thereafter they moved on to operational infrastructures 
that in turn had disastrous results on essential services. 
The opposing experiences described by the respondents were that copper 
cable theft crime was not impossible to anticipate; instead crime intelligence 
was slow and/or inadequate, which resulted in the victims being unprepared 
and ill-equipped. But the general consensus was that copper thieves had the 
initiative for this kind of theft.     
3.3.3 Probe 3: The nature of the offender 
Question: What is the profile (type, qualification, employers, nationality) 
of offenders? 
„We found offenders to be anything from subsistence thieves to highly 
organised syndicates with enormous capacity.‟ The respondents experienced 
copper thieves to be of above-average intellect, with the capacity to cultivate 
their market and to explore and/or to create various beneficial networks to 
protect and to support them in their criminal activities. Control and trust of gang 
members was achieved through good leadership. They had a detailed 
background of power networks as well as knowledge of the how electricity 
worked. They did an in depth reconnaissance of the area where the crime had 
been planned and in the meanwhile they built impressive intelligence networks.  
The respondents mentioned that subsistence thieves were mostly illegal 
immigrants, working in small groups in a hit and run format. They stayed in 
informal settlements, close to power cable line activities where they targeted 
the overhead cables. The more specialised syndicates focussed on the bigger 
copper cables found in the underground infrastructure. These syndicates and 
other organised crime cells utilised the smaller informal groups, such as the 
subsistence thieves, by giving orders, reporting and receiving feedback 
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through command channels right from ground level theft operations up to the 
industries that recycle copper.    
Subsistence thieves were mainly unemployed illegal immigrants primarily from 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. They stole for survival, but it had become evident 
that many had, had military training as some of those who had been arrested 
were identified as serving members in the military forces of these foreign 
countries.  
Syndicates operated more sophisticatedly as they had the resources, the 
command and the control. However, some syndicates were illiterate mob 
driven, while others were incidentally formed to carry out an „informal‟ theft 
operation, after which they had naturally been disbanded. According to the 
respondents, well run syndicates were suspected of being managed by the 
typical blue-collar types or manual labourers.  
Only a small percentage of internal employees were involved in theft 
syndicates, but respondents could provide very little evidence this. It was only 
on construction sites that their involvement might be suspect. On many of 
these sites, stores and warehouses and unused material was not logistically 
managed; cut-off (pieces of unused copper) had been left lying around, 
information was randomly sold, and many employees played along by turning a 
blind eye. These internal employees usually had close connections with illegal 
immigrants. According to the respondents, contactors in the corporate system 
were considered to be the biggest culprits as they seemed to have carte 
blanche. They knew where everything was, and what the procedures were, etc. 
And interestingly it was the safety boot marks of the contractor that were 
usually found at these illegal „dug-outs‟.    
Organised crime was deemed to be the biggest threat in copper cable theft,  
because, according to the respondents, they were „business professionals‟. For 
example, they tendered for permits for the delivery of copper and then they 
recruited „thieves‟ to provide such copper quotas. Organised crime was not 
experienced regularly, however when it happened, it did the most damage. 
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Respondent‟s suspected such professional brigands usually comprised of 
scrap metal dealers.  
A highly specialised task force, such as the asset forfeiture group, was 
required to successfully combat this crime by investigating these criminal 
groups and putting them behind bars. But because the initial police 
investigations, arrests and prosecuting groundwork capacity seemed doubtful, 
such highly specialised task forces were not involved as they should be. 
3.3.4 Probe 4: Visual measurements and awareness of the gravity of 
copper cable theft  
Question: How and to who do you spread the message/news and does it 
work?  
The respondents did security awareness campaigns on a recurring basis, 
which involved the following methodologies:  
a. Distributing pamphlets (deemed a waste of money). 
b. Community Forums. 
c. Crime line (for whistle blowing). 
d. Rewards. 
e. Professional recognition. 
f. Direct awareness programmes aimed at peddlers.  
g. Selective broadcasts on TV and Radio as these were very expensive. 
h. Articles in newspapers. 
i. Collaboration bodies; such as the previous Non-ferrous Theft 
Combating Committee (NFTCC), which had unfortunately not been very 
successful.   
Most respondents thought that they had been relatively successful in their 
campaigns in reducing copper cable theft. Some of their group leaders or 
CEO‟s regularly appeared on TV. They all handed out pamphlets, but this was 
generally regarded as a waste of money. Posters were also distributed both 
internally and at scrap metal vendors that depicted the copper items that were 
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being targeted. A respondent even launched an awareness programme on a 
breakfast TV programme, followed by a specific awareness programme for the 
rural communities. Close collaboration in this drive still existed between 
Eskom, Telkom and Transnet. As part of a continuous awareness drive, one 
respondent with the help of two dedicated legal specialists even trained 
members of court.  
The extent of the copper crime was promoted through the external media. But 
internal budget restraints limited these promotional activities thus only limited 
success had been achieved from this coverage. The general feeling was that it 
should be a continuous exercise and not just ad hoc awareness campaigns. 
The respondents also tried to spread the message by forming security 
committees within the organisation. In the end the respondents could not 
measure if all the awareness initiatives were successful or not. It seemed more 
like a bottomless pit. 
The opposing experiences of described by respondents indicated that they did 
not all have the same faith in the success of the media and in the awareness 
campaigns. Some felt that the targeted population, which needed to be 
contacted, fell outside of the mainstream „propaganda‟ reach. Some would 
rather have distributed pamphlets with details such, as photos depicting copper 
cable theft and contact numbers for reporting cable theft - thus selective 
distribution, specifically aimed at intelligence gathering.   
 3.3.5 Probe 5: Technology measurements 
Question: What specific technology is utilised to harden targets? Does it 
work? What do you recommend as the (possible) solution?   
The respondents had not found the technology that really worked on the 
conductors, as the high voltage cables made things difficult, and the criminals‟ 
knew precisely where the weak areas were that technology did not work. No 
real breakthrough to the solution had thus far been found. The general 
requirement was that a technological solution had to be found which would 
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make copper worth nothing when stolen, only then would the „demand‟ in the 
market diminish.  
Physical security and supportive technology were still a high priority, according 
to the respondents, as these were readily available and in a way more 
practical, for example; special alarms on cables and networks linked with 
armed reaction. Physical actions included; declaring hotspot areas and then to 
hardening these areas with more physical guarding and/or placing cables in 
concrete, installing alarms, night vision, etc.   
The respondents were also contemplating the possibility of using identification 
marks on cables - marking these as part of the manufacturing process. This, 
however, was still debatable and implied that all cables would have to be 
replaced and supported by investigative capacities, which were more 
specialised than what was currently happening.  
An alternative to technology that was being widely used was the utilisation of 
specialised investigative resources, which appled high tech equipment for 
surveillance, and monitoring and then supporting such technology with 
qualified crime intelligence capacities. In layman‟s terms, this capacity was 
known as Crime Intelligence Operations and there were only two private 
concerns in Gauteng that could provide such services and only one had a 
national footprint with its Head Quarters in Centurion, Pretoria.  
3.3.6 Probe 6: Integrated measurements  
Question: What integration measurements, for example; GIS 
(Geographical Information System), continuous crime assessment, risk 
data analysis, early warning systems or networks, etc. capacity are 
utilised by you to provide an on time and proactive risk and vulnerability 
projection? 
The vastness of the whole copper theft arena made it difficult to manage and 
thus delayed reactive responses were the rule. Integrated operational centres 
believed to provide a monitoring and control capacity at a 24/7 readiness, 
77 
which could lead to early warning where possible should be operational. A 
„dashboard‟ or an „artificial intelligence‟ system, which visually portrayed real 
time crime incidences: a real time monitor capacity that was focused on copper 
theft was very sought after by all respondents. There were such plans in the 
pipeline, but at the time of this research it was not yet in existence. This system 
would lead to a focused approach that was operational 24/7, it was called an 
integrated CRIME-IDO (Crime Intelligence Driven Operation) capacity.   
The respondents agreed that the biggest challenge in combating copper theft 
was acting with an intelligence network, based on integrated measurements, 
before the crime occurred. This implied that there had to be an intelligence-
based gathering and assimilation capacity with a direct link to operations 
and/or control that knew where, when and by whom a copper theft incident 
would occur. This concept of an intelligence and central control centre then 
had to be supported by specialist task/hit teams. This concept had been tested 
by most respondents in small operations who all realised that this method was 
in essence the only solution that had shown any real long lasting dividends in 
combating copper cable theft.   
A complaint from the respondents was that the integration measurements for 
CRIME-IDO‟, would take a long time to establish, develop, implement and 
maintain, before providing any useful intelligence. It was also expensive, 
especially when small dividends were shown in the short term whilst the 
demand was for immediate gratification. The respondents all felt that the pro‟s 
over shadowed the con‟s, because if such a system was in place, the 
defenders/victims would receive a pre-warning in that they would know where 
the crime could and would occur before it did. They could then follow up with 
closer investigation, sting–ops, monitors, alarms on the spot, arrests, or even 
witness the crime and follow the thieves to the real controllers. 
The integration of such security systems and operations were deemed to be 
too advanced for the current security operators, and it might become an IT 
driven application and not a security tool. The IT managers would then drive 
the process without a counter crime core or mind set, and it would thus 
become more of a system management exercise than a crime prevention tool. 
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Professional security exponents were needed to head such an application with 
IT supporting them. 
Most respondents did have a crime analyses capacity, but it was mostly for 
statistical purposes and not for real time tactical support in conjunction with a 
GIS capacity within a Crime-IDO set-up. The respondents in general felt that 
from a security perspective they currently did not have an effective GIS 
system. Most of the respondents with such systems described them as white 
elephants, which were not designed and managed by subject matter security 
experts.   
All respondents, however, had implemented or were busy planning, or building 
a NOC/JOC (National or Joint Operations Centre) to centralise and to control 
all operational incidents which would allow for immediate reaction. The 
respondents nevertheless doubted if the application and the capacity of these 
GIS systems would be effectively implemented in combating copper crime 
theft.  
An opposing experience of a respondent was that too much emphasis had 
been placed on systems doing what only hard physical work could achieve in 
the field.  
3.3.7 Probe 7: External measurements 
Question: What external measurements are or can be put in place to 
lessen the threat to your copper status?  
Most respondents hoped and waited for the new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 
6 of 2009) to be fully implemented and properly managed by the SAPS, and 
that the SAPS would be able to co-ordinate all role players in fighting copper 
cable theft in unison. But most of the respondents also thought that the SAPS 
would not be able to deliver. 
Some of the respondents had entered into a national scrap metal agreement 
with a specific service pro vider, regarding the sale and the recycling of scrap 
conductor metal. This implied that non accredited scrap metal dealers were not 
79 
allowed to buy the scrap copper from such stakeholders. If there was any 
concern the scrap dealer had act as if it had been stolen. The agreement was 
frequently inspected for 100% compliance. This sounded good on paper but it 
unfortunately was difficult to police.   
Respondents felt that it was necessary for them to understand and to uncover 
the Risk/Threat/Vulnerability profiles that copper cable theft might have on their 
industries. Necessary activities on how to combat copper cable theft as 
mentioned by the respondents are depicted below: 
a. Tactical deployments by a dedicated special response capacity which 
would allow early warning, patrols, observation posts (OP‟s) and 
reactive task teams. 
b. Dedicated and effective crime intelligence gathering, information 
analyses, profiling and patterns. 
c. Scrap metal investigations and research. 
d. Socio ecology awareness. 
e. Doctrine for best practice in reacting, combating and prevention of 
copper cable theft, to be run on a national level. 
f. Understanding how to professionally protect, prevent and prepare. A 
need for professional and accredited security specialists.  
g. Target hardening on all levels, from the burying of cables to tying it up 
with layers of cable ties, to make it as difficult as possible for the 
offender. 
h. Cost effectiveness through buying power and sharing, this required 
collaboration between all role players.  
i. Control the market of scrap metal dealers. Know who the buyers and 
the sellers are. Must be able to catch them at will.  
j. The modus operandi of each criminal and each syndicate had to be 
researched and understood: The how, why, when, where and with what 
did criminals operate. This could only be achieved when syndicates and 
scrap metal dealers were infiltrated and/or monitored very closely. 
Routes used, associations and modus operandi of the offender had to 
be known, allowing for proper planned action.  
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k. Respondents continuously referred to the following external 
requirements that they believed had to be put in place to support 
internal measurements: 
i. Visible policing.  
ii. Dedicated and continuous compliance audits at scrap yards.  
iii. Harsh sentences. 
iv. Focus on scrap dealers and the recycling industry. 
v. A national NFMTCC clearly and strongly managed.     
3.3.8 Probe 8: Law enforcement and legal aspects  
Question: Does law enforcement support you in the mitigation of copper 
cable theft and are there sufficient legal constraints to mitigate copper 
cable theft effectively?  
The current Law was sufficient but it had not yet been implemented. Law 
enforcement could not even enforce the „old‟ Second-Hand Goods Act, but the 
new Second-Hand Goods Act was already imminent. If the „old‟ Second-Hand 
Goods Act (no 23 of 1955) had not properly been policed then how would the 
new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) be? The question occurred: „What 
is going to be different?‟ The feeling was that the SAPS were clueless; dockets 
got lost, and cases took months and even years to be finalised. The culture of 
crime in South Africa was too big for the SAPS to control. 
Non-ferrous metal theft in general, and copper cable theft in particular was 
never seen and treated as a priority crime. Emotional crime received more 
attention, as it was perceived by the public as tangible and thus more serious. 
The SAPS did not understand non-ferrous metal theft; therefore, their 
resources allocated to combating copper cable theft were insufficient. Pre 2009 
a specific non-ferrous metal theft unit was operational. But this function was 
handed over to the organised crime unit, at the end of 2009. According to the 
respondents, the SAPS „just let it go‟. And in this process a lot of expertise and 
capacity went to ground. Copper cable theft, on ground level, was clearly not a 
priority of the SAPS, they at most patrolled scrap some metal dealers three 
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times per month. However, no real effect was noticed as the members of the 
SAPS had not been trained and were not vigilant in this kind of crime. The 
SAPS with their limited manpower, knowledge and vehicles seemed to be 
missing the bigger picture all together. „The bottom-line is that you must realise 
you are on your own, don‟t expect any help‟, was the general feeling of the 
respondents.  
Noteworthy opposing experiences between respondents were as follows: Even 
though the respondents were in agreement when stating their misgivings about 
the weak state of the law enforcement capacity, some were not as critical they 
were sympathetic and supportive. The opposing statement was that the 
responsibility still had to be handed to the police and that they (the SAPS) had 
to take leadership and sort the problems out. Most of the respondents 
remained sceptic of this ever happening. One respondent however gave a 
totally opposing experience of the SAPS, stating that when their services were 
required, they were delivered. It was, however, noted that this positive 
respondent basically had an internal capacity that delivered all the functions of 
the SAPS and even provided close guidance on copper related crimes to the 
legal system. This respondent, who claimed success for the imprisonment of 
copper criminals, rendered the following internal services to the police:    
a. They provide the courts with a video/CD of the stolen copper that explained 
the crime. Two lawyers on call were frequently used to educate and to 
sensitise the courts.  
b. Relationships were being built with the SAPS by helping with basic docket 
processes, case guidance, the necessary data and support in the 
identification of the stolen copper.  
c. Using their own legal team they went so far as to request that no bail would 
be granted at first appearance in court.  
d. They populated the docket with relevant information to make the 
seriousness of the crime clear and comprehensive for the state prosecutor 
to utilise effectively.  
e. Providing supporting briefs, which would aggravate the sentence, with 
photos and other evidence.  
82 
f. They policed the scrap yards continuously. 
3.3.9 Probe 9: Political aspects. 
Question: How do political decisions influence the mitigation of copper 
theft? 
Externally, the political will (Government and State President) was verbally 
demonstrated and by the decisions taken. However, the supportive capacity 
was not there to realise the Political will and/or Acts at ground level. Internally 
the security needs and messages did not always get to the top as true security 
specialists did not sit at executive level to influence decision making.  
The respondents experienced that copper theft was still not a priority of the 
SAPS, as emotional crime was politically more important. The capacity and the 
competence in the SAPS for combating copper cable theft was very limited 
notwithstanding political assurances.  
Political support was based on statistics, which the respondents regarded as 
speckled with discrepancies. It was claimed that the specific true copper theft 
numbers were difficult to obtain. The figures that were released had been 
inflated, possibly because of the sensational value, or not keeping proper 
records, or for fear of making the true situation transparent. 
In general, the political will had not yet done anything noteworthy for copper 
crime reduction.   
3.3.10 Probe 10: Financial situation 
Question: The resources at hand versus the threat, are these sufficient? 
What is the impact of the financial parameters in combating copper theft?  
Finances seemed to be an enormous frustration for all of the respondents. 
Funding usually was available when the risk of crime became unacceptable. 
However, when security was successful it was more difficult to justify the need 
for funding and success even became a preamble for uninformed cuts. 
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Security was never regarded as core to business and, therefore, when budget 
cuts were implemented security was the first to be cut. Notwithstanding, the 
respondents were required to continuously provide adequate security within a 
change management environment with added financial restrictions. As quoted 
by  the respondents; 
“Every year our risks are higher and the money less. We can‟t grow our 
capacity more than seven percent per annum. Higher inflation therefore 
kills any advantages and effectively we must do more with less to the 
point where we are ineffective with no more room for efficiencies.”  
The implication was; to combat copper cable theft it had to become a 
specialised function. The controlling capacity had to be even better qualified to 
manage the required services where the „usual‟ resources were depleted.  
The respondents felt that money was wasted on contracting a vast array of 
private contractors to do physical security. A clear national plan and a 
concentrated effort between all role players would save money; and if it did not 
save money, at least it would definitely bring damages down significantly.  
One of the respondents stated that, the resources and the management were 
sufficient to contain the current situation with the dated approach. The problem 
was not only the money. The problem had everything to do with the lack of 
knowledge, experience and the capability to run a crime prevention capacity 
based on a model of crime intelligence operation. If implemented correctly it 
would eventually save lots of money.   
3.3.11 Probe 11: Quality assurance  
Question: What measurements do you use to ensure quality processes 
and standards in mitigating copper theft?  
Some respondents claimed ISO 9001, SANS, OSH and RSR standards were 
used to establish, develop, implement and maintain security processes. But 
only one respondent could explain how these security standards worked. 
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The respondents implemented corrective actions by means of an audit process 
in which they were assessed during crime surveys about losses, customer 
feedback and behaviour, reasons for business interruptions, time lost recorded 
and customer opinions. The respondents tried to ensure quality, by adhering to 
the strict monitoring of SLA‟s for performance delivery as agreed upon. This 
was done through clear security requirements, standards, and KPI‟s with stern 
penalty clauses where non compliance was found.  
The problem of ensuring quality was a challenge to the respondents, in that 
they knowingly fought copper cable theft with the wrong people and with the 
wrong tools.  
To uphold standards, some respondents invested externally by training law 
enforcers, especially from the NPA, SAPS and the courts.  
For security to be effective, knowledgeable Security Managers were needed, 
with a high level of technical capacity, to understand the integration of security 
measurements, its quality factors and its applications for best practice. The 
respondents felt the training of the operational security managers was lacking 
in the art of intelligence gathering, and in out-flowing analysis methodologies. 
This implied a poor understanding of the profiles of copper thieves and copper 
criminal activity patterns which should have been used and assessed for 
quality counter operations.     
All the respondents stated that for security to become a quality measureable 
function a specialised capacity was needed for proper intelligence gathering 
and for forensic type investigations, which could be measured against arrests, 
the conviction rate and the monitored crime tendencies. Currently, to keep 
abreast of the general situation, and to be able to measure current quality 
outcomes against current threats, the respondents had to monitor the copper 
cable theft scenario closely through reports, communication and publications 
from both internal and external markets.  
The respondents felt that visible policing would still be the best agent for 
gathering information as it would provide a platform from where counter 
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planning could be done. However, this would imply police officers were 
qualified and knowledgeable.  
In general, the respondents were serving under general company policies 
prescribing to „traditional‟ standards and their compliance. It was difficult to 
embed security specific functions into these traditional policies and standards 
because of the constant configuration changes in security and the constant 
changes in the environments. All respondents stated that security should have 
its own standards, for example; as prescribed by ISO for processes, this 
standard had to cover the outcomes or the deliverables of the mandated scope 
as agreed upon.   
Noteworthy opposing experiences amongst respondents were that only one 
respondent could emphatically state that all the above mentioned standards 
were in place. Most respondents stated the abovementioned was in place in 
one way or another, but they were unsure how to quantify it in a security 
environment, and some even stated that there was no quality audit.     
3.3.12 Probe 12: Strategy 
Question: What strategy(s), up to now in your experience, has/have 
shown to have a positive impact on mitigating copper theft?  
The respondents unanimously agreed that no security strategy so far could be 
described as having had a show stopper impact on combating copper cable 
theft. A solution for this was still being searched for. The respondents felt that 
the strategy required was a Crime Intelligence Driven Operational concept. A 
permanent security capacity that would involve hit squads, immediate 
response, intelligence gathering, proactive investigations and mobile task 
teams, supported by expert witnesses, legal and law enforcement training and 
functions.  
Some respondents felt that security policy makers generally misunderstood the 
concept of „strategy‟. Some of the top management, overseeing the security 
function, regarded the security strategy a secret only for „behind the doors 
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confidential‟ planning, and so much so that nobody dared ask for such a 
strategy as they would be frowned upon. 
Guarding was the most used crime prevention strategy, yet in its current 
application most respondents considered it ineffective and a waste of money, 
because the guarding companies had no knowledge of, or real interest in, how 
to combat copper cable theft permanently. It was mentioned by the 
respondents that these service providers were employed by gullible and/or 
disinterested security heads, perhaps even with a financial interest in mind.  
Dedicated and knowledgeable security specialists needed to be sourced and 
appointed for any security strategy to be implemented, established and 
maintained. According to the respondents security had unfortunately become a 
dumping ground for „connected‟ appointees who did not understand the 
problem or the field of security as a science.   
The respondents at best saw themselves as reactive, working in silos and with 
little or no national leadership and without a clear strategy.   
Noteworthy contrasting experiences amongst respondents were as follows: 
The most successful stakeholder in combating copper cable theft only utilised 
a very limited guarding capacity, their copper losses were lower than most and 
had appeared to stabilised. According to this respondent, copper cable theft 
crimes were investigated by a private intelligence gathering service provider, 
followed by proper in-depth investigations, which led to bona fide arrests and 
prosecuting processes. This Crime IDO unit had a great deal of experience in 
copper cable theft and the industry environment, which also encapsulated the 
policing of the scrap metal industry. In order to enhance such a Crime IDO 
capacity, physical security had also become more effective with the intelligence 
received and the hot spot assessments drawn up for proactive manoeuvring 
where possible. The message was out and the copper cable thieves knew that 
they would be caught and prosecuted.  
The benefit of such a strategy was that the longer it was implemented, the 
better its networks would work and the proactive controlling of copper cable 
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theft would escalate. The down side was also that the stakeholder would 
become more and more dependent on the service provider. However, since 
there was no real collaboration between all stakeholders, this exercise could 
reach a limited saturation point. If this methodology or strategy was not 
adopted by all stakeholders it would basically just remain a drop in the ocean 
and copper cable theft would not be eradicated but merely displaced.    
3.3.13 Probe 13: Security Service provider 
Question: What impact do the security service providers have on the 
mitigation of copper theft and how can it be improved? 
Security service providers were necessary, but the deployment of internal 
personnel to check if they complied with the expected service deliverables was 
time consuming and expensive. Some of the respondents complained that they 
had to manage the service providers 24/7 just to make sure they did their jobs. 
Some respondents were so frustrated with the underperforming security 
service providers that they even contemplated the option of only relying on 
insurance; a cheaper option (at first) and less stressful, than managing mostly 
ineffective private security providers. It was already an acceptable strategy to 
accept losses, which they just managed in certain cases and in certain areas. 
The challenge was keeping operations going whilst managing the risk 
accordingly.  
Security (guarding) was mostly outsourced by the respondents. However, the 
respondents felt that they were in the hands of „guarding mercenaries‟ with a 
very limited capacity. The limited security experience, management and 
leadership within the respondents‟ organisations created the opportunity for 
security service providers to deliver less than what was expected and get away 
with it. The internal operational Security Managers generally did not 
understand the scope of service delivery that was required as they did not 
understand the threat or the science of security, let alone have a „vague‟ 
security strategy. They were thus ill-equipped to implement a control audit for a 
proper performance measurement, to guarantee the way it should be. The 
service providers were expected to provide the plan, the capacity and to 
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measure its own performance. The service provider was therefore the player 
and the referee.  
The respondents testified that the guarding service providers did not always 
have a specialised understanding of what the industry required. In general, 
untrained guards were just „dumped‟ on patrol, without knowledgeable 
leadership. Limited management, knowledge and support were the rule rather 
than the exception. Security providers only delivered if penalty clauses were 
clear and enforced with intolerance. According to the respondents, the 
involvement of the guard with criminals was an unfortunate fact, and under the 
„right‟ conditions it became the rule rather than the exception. Respondents felt 
that the service provider had to be held responsible for damages and for losses 
where they were entrusted with a specific security responsibility, which they 
had contractually accepted. Consequential liability when negligent was a must. 
But service providers always shied away from this as they did not trust their 
own capacities of delivering as expected.  
According to the respondents, the situation became even more aggravated 
because of professional jealousy between the lower level managers of the 
organisation and the security managers of the service providers. This created 
animosity as they started seeing each other as a threat. The respondents, 
however, acknowledged that at managerial level, the service providers were 
generally more knowledgeable than the operational security managers. One of 
the respondents said: „The tail wags the dog, and the tail is there to make as 
much money for as little as possible, and we don‟t have the capacity or the 
knowledge to counter that.‟   
The stakeholder respondents felt that security service providers were business 
organisations and entrepreneurial entities first, second and last. Security as a 
business could only be good whilst a crime risk was a real threat. One 
respondent stated: „The security service providers call the shots. They are not 
loyal to the „cause‟. They are loyal only to their own purses. It is a business for 
them; the appearance to combat crime brings in money. Why then kill the 
creator (copper theft) of wealth if you can maintain it?‟  
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Opposing experiences noteworthy among respondents were indicated as 
follows: The respondents were in two minds regarding whether outsourcing 
security was the best option. Some felt threatened in that they themselves 
were not in control of their general security and the implication was the security 
providers had become untouchable. Others felt that outsourcing security was 
the „cheapest‟ solution, but the „client‟ had to upgrade their own operational 
security management capacity to be able to properly manage the service 
providers.        
3.3.14 Probe 14: Management and man power 
Question: Can your current manpower and management capacity 
effectively mitigate copper theft?  
Throughout the interviews the respondents stated that security was 
unfortunately grudge expenditure and therefore it would always experience the 
first organisational cut when there was any financial difficulty in the industry. 
The reason being security was an EXCO decision based on risk, threat and 
vulnerability parameters. The respondents all stated that the in-house security 
capacity had already been cut to the bone, with only limited managerial 
capacity, which was even less when the lack of experience was measured.   
The geographical area, which the respondents were responsible for, was 
impossibly large; in fact too large for only physical security coverage to be cost 
effective and efficient. The current general manpower would never be enough 
in the current guarding configuration to cover the vastness of the area. And to 
make it even more difficult, the sociological environment was ever changing. It 
was very difficult, for the current security capacities, to adopt corrective 
measurements timely, especially within the dynamic sociological environment 
involving informal settlements, industrial-, commercial- and residential regions. 
The manpower was not sufficient to cover all these security areas and on top 
of this, it was impossible to also patrol the scrap metal dealers and do visible 
policing.  
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According to the respondents, the general shortage of technical force 
multipliers and know-how demanded an even higher level of professional 
requirement from guards on the ground. This in itself was an issue which had 
proven to be unachievable for many reasons, which implied the security status 
was even lower.   
What was needed, according to the respondents, were knowledgeable 
managers to negotiate the risk regarding the principles of threat, transfer, 
tolerate and terminate, and then to make timely and relevant decisions. This 
should be a priority. It came down to security managers who understood the 
science of security and its management. The current operational security 
managers were generally inexperienced, according to the respondents. They 
did not come from a security environment and thus had very limited knowledge 
and qualifications in security, in particular, and in managerial expertise, in 
general. It was thus difficult to say if the manpower was insufficient or not. The 
numbers might be right but their output clearly was insufficient.  
The respondents in general felt that stakeholders were held „hostage‟ by an 
untrained and an unsuitable workforce. „They don‟t know what they don‟t 
know.‟ Security had unfortunately become an employment avenue; the social 
responsibility buffer. The outcome was that with all the „dead wood‟ in the 
industry the ensuing incompetence frustrated the security managers, to the 
utmost, who were expected to deliver. 
3.3.15 Probe 15: Command and control 
Question: What is the composition of your security/risk control strength 
which is responsible for copper theft mitigation? 
Copper cable theft was just another general security responsibility, which was 
part of all other criminal type of threats to the organisation. The security 
structures, which the respondents managed, were more management inclined 
than operationally involved as operational aspects were generally outsourced. 
In a perfect world, respondents basically designed a strategic plan within set 
parameters (finance, personnel, business requirements, etc.) as a priority. A 
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mandate and a structure could be formulated from this, which would mirror the 
required command and control structure. A risk analysis and survey would then 
be done to motivate or to assist this designed structure that was necessary to 
combat copper cable theft. However, any security strategy was subservient to 
the company strategy and mandate. This implied that the security managers 
got what was dished out and they had to make it work, regardless of the facts 
and the requirements provided.  
The respondents stated the need for an in-house crime Intelligence and 
Investigative capacity. This capacity encapsulated all non-guarding operational 
requirements specifically to do with copper related crimes and was aimed 
towards a future pro-active capacity. Currently, such capacity (although limited) 
was also largely outsourced and utilised on an ad hoc basis.  
The command and control lines varied in the respondents‟ environments. 
Some Senior Managers reported directly to the board and or board members. 
Some reported to non-board members, such as; the human relations or finance 
departments who had inherited security just as an ad hoc function. The 
affected respondents stated that such a situation caused many security 
problems. At the time of this research, none of the respondents reported to a 
top board member who was solely responsible for safety and security. Two 
respondents reported their organisations were considering the possibilities of 
appointing such security board members. However, the fear the respondents 
had was, that these newly appointed top managers would just be politically 
connected, non-security specialists with either a military or a police 
background.  
Opposing experiences noteworthy among respondents were indicated as: 
The respondents who were not supportive of having an internal crime 
intelligence capacity did not know how this would work and be managed within 
the current ill-equipped structure. With the current lack of knowledge and 
professionalism in their security middle management, this high maintenance 
capacity would most likely turn out to be disastrous.  
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One respondent was mildly satisfied with his security‟s composition in 
combatting copper cable theft/crimes. He had contained this crime at a stable 
level for the past few years. It was the responsibility of a dedicated body 
residing at the Corporate Head Office. He had two senior security managers 
who strategized and advised all other regions and/or areas which were run as 
separate cost centres. An important asset for this respondent would be a 
research department that would provide guidance and the latest crime related 
information, that would allow this respondent to adapt as the threat changed. 
He rated his success a result of the controlled integration of all capacities 
(specialists in departments of commercial, technical and security loss control) 
and, even though limited, his managing personnel were capable and 
competent. He had appointed a service provider to provide him with a full crime 
IDO capacity in focused areas. Most of his guarding, also limited, was an in-
house capacity, whilst the other respondents out-sourced this capacity.   
3.3.16 Probe 16: Risk analysis and standards to support business  
Question: What does your organisation use/do to measure risks, 
vulnerabilities and threats?  
Most respondents acknowledged a risk analysis approach. However, some 
respondents felt that the situation regarding copper cable theft had deteriorated 
to the point where such assessments had in fact become nonsensical. They 
were frustrated because their message about the identified risks had not 
received the attention it deserved.   
Two respondents stated that they had used a custom designed risk 
assessment from where they promulgated Standards of Procedures (SOP‟s) 
for each capacity that was then measured through internal audits. Most 
respondents, however, felt that a risk analysis was just an academic exercise 
from which nothing evolved because of untrained managers who had little to 
no analysis capacity. This exercise was seen as a waste of time and the 
figures that had been provided were not to be trusted. In most instances top 
management saw a security risk analysis as a „scare tactic‟ to invoke fear to 
93 
ask for more money. All the previous warnings had not materialised and they 
were content carrying the risk and going on as per usual.  
Some interesting remarks made by the respondents regarding the way in 
which top management dealt with the priority outcomes of the risk analyses: 
a. Did top management really care? 
b. Corruption was so rife that notwithstanding the risk analyses outcome, 
tenders were influenced based on non-business principles.   
c. If they were really interested, they should have been able to mitigate this 
copper cable crime by know. Security would have been empowered and 
well sourced.  
d. Why did they not care about the very bad reputation and image created 
by copper cable theft and also as predicted in a proper risk analyses? 
e. Why did they do nothing more than talk and provide public rhetoric? 
f. Currently, security decision making did not protect or benefit the 
company. 
g. Clearly, individuals got the benefit; the business was a last priority.    
3.3.17 Probe 17: Unique model and standards  
Question: Does a theory containing a clear model or plan, and supported 
by required standards, exist in or outside your organisation for the 
mitigation of copper cable theft? Have you ever considered such a 
model? What was/is it? Has it successfully been implemented? If not, 
why not?   
All the respondents stated that a specific chosen or designed model to combat 
copper theft in their organisations did not exist. However, all but one mentioned 
that the „Crime IDO concept‟ should be considered to stem copper cable 
crimes. This concept would approach the copper cable theft situation from a 
broad perspective and incorporate all possible measurements in an integrated 
fashion. The respondents mostly ascribed the current „models‟ they utilised as 
being more intuitive driven, from many years of experience, rather than 
embedded in scientific theory.   
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3.3.18 Probe 18: Concentrated effort, collaboration  
Question: Do all role players and the copper cable theft victims, work 
together effectively to mitigate the common crime?  If not, why not? If so 
explain how?  
Collaboration between the respondents, in this study, was a continuously 
fluctuating process. Sometimes close co-operation was achieved, but as of 
late, it was not very clear and for some it was basically non-existing.  
According to two respondents, Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA) 
was previously the conveyer and the facilitator, between all the large 
organisations, for victims under the auspicious of the NFTCC. The Non-ferrous 
Theft Combat Committee (NFTCC) had not existed until two years ago. It was 
professionally run by Business Against Crime (BAC), the watch dog for 
businesses and a body which furthered the interest of businesses. It consisted 
of 130 persons. Decision making processes were done at National 
Conferences. Thirty five area committees not only kept everything relevant, a 
clear operational strategy was also in place. Everything was kept central, all 
members as well as the Police were part of this strategy making body. 
Everyone concerned sometimes utilised an external facilitator for bigger 
decisions.  
However, after the SAPS had been handed the reins by BACSA in 2009/2010, 
everything came to a standstill. Since then there had not been similar NFTCC 
meetings for the respondents. The SAPS Minister was responsible but she, 
however, declined and referred it to a SAPS Commissioner. Currently the 
respondents were not sure who in the police were operationally responsible for 
the occurring non-ferrous metal thefts. It was believed a structuring 
responsibility had been incurred in the SAPS in 2011, but the respondents had 
to date not seen any changes. Formal and orchestrated collaboration between 
copper cable theft victims in Gauteng had effectively come to a standstill. It 
was, however, clear, that since the Non-ferrous Metal Combating Committee 
was not driven via BACSA the wheels had come off. Everybody was back in 
their silos. The respondents stated that many conferences and work groups 
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had been attended, but no leader had emerged. Everybody was waiting for the 
police to take up their mandate with a knowledgeable strong leadership.  
Some respondents even stated that they had distanced themselves on 
purpose from the current SAPS and BACSA; institutions from which nothing 
positive could be expected. Other respondents felt that goodwill and even 
support was received from these institutions, but it was mostly at top 
management level, as the products on the ground were still few and far in 
between. All the respondents but one, stated that the SAPS‟ role players were 
unknown to them; „We experience their capacity as extremely low and then 
coupled with a very high rate of turnover in SAPS‟ positions, it makes it 
impossible to build a long standing relationship, let alone for the SAPS 
members to get acquainted with the copper theft phenomenon.‟ The 
respondents were clear in it that without a strong SAPS leadership, with 
focused and prioritised capacities, collaboration between role players would 
never be a long term success.  
Some respondents mentioned that stakeholders had previously collaborated - 
but for selfish reasons: to look for what they could get rather than what they 
could put on the table. Professional jealousy was always very clear and the 
people with the most information started feeling abused and withdrew their 
contributions.     
3.3.19 Probe 19: Socio economic 
Question: What is the external or neighbouring role, outside of the 
business environments‟ direct space, regarding copper cable theft, and 
how do you involve such external environments in combating copper 
cable theft?   
The respondents all stated that community awareness was an important 
mitigation tool. The general crime culture in SA was the biggest threat as 
criminals were sometimes protected and were even seen to have a right to 
plunder. Road shows were frequently launched to educate the general 
population on copper cable theft issues. The respondents experienced a lot of 
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goodwill and support from the general population. They also did their utmost to 
get communities involved in reporting such crimes. The mobilisation through 
CPF‟s did work where possible. However, the general feeling of the 
respondents was that the involvement of the public did not really work. 
Criminals were so specialised that they could hide from specialist counter-
crime operators; and the chance that civilians would uncover them or even see 
them, was very rare. The few, who then did see and recognise such crimes, 
were in danger of intimidation and even worse. 
The respondents also stated that the target population in all probability would 
not be reached by the usual media and propaganda mediums. They, the 
general population, also did not really care about the effects of copper cable 
crimes as they were just trying to survive from day to day. The effectiveness of 
community involvement was perceived to be un-measurable. Awareness 
operations were also decentralised, and if the local resident security manager 
took full responsibility, it again implied that a silo approach was operational.   
The respondents were in two minds when it came to delivering the message to 
the right audience. Most of the respondents, however, felt that a definite 
expansion on this activity was necessary, but some respondents stated that 
proper Crime IDO‟s would encapsulate this requirement.  
3.3.20 Probe 20: Media 
Question: Does the media portray the copper cable theft problem 
accurately and sufficiently? 
All respondents acknowledged that the latest news programmes on TV, 
regarding copper cable theft, were very important in getting the seriousness of 
the situation across. They however had some reservations because they 
showed only the symptoms of the problem in a sensational manner. The core 
of the problem never got mentioned; that security was run by non-professionals 
from Middle Management downwards, that law enforcement was incapable, 
everybody acted in silos, and a central strategy and leadership was not 
available. 
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The respondents mentioned that they had in general found the articles on 
copper cable theft and its impact watered down in the media. However, the 
respondents still stated that most reports were factual and the sources were 
respected. The general feeling also was that the media should report more 
regularly; the SACCI‟s (South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry) 
copper cable theft barometer should be more visible and inclusive, with more 
investigative journalism to support the claims. 
The cost of continuously being in the media, propagating the real story of 
copper cable theft in Gauteng, was just too expensive for the respondents, and 
since it was not sensational enough copper cable crimes were at the best of 
times an ad hoc production.     
3.3.21 Probe 21: Scrap metal dealers  
Question: What is the role of scrap dealers in the copper theft 
phenomenon?  
The respondents believed that about 5000 scrap metal dealers resided in 
South Africa with about 3000 in Gauteng alone. According to the respondents, 
all the stolen copper had to go through the hands of scrap metal dealers and 
the recycling vendors. This made the scrap metal dealers the key to the 
mitigation of copper cable theft. Yet on the other hand they were the core 
institutions that kept copper cable theft alive and well. In the light of this, all 
scrap metal dealers had to be regarded as suspect, as they were all directly 
and/or indirectly involved in this crime. Demand and supply was the order of 
the day, and one of the respondents believed that 95% of scrap metal dealers 
would buy stolen copper if it was presented to them.   
The respondents supported the notion that the scrap metal market was in no 
manner policed sufficiently. There were so many loopholes that in a way they 
had become untouchable. They created the market, thus they were in control. 
Copper as a commodity was in such great demand that the weak security and 
law enforcement situation in this country allowed copper to be provided/stolen 
on demand, for business entities and the entrepreneurs such as scrap metal 
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dealers, who could destroy any evidence quickly through the general recycling 
process.  
Bucket shops and scrap metal dealers were one and the same, even working 
with and for each other. Together they found loopholes in the systems, for 
example, they moved the stolen copper cables through internal loops and 
networks, making the identification and quantification of stolen copper very 
difficult.  
The respondents believed that there should be a strict clear policy relevant to 
all scrap metal dealers, which could work if controlled. Metal merchants knew 
what was right, but they ignored compliance because of bad control, weak law 
enforcement, and untrained police. Some respondents believed that it was 
beneficial to have an agreement with a single scrap dealer to control losses. 
Transnet, Eskom and Telkom individually used selected service providers for 
their specific, unique and identifiable scrap metal. At such a selected service 
provider everything was done on site for aluminium and copper. General 
and/or other scrap metal dealers were trained to identify the unique markings 
of these stakeholders because if any of this marked copper was found at these 
scrap dealers they would be charged with dealing in stolen goods. The three 
big stakeholders put a receipt system plus a poster system in place at all scrap 
metal dealers and no excuses were tolerated. However, the respondents 
assumed that 20% to 50% of copper still went the illegal route. It was very 
difficult to prove any illegal activities unless the criminals were caught red 
handed. 
The respondents felt that scrap metal dealers should be the focus of law 
enforcement. A specific disciplinary code had to be put in place under the 
auspicious of the MBA, who had to strictly follow said controls and regulations 
as work ethics. According to the new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009), 
scrap metal dealers received incentives if they were members of the MBA. 
They were exempted from the required seven day cooling off period, or waiting 
time before they could sell copper. The SAPS had to, in co-operation with the 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), operate as a task team and control 
and issue licenses to scrap metal dealers. Scrap should not be paid for in 
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cash, but with a cheque receipt system. The respondents felt that there was a 
definite need for a software programme that could integrate all transactions at 
scrap metal dealers. These should immediately be verified through a data base 
and a biometric identity system.  
Opposing experiences noteworthy between respondents were depicted as 
follows: 
One respondent felt that the scrap metal dealers were playing a very important 
role in self-regulating. They were also valuable informants who were reporting 
the suspect behaviour of suspect entities selling copper. Scrap metal dealers, 
according to this respondent, were mostly honourable business people. They 
were people of substance, in some instances running very large businesses. 
The untrained SAPS as well as the other law enforcement personnel was 
mostly a nuisance, resulting in making these very important partners, in the 
fight against copper cable theft, disgruntled and non-co-operative. The law and 
this respondent stated that nobody could/should take the right to trade away 
from anybody, as it would impact on the right of free trade and 
entrepreneurship.  
3.3.22 Probe 22: Solutions  
Question: What do you propose as solution(s) for copper cable theft? 
The collaborated experiences of the respondents concerning solutions to 
copper cable threats were as indicated below:   
a. A clear national strategy for copper theft. 
b. A supportive law enforcement and proper legal capacity. 
c. A qualified police division with a high capacity to lead and to manage.  
d. A centralised intelligence hub from where all stakeholders could plan 
and work together. 
e. Technology, which would make the copper invaluable if illegally 
obtained.   
100 
f. An alternative to human guards. They were generally ineffective and too 
expensive. 
g. Laws which could be enforced.  
h. Management of human behaviour through dedicated security designs.  
i. National collaboration and zero tolerance processes. 
j. Share and utilise resources between stakeholders.  
k. Military to patrol infrastructure and borders.  
l. Export market was the wrong focus; the focus should be on internal 
causes, not symptoms.  
m. A total culture change in the country was needed. Respect for other and 
respect for the Law had to be non-negotiable.  
n. Employment had to increase in general. 
o. Stricter border control. Deport illegal immigrants, and prevent them from 
returning. 
p. Control the scrap-metal market. 
q. Buying all copper to biometrically trace it back to role players.   
r. Self-regulation (ethical) in the scrap metal market. 
s. Inputs of security specialists of major stakeholders in the economic and 
legal milieu where copper crimes were discussed.   
t. Quality training, for all the security managers, in security as a science. 
Everyone should be graded, especially those in top positions. 
u. A dedicated parliamentary committee for copper theft mitigation.  
v. A national drive to have a singular Crime IDO capacity to curb copper 
cable theft.    
3.3.23 Probe 23: CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental 
Design) 
Question: Do you have any knowledge of CPTED? If so, what does it 
mean to you and how do you think it can be utilised in mitigating copper 
cable theft?   
CPTED, as a theory and a methodology was unknown to the respondents; 
their answers were generally as follows:  
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a. They had heard of it but did not know much about it.  
b. They thought it was a new way of thinking. 
c. They had not heard of it and were not familiar with the concept.  
The respondents, all security specialists, were all senior managers regarded as 
leaders in their respective environments. The unfamiliarity of the term CPTED; 
the general lack of understanding security as science; the criminological 
methods, and the crime prevention theories in the security industry were all 
very disconcerting. This situation warranted an in-depth research.     
This transcribed interview schedule, consisting of 23 probes, was successful. It 
not only initiated, it also invited open dialogue on the topic of copper cable 
theft. Their willingness to share their experiences was positive and even 
overwhelming. The information collected in each probe topic reached 
saturation, which indicated the successful coverage of all the data. This made 
central and sub-themes easy to identify and to code.  
The phenomenological data that had been gathered was sufficient for the 
empirical phenomenological data analyses methodology to commence in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
3.4 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THE COPPER THEFT CASE 
The main points of the copper theft phenomenon were derived from the central 
themes as experienced by the Collective-Respondent. This collective 
respondent would be referred to as „R‟ in this chapter. The rationale for 
referring to all respondents as „R‟ was for practical reasons as including all the 
individual references, of all the respondents, all the time, could make this 
report unwieldy (Ladikos & Kruger 2006:168). This method would also support 
the search for invariance in the analyses process as mentioned by Ladikos and 
Kruger (2006:173).  
The sequence of events, as uniquely experienced by the respondents‟, or 
collectively as „R‟, and how these real themed experiences revealed the 
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existential and social meaning of the copper theft phenomena in Gauteng are 
discussed under the following themes:  
3.4.1 Theme A: Extent and impact of the crime  
„R‟s‟ experience stemmed from being part of the victim body and also from 
witnessing the consequential damage inflicted on the clients using his 
employer. „R‟ explained that the greatest problem experienced with copper 
cable crimes was the theft of copper cables that fed essential infrastructures 
delivering essential services. This again caused disruptions in the quality of life 
of the people dependant on these essential services. The first implication 
experienced, was the tangible damage of the theft; secondly the consequential 
out-flowing damage, and then thirdly the aftershock damage caused by 
disgruntled customers‟ projecting their frustration on the respondents‟ 
environment.    
This was a vicious cycle in which there were only losers. „R‟ mentioned, as an 
example, the incident where frustrated peddlers burnt of a railway station 
because they were late time and again. The lateness of the train was a 
consequence of the continuous copper cable theft.  
„R‟ was intensely frustrated by the consequential damages that were caused. 
He mentioned for example that one metre of stolen copper cable stopped the 
operations of many supply chains. The replacement costs based on labour, 
time lost, and stolen copper, were unrealistic in comparison to what had been 
stolen and what had to be done to replace this one metre piece of cable.  
„R‟ was of the opinion that the extent and the impact of copper theft on the 
national economy and on the general population was so great that it was in fact 
not comprehended by either the man on the street or the politicians .  
3.4.2 Theme B: The nature and modus operandi of the offender   
„R‟ experienced that copper cable thieves stole copper using any make shift 
tool they were able to design. The operational requirement remained the same 
as the cable had to either be dug out or cut off from a structure. What made the 
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theft of copper unique was the cables were a very dangerous item to steal 
because of the voltage they carried. But the way in which the thieves got 
around the electricity current showed that their knowledge levels were high. 
They had the capacity to diversify; they even stole goods from goods 
transporters affected by the power cuts. It was also mentioned by „R‟, that 
taxi‟s and other modes of transport that were unnaturally quick on the scene 
raised suspicion, which could perhaps imply a further collaboration between 
criminals and other elements that could indirectly benefit from copper theft.    
„R‟ experienced the modus operandi of copper cable thieves covered the whole 
spectrum of criminals, from subsistence thieves with rudimentary equipment 
and movement, to syndicate driven crime hubs who employed all spectrums to 
steal on their behalf, and lastly to organised criminal elements who appeared in 
any format necessary to steal. The subsistence thieves were mostly illegal 
immigrants, working in small groups, staying in informal settlements close to 
their target area, which made it very difficult to arrest them as they disappeared 
very easily. The syndicates employed subsistence thieves and/or used them as 
cheap suppliers; they were the doers. Syndicates were involved on all levels, 
from scrap dealers to recyclers. They were not only the planners they also ran 
big theft organisations where necessary.      
3.4.3 Theme C: Measurements utilised to combat crime 
According to „R‟ the measurements necessary to mitigate copper cable theft 
were multi-dimensional, involving direct target hardening measurements which 
covered better bolting actions of cables and deeper entrenched ground 
tunnels. Everything possible was being done to protect copper cost effectively 
through tangible measurements and to increase the effort and risk to the 
offender with regard to the environment he targeted. However, the large 
remote areas made timely reaction impossible to intercept this crime. 
According to „R‟; „To catch them you had to either catch them on the job or you 
had to have information so that you could wait for them - otherwise everybody 
was always two steps behind, which was currently the case.‟  
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Measurements also meant the involvement of social support systems and the 
collaboration between all role players. Based on the experience of „R‟ many 
social awareness initiatives such as; posters, pamphlets, radio messages, 
crime lines, community forums and newspaper advertisements, did not really 
work because the target population did not have access to these mediums and 
pamphlets tended to arrive a bit late. But possibly the most important aspect 
was the „culture of crime‟ that had to be changed at an early age. According to 
„R‟s‟, the media was more interested in propagating sensational news in a 
sensational format. And because copper theft lacked the sensation issues, the 
causes of the copper cable theft phenomena and the core needs were not 
addressed; in fact nothing noteworthy or any tangible benefits had ever come 
from it.  
„R‟ mentioned that it was just as difficult that to get the communities and other 
socio-ecology players involved, because the large geographical areas were 
each speckled with different sub-cultures. However, communities could 
become involved through training and awareness programmes. But 
unfortunately the vastness of the target area more often than not resulted in 
these programmes being decentralised, which made it difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of such community programmes. Success then largely depended 
on the passion and the dedication of the decentralised area management.  
„R‟ had not encountered any single technical system or tool that successfully 
mitigated copper cable theft as a copper replacement or an early crime 
detection tool. The current alternative replacement metals for copper were 
expensive. The question posed was just how long before these would also be 
stolen? „R‟ mentioned that technology was available that would prevent stolen 
copper from being melted, as it would become worthless thereafter. But even 
though it was rated a viable solution it was very expensive. Many hours of 
planning and money were being invested in central control centres to centralise 
monitoring and planning, but these still had to be proven effective to the point 
where they could take charge of copper theft environments. And to date these 
centres proved to be expensive ad hoc monitoring and recording „call-centres‟ 
and nothing more.  
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„R‟s‟ advised that the only measurement that would have an immediate and 
permanent positive impact on the copper cable theft phenomenon in Gauteng 
was the implementation of integrated crime intelligence and security 
surveillance technological capacities, that were directly supported by capable 
and effective law enforcement structures. This could work because then the 
focus would be on analysing this phenomenon and all of its variables (e.g. the 
scrap metal market) for proactive operations, resulting in a high level of arrests 
and successful prosecutions. „R‟ mentioned that some of these requirements 
already existed in a limited fashion yet the role players operated mostly in silos.   
3.4.4 Theme D: Factors inhibiting the mitigation of copper cable theft  
According to „R‟s‟ experience, a copper cable theft mitigation organisation had 
to be centrally facilitated and run by either the SAPS and/or Stake Holder 
Industries within clear accountable performance measurement parameters. 
The BACSA handed over the facilitating responsibility to the SAPS and the 
then functioning NFTCC was disintegrated at a time when it was just starting to 
come together. While still under the BACSA information was shared and even 
disruption operations were jointly done, which involved scrap yard inspections 
and even apprehending well known criminals. 
„R‟ said they knew the SAPS role players, but they experienced their capacity 
as very below standard. It felt as if the wheels had fallen off and they had been 
left on their own without a leader. They did, however, experience a strong 
political will in South Africa that was very positive towards changing the current 
situation. New laws were even being made and the public opinion and 
involvement was apparent and positive. However, goodwill alone could not 
realise good intentions in practise. And even with the backup of the weak 
SAPS, all the talk just remained talk, no substance followed the good 
intentions.  
„R‟ felt that the law and the old Second-Hand Goods Act (no 23 of 1955) were 
sufficient. The new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 9 of 2009) was just a modern 
update of the old Second Hand Goods Act (no 23 of 1955) with the inclusion of 
one or two more regulations to allow for more transparency. However, 
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according to „R‟, the problem did not reside with the law as such, but more with 
the implementation and policing thereof. He felt that should be the area of 
focus of the SAPS. But it frustrated „R‟ that the SAPS had thought it good to 
disband the special unit for non-ferrous metal at the end of 2009, and make 
copper theft a general function under the SAPS organised crime unit. „R‟ felt 
that the fact that copper theft was not a priority in the SAPS was demonstrated 
in the expertise and capacity that had been lost in this process.  
„R‟ monitored the SAPS closely; at most they patrolled scrap metal dealers up 
to three times per month. But no real effect had been noticed with the SAPS 
involvement in mitigating copper cable theft crimes, because the SAPS 
members were not trained and/or vigilant enough for the specific requirements 
of this crime. With limited manpower, knowledge and vehicles, the bigger 
picture was continuously missed all together. „R‟ experienced the SAPS as 
clueless and it showed, in that dockets got lost and simple cases took months 
and even years to be finalised; „The bottom-line is that you must realise you 
are on your own. Don‟t expect any help.‟  
„R‟s‟ experienced scrap metal dealers as being suspect in trading stolen 
copper. They created the market and were the core institution that kept copper 
theft alive and well. The reason for this suspicion was that all stolen copper 
eventually had to go through scrap metal dealers. The bare fact was that all the 
stolen copper, responsible for about 10 billion rand of consequential damages 
to the South African economy, had at one stage been handled by scrap metal 
dealers. „R‟ blamed the fact that scrap metal dealers were not effectively 
policed, which created the time and the opportunity for them to become 
involved in purchasing illegal copper. „R‟ felt with the allocation of specific 
areas and processes that could be controlled by the SAPS 24/7, only one 
copper vendor that did all the buyback of this metal should be allowed. 
Because if you took the opportunity for illegal trading away, you controlled the 
market, and by implementing such action, second hand copper would, from a 
criminal point of view, lose all value.   
The biggest challenge experienced in mitigating copper theft was the scarce 
and limited resources, especially money. Each year this threat increased more 
107 
than inflation, while the damages became more expensive to repair. However, 
in relation, the increase in the security budget was less each year and the 
expectation was to do more with less. „R‟ mentioned that security was mostly 
seen as grudge expenditure and it would always be the first to experience cut-
backs. In-house security especially, would always at best function on a 
skeleton crew capacity. „R‟ felt that this forced him to rather invest in 
specialised security and to displace the calculated risk acceptance to 
insurance. This would never eradicate copper cable theft, but it might manage 
losses to become „acceptable‟. From „R‟s‟ experience, EXCO‟s decisions were 
solely based on Risk, Threat and Vulnerability parameters. If the losses could 
be recovered from the increasing prices;- why not…as it was only the bottom-
line that counted.     
 „R‟ was also of the opinion, that if a risk assessment was not done regularly, 
showing clear threats, vulnerabilities and risks from the copper threat 
phenomenon, organisations and regions would be blind to this threat. „R‟ also 
mentioned that crime combating SOP‟s could only be effective if they were 
based on such recent risk assessments. „R‟ stated that there was a real need 
for custom designed risk assessments to measure best practise and 
performance measurements. „R‟ felt that corrective action on on-going copper 
thefts could only be implemented after a proper audit process had been 
followed. He mentioned that it was not just about fixing security related 
problems, but also about measuring if business requirements and satisfaction 
had been met. „R‟ found that such quality audits provided good statistics 
regarding losses, true and consequential, for later planning purposes and to 
measure the progress and the performance of current processes. A good risk 
assessment strategy and standard measurement process would counter that.  
„R‟ believed that the only strategy with which to mitigate copper cable theft was 
via a combination of physical security and Crime IDO‟s. „R‟ motivated this by 
pointing out that strategic plans were not always supported by clearly defined 
intelligence and quality physical security elements with the capacity to act and 
to think without hesitation, which was absolutely necessary as copper cable 
theft required instant decisions and immediate implementation.   
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„R‟s‟ experienced that security service providers that provided guards, 
eventually cost you more than the service they had been contracted to render. 
He explained that it had become necessary to appoint people or to use scare 
resources to watch over security service providers and more specifically their 
guards, to make sure they did their jobs well and correctly. „R‟ felt the only way 
to manage these service providers was to hold them liable for damages, and 
also to penalise them to the point of paying them nothing for bad service. This, 
however, did not make crime go away, it did add to the already high 
administrative implication. „R‟, mentioned that it only took a short time before 
guards were infiltrated and /or compromised by copper thieves or syndicates. 
„R‟ believed that the ultimate solution to copper cable theft would be that which 
did not include guarding provided by a service provider. „R‟ contemplated that 
security service provider‟s benefitted from the current crime situation, so why 
would they want to erode it? Guarding, however, was still the most widely used 
protection capacity; because they did not know what else to do within the 
limited budget. On a daily base „R‟ had to work with the SAPS and their 
knowledge based limitations. 
„R‟ mentioned that the area was impossibly large for which security had to be 
provided. In fact it was too large for physical security coverage to be practical 
and cost effective. „R‟ also mentioned that his internal personnel capacity was 
not either sufficient to patrol both internal security positions and external scrap 
yards to ensure compliance. „R‟ felt that this created ample opportunity for 
criminals to steal, and for guards and scrap yards this created ample 
opportunity to be non-compliant and/or to become involved in illegal copper 
trade. 
3.5 ILLUSTRATED CASE CONDENSATION: THE GIST 
According to „R‟s‟ personal experiences and perceptions the impact and the 
extent of copper theft crimes evoked feelings of frustration and despair  
especially when the crime could in actual fact not be mitigated if it was given 
the priority and the attention it deserved. What also stood out as a refrain 
throughout „R‟s‟ responses was that he believed that the political will was there, 
the leadership was there, the tools were there, the laws were there but the 
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capacity to support, implement and maintain the requirements, was just not 
possible within the current set-up. This situation, as perceived by „R‟, gave rise 
to feelings of frustration, anger and even despair. „R‟ portrayed this as; but a 
matter of accepting it as fate, as he was of the opinion that  nothing would 
change.  
„R‟s‟ experience of poor service delivery and especially of feelings of 
despondency was verbalised because copper cable theft occurred regularly 
and was greatly unabated, whilst no decisive action on the same grand scale 
was forth coming. Unfortunately, the powers that be and the general man on 
the street perceived this crime as being victimless. In the process this 
perception diminished any urgency required to combat this crime. 
The prominent aspects identifiable from „R‟s‟ experience of copper cable theft 
were embedded in; the inability of the law enforcement and the legal services 
to solve cases successfully; the uncoordinated and isolated manner in which 
copper theft was fought; and the continuous waiting and hoping to find a 
method or a technical tool to beat copper cable theft effectively and cost 
efficiently. 
In „R‟s‟ experience there was no proven technical tool that could prevent 
copper from being stolen. Everything that had been proposed was very much 
first generation or still in the research and development phases. As far as a 
methodology, to mitigate copper cable theft, was concerned, nothing specific 
had yet been defined, however, Crime IDO‟s were seen as a concept which 
had provided some success, even though these were reactive and based on 
small surgical strikes. Crime IDO‟s could work, according to „R‟, but only if all 
members participated. Thus it had to be a total collaboration exercise based on 
longevity.   
 „R‟ did not only criticise, he displayed an understanding for the dilemma of the 
copper cable theft exponents. „R‟ stated that the police were not trained to be 
copper theft fighters, and neither did they have the capacity to a pro-actively 
act and protect. Traditionally they were inclined and trained to be supportive 
role players in the investigation, the arrest and the prosecuting legal process, 
110 
and not security guards for major infrastructures. However, to make the newly 
passed law on the trade of second hand goods effective it was necessary to 
focus on the vast number of scrap metal vendors because all stolen copper 
eventually passed through the hands of scrap-metal vendors, and this required 
vigilant and dedicated police monitoring. However, in „R‟s‟ experience, the 
SAPS had neither the resources nor the capability, or the capacity or the 
personnel to carry out this basic task successfully. From this, „R‟ deduced that 
the criminals in fact knew where the strengths and the weakness of the SAPS 
were and where to focus when planning copper cable theft. These weaknesses 
resulted in business stakeholders depending on very limited internal resources 
and rather outsourcing major tasks to security providers. „R‟ explained that this 
situation was at best a small reactive solution for a much bigger security 
requirement. He emphasised the fact that when it came to combating this 
crime they had to date failed dismally, because it could never be won with what 
they had. Instead all they could do was to try to keep it at acceptable loss 
levels.  
„R‟ was of the opinion that since the BACSA‟s role of facilitation and conveying  
to get the entire group of businesses that were victims of copper theft around 
the same table had been handed over to the SAPS; the whole collaboration 
capacity had unravelled. These businesses were once again, each working in 
a separate silo.  
 „R‟ did not either agree that it was acceptable for businesses, which provided 
essential services to industry, to absorb damages through insurance designed 
by and for the calculated appetite risk equation. This approach would never 
eradicate copper cable theft criminals, and neither would it place trust in the 
minds of clients. This could in fact cause a negative domino effect within the 
bigger economical set up of South Africa, causing industries to either find other 
means of transport/power/communication or to close their businesses.   
„R‟ wanted to see all the industry role players putting their heads together, to 
present a plan on eradicating copper cable theft through the proper 
collaboration of knowledge, mitigation measurements and technology, shared 
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methodologies and law enforcement with focussed capacity supported by clear 
legal acts.  
The abovementioned examples illustrated the personal feelings and 
perceptions of the respondents. The following section will describe these in the 
context of the position or psychological structure in which the respondents 
were in relation to their experiences.    
3.6 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION 
The respondents („R‟) had on average directly been involved in a combating 
role to mitigate copper theft for more than 20 years. In „R‟s‟ experience since 
2000, non-ferrous metal theft was very little and only isolated had been 
reported. But in the last seven years it had suddenly escalated and become an 
unstoppable crime, inflicting consequential damages that had a disastrous 
impact not only on all operations but also on the South African economy as a 
whole.   
The experience of „R‟ resided in feelings of frustration, powerlessness and 
vulnerability. „R‟ continuously explained that the bigger picture or structure had 
to be understood, in that the physical deed of copper theft, was in most cases 
a minor activity, which most people did not care much about because to them it 
was a relatively small piece of stolen copper cable with a limited street value. 
However, the consequential costs and damages were symptomatic factors that 
were much graver than the essential piece of copper stolen.   
„R‟ stated that copper thieves would never become rich out of copper cable 
theft as they got paid a minimum fee, and therefore, they kept on stealing to 
survive. They would never retire. Whether the price was good or whether it was 
bad, they would steal. It was actually a never ending process; a futile war 
against a mostly small and mobile enemy „insurgent‟ that caused at will, grave 
damages to essential services. And it did not take up a lot of time and it could 
be done anywhere and at a high speed.  
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„R‟ despondently stated that the holes could never all be plugged as they were 
always trying to catch up because the thieves chose the playing field and they 
made the rules. If you removed a security capacity the theft would just re-occur 
and carry on as per usual because they knew it was not always affordable to 
keep selected security measures in place all the time; „So, you are damned if 
you do, and you are damned if you don‟t.‟     
According to „R‟; all the security requirements or rather the lack thereof, put 
massive pressure on internal controls. It was impossible to manage and to 
control if you knew that you were not compliant with what was required. This 
instilled frustration and feelings of abandonment and resulted in the „R‟s‟ opting 
for the option of letting insurance cover costs even though this resulted in 
insurance premiums increasing. In fact it did not matter what they did they 
could not win.  
Another frustration of „R‟ was everybody knew the scrap metal market bought 
the stolen copper, but somehow this could not be controlled by any means. 
Something did indeed smell wrong.  
These experiences of „R‟ were also emphasised by the lack of understanding 
and the unfair treatment exposed in the internal management processes and 
expectations. The attitude was that cable theft was a responsibility of the 
security manager. It was in fact one of the key performance areas. If he/she 
was not able to control cable theft and the out flowing symptomatic activities 
impacted negatively on business then he/she would not get a salary increase.. 
Respondent „R‟ further stated that other process partners rated a manager‟s 
SLA (Service Level Agreement) according to how he/she allowed the business 
to work at leisure or not. This again had a snowball impact on the service 
providers, who had accepted such SLAs, even though they knew they would 
be under resourced, and would be heavily penalised for anything that went 
wrong under their guard. This meant that the service provider was continuously 
remunerated at a higher reduced premium.   
„R‟ only saw things getting worse in stating they were in fact on their own 24/7.  
They could not depend on anyone for assistance, not even the police. There 
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was not either a central facilitating or an organised body that could bring role 
players together. The previous NFTCC (Non-ferrous Theft Combating 
Committee) no longer existed. Technology that worked was very scarce, and if 
it was not benchmarked through collaboration it would in any case not become 
familiar to all role players. And even though the money was less, they were still 
expected to do more with this less, when in fact they did not even have enough 
at any other time to begin with. 
The employer or company expected „R‟ to combat copper cable theft without 
an internal or an in-house platform of knowledge and experience to work from. 
Instead he had to depend on outsiders and their equipment. „R‟ also touched 
on the fear aspect of being under-powered regarding technical and human 
resources. He stated that to run a successful counter copper theft operation 
required specialised equipment and personnel, people who understood that 
there was no quick cure and easy application. It was a dangerous environment, 
people were armed, both sides. Knowledge of security and risk assessments 
were indeed a prerequisite, but these people were expensive and not readily 
available. Where organisations had outsourced, they had lost in-house 
knowledge and the experience to control the copper cable theft phenomena. 
This implied that resources (physical and intellectual) which were necessary to 
build future business resilience on were lost forever.  
“R‟s” despondency was underwritten in his statement that It had become a 
nightmare as they actually knew what to do, the laws were there and the 
expertise could be outsourced. But they were alone in this fight because with 
their limited resources they were restricted. And the formal sector did not have 
the knowhow to lead and/or the resources or to actively combat this crime.  
The final step in the empirical phenomenological methodology entails that all 
the reduced themes, the condensation of the illustrated experiences and the 
psychological structure as depicted, are subjected to the following question: 
What is the essence of the psychological structure of any experience of crime 
in similar circumstances? To achieve this requirement the researcher 
continuously looked for invariance in the analyses to achieve a higher level of 
abstraction (Ladikos & Kruger 2006:173).  
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3.7 THE ESSENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE   
The essential psychological structure, affecting the experience of copper cable 
theft within which the respondents‟ experiences of copper theft will be 
discussed, is embedded in five central themes identified to serve as the 
essence of the psychological structure. These central themes are further 
delineated by the contextual supporting „sub themes‟, and each „sub theme‟ will 
be discussed and clarified within the context of the central theme..  
These five central themes are: 
1. The extent and the impact of the crime.  
2. The nature and the modus operandi of the offender. 
3. The measurements utilised to mitigate the crime.  
4. Factors limiting successful mitigation of the crime. 
5. Proposed solutions. 
The researcher established a general structure of the experience of copper 
cable theft crimes, as reflected in „R‟s‟ experiences.  
„R‟ understood the gravity of the copper cable theft phenomena and that it 
spanned over national and international borders. It had, however, become 
clear that „R‟ experienced extremely high levels of frustration and even 
despondency, because it seemed as if this crime would not be successfully 
stopped and/or combated. What made it even worse was that the crime was 
understood by him/her and enough knowledge existed, and was readily 
available, to put a workable plan together to mitigate copper cable theft 
successfully.  
The essential knowledge about copper cable theft as experienced by „R‟ is 
depicted below.  
3.7.1. Extent and Impact of the crime  
a. Not understood: „R‟ was frustrated because the unique phenomenon of 
copper cable theft was not fully understood by the general public or the 
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law enforcement agencies. The impact was mostly experienced 
indirectly by the man on the street. It was even called the „victimless 
crime‟.  
b. Consequential damages: The essence of copper cable theft resided in 
the impact thereof, more specifically the „consequential‟ impact thereof. 
It only took a few metres of stolen copper cable to bring to a standstill a 
whole business infrastructure or supply chain that was reliant on the 
power conducted through that copper cable.  
c. Out of sight, out of reach: All the published material showed that 
copper cable theft was responsible for major damages to the South 
African economical infrastructure. However, the initial crime deed was 
nonsensical in the bigger scope of things, and was it not reported on 
enough to allocate the necessary resources and leadership to stop it.  
3.7.2 The nature and modus operandi of the offender  
a. Multi-dimensional: The perpetrators were not a specific group, but a 
sample of the national and illegal immigrant socio-economic 
compilation, which involved subsistence thieves, hardened criminals, 
amateurs, gangs and small to large organised crime syndicates. The 
criminals would use any measure and means to their disposal to commit 
coppers theft crimes. Even though the rudimentary tools used were 
basically the same, the DIY methodology was implemented when 
required. These methods also differed from using very basic to 
specialist tools designed by knowledgeable people. The organised 
criminals were well trained and planned their crime operations in the 
finest details. „R‟ felt that the criminal intelligence networks were far 
better than those of the victims. What was most disturbing to „R‟ was the 
internal involvement of own personnel, contractors and or suppliers in 
the copper cable theft environment. 
b. Gauteng the originator: Gauteng seemed to be the copper theft „hub‟ 
and originator of copper cable theft; some even stated that Gauteng was 
the training ground for copper cable thieves. 
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c. Copper cable theft would happen: The cost to fight such a versatile 
and mobile adversary was high. The criminals had the luxury of 
choosing the time and place. They had the intelligence to precisely 
design and plan the cable copper theft. „R‟ had to contemplate areas 
where the appetite for risk might or might not be tolerated and then plan 
accordingly. „R‟ knew that unprotected copper would be stolen; it was 
just a matter of time. And if the criminals were not interrupted they would 
steal „everything‟ of value.  
3.7.3 Measurements utilised to combat copper cable theft 
The following measurements were being used to combat copper cable theft:  
a. Anything that worked: „R‟ was responsible for copper cable theft 
mitigation, and utilised all possible measurements, tangible and non-
tangible, to lessen the threat, vulnerability and risk to his corporate or 
parastatal.  
b. The media: The media was directly and indirectly a tool that was 
utilised by „R‟ to reduce copper cable theft. The media in all its formats, 
TV, radio, newspapers, pamphlets and posters was, however, an 
expensive option and only successful if deployed on a continuous basis. 
Unfortunately the media was sensational in nature and covered the 
damages and not the source or the cause of the criminal conduct. What 
was seen as a bonus was the investigative TV programme; Carte 
Blanche, which aired a few in-depth case studies and operational 
programmes dedicated to copper cable theft. However, the media did 
not always reach the people who really needed to see these 
programmes.  
c. Physical security: This entailed guards and a reactive alarm capacity. 
Physical security was still the easiest measurement to utilise. This, 
however, had become very expensive and less and less effective, 
because of the lack of resources and the vastness of the areas that had 
to be protected. 
d. Proactive v/s reactive: What was needed was a proactive/early 
warning capacity. Everything was reactively inclined, which implied the 
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action took place after the incident had already happened and in which 
case the thieves nearly always got away.  
e. Technology: Technology was the solution, according to „R‟; it, however, 
sounded more like a cry in the dark. However, at this stage, as far as 
the equipment and the personnel were concerned, it was haphazard 
and expensive. Nobody wanted to pay for research and development 
without guarantees. Technology was required that would specifically 
replace copper with a product that would have no market value if stolen. 
Technology to support an integrated security capacity was important. It 
was mentioned that a capacity was available where surveillance and 
other monitoring capacities were interfaced to provide an immediate GIS 
picture in a central Risk Control Centre from where decisions could be 
made. This would provide an immediate picture of what was transpiring. 
However, to manage and to maintain such a capacity to its full potential 
with the current resources would not be possible. 
f. IDO solution: „The biggest challenge remains: to act before the crime 
occurs.‟ This is the refrain that „R‟ continuously emphasised. In order to 
realise this challenge, Crime Intelligence Driven Operations (Crime-IDO) 
was the current buzz word among the respondents. It was seen as the 
only solution that had so far shown real sustainable dividends to control 
copper theft. In a nutshell; this concept required a well settled 
investigative and intelligence gathering capacity, which would become 
so well imbedded in a specific area, that crime and criminals would be 
unmasked even before they could act. It was hoped that in the end it 
would become unnecessary to have expensive security systems and 
guards behind every bush. The time it would take to build this concept 
and for the current unequipped capacity to run such an operational 
system would, however, be a major challenge. Currently such a capacity 
could only be outsourced.  
g. The need for a qualified facilitator: „R‟ stated that the only way in 
which the copper theft crime would be solved, was if the criminal did not 
see the target as easy and risk free. This would only happen if a 
massive operational capacity was in place that covered the whole 
country, and from where all role players could be manoeuvred as 
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collaborative partners. Such a capacity was in the process of being 
implemented by the disbanded NFTCC, under the auspicious of BACSA 
(Business against Crime South Africa), and it would have worked as all 
role players had been brought together, but the collaboration process 
was not facilitated properly. In fact many joint operations were done, 
and the support was there because many successes had been 
achieved, but since BACSA had withdrawn from their original role as 
facilitator, everything had come to a standstill while everyone waited for 
the promised replacement 
h. The SAPS as new facilitator: To the distress of „R‟ the BACSA, as 
facilitating body, referred their responsibility to the SAPS - in his opinion, 
the wolf in sheep‟s clothing. And since the SAPS had accepted this role 
nothing was done to bring the role players together, who in the bigger 
picture had subsequently become leaderless, and operated in their own 
silos. It was stated that if the SAPS was actively involved, the message 
had not yet reached them. They had been hearing the right noises for 
years, but to date had not seen anything at ground level.  
i. Shared costs and resources: „R‟ stated that costs could be shared 
between victims of copper cable theft; the resources could be shared 
and the operations could be planned. Millions of rand were wasted 
because of duplication and the silo mentality. The command and control 
of a „strong‟ facilitator was required and but such a capacity did not 
exist. 
j.  Major reason for a dysfunctional situation: „R‟ saw the issues of no 
leadership and a break down in collaboration as possibly being the 
major reasons why copper cable theft was still unabated and serious.  
k. Political support: Even though the general feeling towards formal 
structures and leadership was negative, „R‟ felt that there genuinely was 
politically commitment, goodwill and support to stop the threat of copper 
cable theft. However, much more than vocal support and new Acts were 
needed. It was a question of empowering the capacity to enable the 
Acts that had been promulgated and to realise the promises that had 
been made to the business environment. Yet very little of this had been 
done and what was especially troublesome was the incapability of the 
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SAPS‟ to fulfil their role. Somebody was required to make not only a 
visible but also a tangible standing that could be measured for 
accountability.  
l. Law enforcement and the police: The police were incapable of 
providing the services that the security manager wanted, so a security 
manager was compelled to take the necessary steps to keep his 
working environment safe. „We are alone; we must accept that and fend 
for ourselves‟. „R‟ further stated that when the police eventually pitched 
up they were „clueless‟. They had become a politically driven 
organisation, where sensational aspects were more important and as 
copper theft was a dirty hard working environment, you would not find 
any sensation there. In fact the police only complicated matters as they 
were not trained and lacked the capacity to make a real difference. The 
question was often asked, whether the police in any way understood 
their own constitutional mandate and responsibility in protecting life and 
possessions. There was in general a lot of negativity towards the SAPS 
especially because of their lack of capacity and competency on all 
levels. What was often mentioned was that the SAPS were expected to 
be the leaders, and everyone would welcome it if the SAPS did take up 
this role and were able to replace the security service providers. 
m. Scrap metal market: „R‟ saw the scrap metal market as being the 
biggest role player that needed to be controlled, if the copper cable theft 
phenomena in any way were to turn for the better; „The only solution is 
to close all scrap metal dealers from trading in copper‟. „R‟ felt that 
specific law enforcement and the criminal justice system was severely 
lacking in tackling the problem of copper cable theft. However, even if it 
might be seen as being a little late, a new law regulating second hand 
trade would be welcomed as it could be a powerful tool especially to 
control scrap metal dealers. „R‟ especially stated that the new Second-
Hand Goods Act (no 6 0f 2009) for example, would forbid scrap metal 
dealers from buying any copper that was not clearly identifiable and/or 
burned. It would also require the second hand metal market to have a 
self-regulating body that would ensure compliance. However, „R‟ 
doubted the effectiveness of the CJS (Criminal Justice System) and the 
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Law Enforcement agents ability to implement the policing and to 
maintain the new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 0f 2009). The problem 
was if they could not make the old Act work how would they make the 
new Act work because nothing had changed in their capacities. This 
would in all probability turn out to be yet another good idea, which will 
be badly executed.  
n. The crime culture: An aspect that made „R‟ cynical about resolving this 
problem of copper cable theft was the culture of crime in South Africa. It 
was too big for the SAPS to contain. Crime that was sensational and 
played on the emotional received all the attention. Crime that was 
perceived victimless would always be last in the row of priorities, and it 
did not matter how serious it was. South Africans had very little respect 
for the laws and for each other. They were not aware of their role in 
building a country, everyone just thought of him/herself and forgot about 
the rest; „An upgrade was needed for loyalty; we had to all see the 
country as being ours.‟   
3.7.4 Organisational challenges that impact on copper cable theft 
mitigation  
The focus, at this point, was the influence of internal organisational challenges 
on the mitigation of copper cable theft operations. The following are the factors 
„R‟  struggled with on a daily basis.  
a. Financial reality: „R‟ named financial restrictions in obtaining and in 
maintaining the necessary resources, as a major contributor to the lack 
of capacity to properly combat copper cable theft. However, the 
business perspective on appetite for risk had to be understood. But in 
many cases „R‟ wondered about the common sense of continuous 
financial restrictions when the crime and the threat kept on escalating. 
He said security was not a nice to have anymore. It had become a „had 
to have‟. Unfortunately security was still grudge expenditure for many of 
the top management role players. It was the first place to cut in financial 
difficulties and in South Africa this had become a recipe for disaster.  
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b. Quality of security personnel: The quality of security personnel 
contributed to the financial restrictions because it had become the 
dumping ground for people who could not make it elsewhere, or who got 
a job through political connections. Most security managers had no 
formal education in the security environment and neither were they 
interested in security. Yet they were expected to analyse the problem, 
look for solutions and justify recommendations and funding for all 
decisions taken up to board level.  
c. Training: Training was a necessity for security personnel and law 
enforcement players; „It is clear that we fight copper theft with the wrong 
people and the wrong tools.‟ The notion to become involved in IDO type 
operations required a specialist with experienced intelligence and 
investigation capacity. This type of resource come at a price and was 
not available everywhere. In fact „R‟ was afraid of mentioning the need 
for specific personnel because they were given people that made the 
problem worse and not better. These people all needed training, and in 
the end training took time and money.  
d. Security strategy: The lack of a clear corporate strategy for security 
and for combating cable theft contributed towards making „R‟ feel 
disempowered. It was always a grey area: They did not know what to 
expect, or what the mandate was, or which policy had to be put in place. 
Security was either not part of the bigger business plan or not 
represented by capable people at the highest level. Yet command and 
control was directly part of strategy. Structures followed strategy and at 
this stage, from senior management and upwards, it was all in order but 
down the line it was a mess. „R‟ clearly stated that control and 
performance compliance on ground level was bad, and that this was 
indicative of the fact that top management was at best unsure of what to 
do about the problem of copper cable theft.  
e. Outsourcing mentality: A major contributor to weak security was the 
outsourcing of security functions, especially at management level. They 
were in the hands of guarding mercenaries. Security Service Providers 
were business people; crime was their bread and butter. They would try 
to sell you as little as possible for as much as possible. And to empower 
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the Security Provider with decision making capacity was like putting 
them in charge of a blank cheque. Their interest was to keep the status 
quo, not to get rid of the crime altogether. „R‟ felt that this situation was 
evident in that the real security competency resided with service 
providers; the client/stakeholder did not have a competent structure with 
which to enforce compliance. This was why „R‟ hoped for a purely 
technical solution, with which to get rid of the hold of Security Providers.  
f. Specific copper cable theft model: A scientific analysis of the copper 
cable theft phenomenon, and a specific design of a mitigation model, did 
not exist. Every organisation did as it pleased within its own frame of 
reference. Even though copper cable theft was a phenomenon in its 
own right, it was still seen as just an ordinary crime that had to be 
mitigated with general counter crime measurements. This entailed 
utilising the same „general dated‟ security thinking and methodologies. 
Copper was still regarded as just another theft. The only difference was 
that it impacted heavily on the South African infrastructure. But in the 
same breathe, why did some people, even MP‟s, want to declare it as 
sabotage and terrorism?‟ This meant that copper cable theft was not just 
an ordinary theft, and therefore, its solution would not be found in 
ordinary thinking. A project plan and model was required based on 
proper facts and methodologies, with leadership that encapsulated the 
total security environment, as well as the social factors. „R‟ endorsed the 
fact that specialists had to review the whole action plan against copper 
cable theft from all angles, to identify a specific plan that could be 
implemented nationally, because; „At this stage, opportunists claiming 
successes from operational up to technical breakthroughs are confusing 
the issue even further.‟ A specific crime prevention model, accepted by 
all, and demonstrated by a qualified capacity, supported with a formal 
facilitating status, was urgently required.    
3.7.5 Solutions proposed  
Many of the solutions mentioned here, were previously discussed in the above-
mentioned experiences of „R‟. One solution that was reiterated throughout this 
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research was the fact that a clear national strategy for copper cable theft was 
urgently required. This strategy had to provide directives for establishing, 
implementing and maintaining an adequate, qualified law enforcement and 
legal capacity This capacity would be respected and in itself fulfil the role of a 
leader.  
The respondents, who were part of the group of security managers, 
continuously listed the following „core‟ solutions they believed would contribute 
towards effectively combating copper theft:    
a. The implementation of a qualified police division with a high capacity to 
lead and to manage.  
b. A centralised intelligence hub from where all stakeholders could plan 
and work together.  
c. Qualified security professionals, who understood how security worked, 
and who had as a template a unique model to mitigate copper theft. 
d. Strict border control and the effective deportation of illegal immigrants. 
e. Strict controls over the scrap-metal market. 
f. Self-regulation (ethical) in the scrap metal market. 
g. Quality training in security, recognising the security field as a 
professional science to be managed by security specialists. 
h. Technology that would make recycled copper invaluable. 
i. Replace human guards, as they were ineffective and too expensive. 
j. Laws which could be enforced.  
k. Management of human behaviour through respected social 
programmes.  
l. National collaboration and zero tolerance processes. 
m.  Sharing and utilising resources.  
n. Military capacity to be utilised for patrolling remote assets.  
o.  Focus on internal causes, not external symptoms, for example; export 
copper. 
p.  The creation of a dedicated copper theft forum with a dedicated director 
facilitating the process as a project. This person had to be 
knowledgeable, experienced and had to have accredited qualifications.  
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
During the qualitative sessions of this research, was clear that the respondents 
valued the fact that their opinions, about copper cable crime, were highly rated 
yet anonymous. The respondents were open to sharing and willingly provided 
a window within which their experiences of crime could be placed with other 
perspectives.  
The gathering of data, by means sharing experiences within the context of 
dialogue had been successfully accomplished. The recognised methodology 
required and subscribed to, for this research, was closely followed and 
adhered to. The total field and not just the individual were placed in the context 
of the methodology, the result of which appeared clearly as the various 
protocols were considered.  
The expertise of the focus workgroup participants was used to confirm the data 
gathered in this chapter. This focussed work group of participants, for all 
practical purposes, became the sixth respondent of this research sample and a 
helpful add-on to the unit of analyses.  
The search for the essential structure of the unit of analysis, namely the senior 
security managers‟ experiences of copper cable theft crimes, led to the 
identification of the five areas which addressed the experiences of crime as 
central themes. Within these central themes, a global picture of the experience 
of copper cable crimes in Gauteng was recorded. This gave meaning to how 
senior security management in Gauteng had experienced the phenomena of 
copper cable theft in its entirety. It was important to note that all the 
respondents shared the same experiences. A saturation level of the selected 
topics was clearly reached after having uncovered the total picture. This was 
confirmation that the research design had been the right choice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is both a synopsis and an integration of the previous chapters. It 
illustrates where, and how the literature review and the empirical research 
findings come together to enlighten the set goals for this research as 
delineated in the Central Themes.  
4.2 THEME A: EXTENT AND IMPACT OF COPPER THEFT   
Richardson (2011:1) illustrates the seriousness of this crime and the general 
impression there is towards copper cable theft, as follows: „The major impact is 
on the country's total economy. Surely that constitutes sabotage, which was a 
major crime the last time I checked‟. The impact of copper cable theft affects 
many different types of victims such as citizens, businesses and even the 
government. However, the greater impact of the damage done by one stolen 
cable is not always seen and or experienced by everyone, thus copper cable 
theft is referred to as the „victimless crime‟.  
The vast majority of the literature reviewed stated that the on-going damages 
incurred to the economy were immense. In chapter two various sources point 
out that South Africa loses anything between seven billion rand and sixteen 
billion rand per annum as a result of copper theft. (Phakathi, 2010a:1). This 
unacceptable situation was because this crime was fought without proper law 
enforcement leadership and with the lack of adequate government resources. 
The vast remote expanse over which this crime occurred was continuously met 
with ineffective security measurements, regardless of the continual escalation 
of copper cable theft. It was reported that the consequential damages were out 
of control and unprecedented levels were continuously surpassed by new 
negative benchmarking; the economy was being sabotaged and copper 
thieves were called „terrorists‟, by members of Parliament, as they posed an 
intolerable threat to essential services (Ndlovu & Magwaza 2008). It was clear 
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that the cumulative damage to the economy of this country, its organisations 
and individuals, was staggering (Geldenhuys, 2008:1). 
The statistical picture is very negative, and for many ordinary people the 
numbers are mind boggling and not easy to grasp. This poses another problem 
because the bigger picture is not fully grasped, by either the man on the street 
or in some instances even by the policy makers. The only frequently published 
figures depicting copper theft are produced by SACCI, and these are based 
only on the estimated replacement cost of stolen copper as recorded by 
Telkom, Eskom and Transnet. These limited statistics do not include the 
figures of the municipalities and the industries.  
This research encountered many discrepancies in the figures reported on 
copper theft. But if the minimum averages only, were taken into account the 
numbers remained staggering. The average figures available for the 
replacement of stolen copper, as collected from published sources, for Eskom 
were 15 – 20 million rand, per annum; for Transnet 20–90 million rand per 
annum and for Telkom 900- 1279 million per annum (allafrica.com., 2012:1). 
And to give an indication of the cost of security to counter copper cable theft, it 
was published that Transnet Freight alone would spend 500 million rand per 
annum on security for the 2010/2011 year (TFR, 2010:1). But to put the figures 
mentioned in the reality of consequential losses, Telkom alone suffered losses, 
to the value of three billion rand over the 2007/2009 year, related to copper 
cable theft, security costs and direct losses in revenue (Hamlyn, 2009:1).  
The research findings, with regard to the impact of copper cable theft as 
derived from the close and personal experiences of the Senior Security 
Managers in Gauteng (most of them have a national responsibility), put 
together a clear image of eminent ruin. According to the respondents the 
general population and even the law enforcement agencies did not fully 
understand the unique phenomenon of the crime of copper cable theft, 
because the impact thereof was mostly experienced and portrayed through the 
range of indirect damages. The true range of damages incurred by copper 
cable theft resided in the „consequential‟ impact thereof. It only took a few 
metres of stolen copper cable to bring a whole business infrastructure to a 
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standstill. The respondents experienced this as frightening. According to their 
viewpoint this crime had the potential of eventually bringing the country to its 
knees. They agreed that business and strategic infrastructure were being 
gambled with if this crime, that was becoming uncontrollable, was not 
controlled soon.  
Frustratingly because there is no real sensational value in copper theft crimes, 
the policy makers lose focus and interest in the phenomenon of copper cable 
theft, and then the needs required to fight these causal factors are neglected. It 
was in light of this „gap‟ between policy makers and the security specialists on 
the ground, that the recent uproar in 2011 was caused when the Gautrain had 
to cancel some operations due to copper cable theft. The guardians of copper 
cables saw this incident as a temporarily window of opportunity to get the 
necessary high level dignitaries in politics and in law enforcement involved and 
interested. Once again the media was inevitably mobilised to its full extent, to 
create an awareness of the copper theft phenomenon in SA. Some security 
managers even stated that this event was like „manna from heaven‟ for the 
copper theft cause. However, nothing substantial was in essence brought to 
life, not even a formal enquiry of this phenomenon or just something to provide 
security managers with some sort of empowerment. It was purely back to 
„normal‟ for the responsible security managers who once again were left to 
react to copper theft incidents, monitor the decay, write reports and attend 
workshops on copper theft just to vent some frustration. Nothing in fact  
changed, everything has remained the same. One respondent aptly quoted 
Einstein saying; „If you keep on doing the same thing and hope for change then 
you are truly a mad man‟.  
4.3 THEME B: THE NATURE AND MODUS OPERANDI OF THE OFFENDER 
The literature review and the respondents agreed that copper cable thieves 
came from all walks of life. In general the research sources mentioned that 
there was a distinct group of the role players who were stealing and/or dealing 
in illegal copper whenever an opportunity to steal copper cable presented itself. 
Four distinct groups were identified in this research:  
128 
1. The subsistence or „bread and butter‟ thieves, this represented the petty 
theft criminal element and was also the most common group. They 
worked in small groups, stayed in informal settlements close to power 
cable lines from where they worked in a hit and run fashion. Some 
worked together in smaller gangs, each with their own leader who was 
an active serving military member from a foreign country making, some 
easy money on the sideline. These subsistence thieves were mainly 
unemployed; they stole for survival, regardless of market prices and 
conditions. Illegal immigrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
appeared to be the core of the subsistence thieves in Gauteng.  
2. Organised crime networks belonged to the next group which consisted 
of different numbers and a different quality of gang; ad hoc teams and 
dedicated syndicates. In many cases subsistence thieves were 
employed by this group. It was this group that regularly recruited internal 
employees from stakeholders, security providers, logistical contractors 
and law enforcement. They became involved, or were invited to be 
involved, because of their expert knowledge and experience. Syndicates 
utilised not only the smaller informal groups, but also the more formal 
organised crime cells, by giving orders and demanding feedback 
through command channels initiated from the ground diggers and cable 
cutters up to the business owners recycling copper. Syndicates 
operated more sophisticatedly as they had the resources, a proper 
command, and a functioning control system. However, some informal 
syndicates were just an illiterate mob, whilst others were used just for a 
specific „informal‟ or impromptu theft operation, after which they 
naturally dispersed. Well run syndicates that faced the possibility of 
being apprehended, were supported by typical blue-collar types, who 
provided effective logistical and intelligence platforms with arranged 
protection and convincing cover stories. Some respondents strongly 
suspected that some parts of the Criminal Justice System (Courts, 
SAPS and Organised Crime Police) were involved in these syndicates. 
Organised crime was not experienced on a large scale; however, they 
did the biggest damage and were thus the biggest threat. They had both 
influence and business expertise, they for example tendered for permits 
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to deliver copper and then recruited „thieves‟ to provide stolen copper for 
these quotas.  
3. The role players in the Scrap Metal Industry such as the scrap metal 
dealers and the recyclers, if given the opportunity, were also part of 
these organised crime networks. Brigands made up of scrap metal 
dealers, or who represented a large scrap metal dealer, were suspected 
of currently operating these networks. They generally only bought and 
recycled stolen copper; their physical involvement in stealing copper 
was actually very minimal.  
The players are many, and they come from diverse environments and 
therefore, a very highly specialised investigative function is required to 
counter these metal merchant crime groups, such as, the asset 
forfeiture group that has been used successfully, even if only in isolated 
cases.  
4. Foreign cartels, mafia‟s and such „business‟ groups have also been 
identified as actively running copper crime ventures in Gauteng. The 
ease of the South African market makes them even run their own 
independent crime operations within South Africa, without any South 
African involvement.  
Each of the above-mentioned four groups is made up of different numbers and 
unique sub-cultures. The diversity and compilations of copper crime exponents 
are legion, only to be matched by their innovativeness to steal. No real solution 
exists for subsistence thieves, because their ad hoc operations, without formal 
structure, planning and disorganised content make them impossible to predict, 
control and manage from a traditional security perspective. The experience of 
the respondents showed that subsistence thieves, with limited resources, 
operated more in city areas, whilst capable syndicates operated more in rural 
areas. Some thieves had been previous employees who were connected to 
organised crime or syndicates. This made them very valuable as they knew 
where to put the power off, how the systems worked, and where an 
infrastructure was at its most vulnerable. Evidence had been found of high 
volumes of theft where thieves used paid labour to help them carry the copper 
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cables. The number of thieves was determined by the amount of cable that 
could be stolen and carried, and vice versa.  
Copper thieves, whether on a small or a large scale, did excellent 
reconnaissance. They even did dry runs by uncovering or tripping copper 
cables and then keeping these targets under surveillance. If nobody acted 
defensively they commenced stealing at will. The thieves stealing in gang 
formation operated in military fashion. They had members in observation posts, 
point‟s men, and a „patrol‟ group making contact with possible ambush 
elements. There were constant cellular communications between the groups 
and their logistical support, for example, vehicles and safe houses, were at 
hand.  
Building networks were very important tools used by copper cable thieves. 
These were achieved by recruiting targeted individuals in key positions who 
had gripes or were experiencing financial difficulties. They were provided with 
the essentials and with luxuries for the services they could provide, which 
included giving out information and/or looking away when necessary.    
The respondents were not all in accord regarding internal theft; one stated that 
only one percent of theft was allocated to internal employees. However, very 
little evidence was available of the involvement of their own personnel in 
copper crimes. This was mostly because of the limited forensic audits and 
records available. Most respondents, however, found there was a tendency of 
their own personnel, especially contractors, being involved at construction 
sites, especially where copper cut-offs were lying around and unused material 
was stored in abundance in temporary and also in general warehouses. The 
CEO of City Power stated clearly that contactors were often responsible for 
theft, primarily of scrap material but also of new cable (EE Publishers, 2010). 
Their involvement was more secondary, for example; selling information, 
especially those with close connections with illegal immigrants. Contractors 
doing maintenance on copper lines were regarded with suspicion by all 
respondents, as these contractors were mostly players (holding and 
maintaining copper capacities) and referees (reporting theft and deciding what 
needed to be done to repair damages).   
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Copper cable thieves served in all capacities; from police officers, contactors, 
employees, security officers, service providers and corporate management. 
Some copper cable theft syndicates and copper cable theft specialists were 
highly qualified and well trained individuals with the influence and the capacity 
of running large criminal operations. The higher the capacity level of a criminal 
was; the better the level and size of equipment used, from excavators up to 
specialised vehicles and copper recycling equipment. In lower level groupings 
thieves used rudimentary tools, anything that would work of which bolt cutters, 
saws, poles and rubber bands for isolation and binding, were the most 
common. Copper cable thieves in general had time to plan and to survey; they 
knew their areas and environment in detail. They knew the security capacity 
and the processes; they knew precisely where soft target areas were. Copper 
cable thieves were seldom caught on the job, as the remote environment and 
well placed observation posts gave these criminal the benefit, and because 
they stole at night the darkness became their ally, helping them to get away 
quicker. Copper thieves constantly looked for weak spots and vulnerable 
places. Their patterns changed, but their methodology invariably stayed the 
same.  
Overhead cables were at first the biggest target until recently; now 95% of the 
targets were underground cables. They had to implement a different strategy; 
first they had to dig up or expose the cables and then „trip‟ the power by 
making a fire on the underground cables until the power tripped. Sometimes 
the power tripped when they hit a nail into the cable, this was, however, very 
dangerous and only used for smaller cables. In some instances a small arms 
side gun was used to fire a shot into the cable. This was also very dangerous 
because when there was such a violent short, an electric arch was created, 
which could burn and kill bystanders. In most instances only new naïve thieves 
were electrocuted; the experienced thieves knew what they were doing. 
When stealing overhead cables the thieves threw cables or ropes over the 
chosen copper cable and caused a „short‟ in the power current of the cable. 
Then they cut the cable using a saw or a bolt cutter that had been attached to 
a long wooden pole, for isolation purposes. Then, the cables were cut into 
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small pieces and carried away or hidden close-by and fetched later. Very 
rudimentary, yet very innovative DIY equipment was used to make „special‟ 
tools. Long dry wooden poles were used to reach the cable from a safe 
distance and because they understood the isolation requirements, they used 
rubber tubes to tie it all together. 
The tools and methods commonly used:  
a. Anything from shovels to motorised graders were used to uncover 
underground copper cables. 
b. Thieves used extensive camouflage and cross dressing, masquerading 
as police, municipality workers or even emergency personnel.   
c. They hid behind shelters to dim both light and sound from where they 
and worked using blow torches and other industrial type heavy tools.  
d. Thieves tended to work outwards from the Distribution Boards (DB‟s) to 
steal as much as they could.  
e. Goods were stolen while a transport infrastructure stood still because of 
a power outage. 
f. If possible, all metal was stolen, not just copper, anything from masts to 
rails; any metal was removed where possible. In certain areas entire rail 
lines had totally been decimated, leaving behind a dirt road.  
g. Thieves targeted everything, from overhead cables to underground 
networks and any equipment that contained copper (transformers) or 
metal.   
h. Unprotected and abandoned lines created ready markets, as these were 
not considered as hotspots and were therefore not protected. The 
thieves „empowered‟ by this situation moved on to operational lines with 
disastrous impacts. 
i. When trains were stranded, taxi‟s and busses were immediately on the 
ready, which gave rise to the possible „collaboration‟ between copper 
thieves and taxi or bus drivers.  
One very despondent respondent asked: „Who is not involved in stealing 
copper?‟ The respondents‟ experiences, supported by the literature review, 
indicated that Gauteng seemed to be the brain and the platform behind most of 
133 
the national copper theft operations. According to Singh and Omar (2011), 
Durban taxpayers had, had to fork out more than nine million rand over a five-
month period to replace stolen copper cables, while slick Gauteng syndicates 
ripped and robbed Kwazulu, Natal, of electricity cables in outlying areas. 
Cornelius Vermaak (in Singh & Omar 2011), Eskom‟s security and distribution 
manager for the eastern region, said cable theft syndicates from Gauteng 
preyed on overhead cables in Kwazulu, Natal. This research found that 
subsistence thieves were mostly found in Gauteng. They operated between 
high density infrastructures, and lived close by as they did not have the cars or 
the money or the logistics that wer necessary to operate over great distances. 
The rural and more resolute areas were thus mostly trespassed by organised 
crime elements, largely employed or controlled and/or funded from Gauteng. 
Taking it even further, according to SARPA (South African Revenue Protection 
Association), as discussed at the 2011 copper theft workshop, most of the 
national copper crime operations were being run from Gauteng.  
The picture emerging from this area of research is interesting. It focussed 
specifically on the copper theft offender‟s nature and modus operandi and it 
clearly shows that it has become imperative for law officers, security officers 
and security managers to contain and act against this crime. From a military 
perspective it seems as if the „enemy‟ insurgents are in control of the 
battlefield, as 99% of the time they are successful and are able to get away 
without being caught. The enemy soldiers are unidentifiable, superior in 
numbers and can move without restriction between their own forces. They 
have a very superior intelligence network and use very cheap and rudimentary 
weapons, easily obtained with which they cause unlimited damage to their very 
expensive and sensitive targets. From an own forces perspective, the picture is 
dismal; the enemy clearly can‟t be fought and overcome or even just restricted 
within the current set up. This is evolving into becoming a lost war/case. 
4.4 THEME C: TYPICAL MEASUREMENTS UTILISED TO COMBAT 
COPPER CABLE THEFT  
Physical security guarding and awareness programmes form the basis of the 
current security measurement against copper cable theft in Gauteng. However, 
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if the current extent and impact of copper cable theft is taken into 
consideration, then the effectiveness of these two options is not something that 
can be deemed successful. The respondents clearly showed that they had no 
faith in the current resources available to them.  
Under Theme C, the current counter copper cable theft measures, and the 
technical applications utilised in the fight against copper cable theft, will be 
discussed under the same sub themes as structured in the Essential 
Psychological Structure design of par 3.7. In these sub themes the 
respondents‟ technical experiences, failures and needs will be uncovered and 
integrated as follows:     
4.4.1 Awareness programmes 
The respondents felt very strongly that the media should report more regularly 
on the seriousness of the situation. They often neglected the copper cable theft 
issue, as it was not regarded as sensational enough. Copper cable theft per se 
was not a priority issue of the media. When reported, the media would mainly 
focus on showing the symptoms of the problem and then in a sensational 
format. The core of the problem such as; security decisions were being made 
by non-professionals and law enforcement was incapable, were never 
mentioned, thus everybody acted in silos. The crime was neither understood 
nor confronted scientifically, in fact a central strategy and strong leadership 
was urgently needed. The general feeling was that any awareness programme 
should be a continuous exercise and not just an ad hoc awareness campaign.  
Awareness activities which could be implemented include the following:  
a. Posters depicting the copper items targeted could be distributed 
internally and at scrap metal vendors.  
b. Security committees within the organisation could also help to spread 
the message effectively.   
c. Hand-out t-shirts displaying a „whistle blower crime line‟ number. 
d. Posters could be put up at hotspots, depicting snake eyes that cause 
superstitious fear and direct messages. 
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e. Security campaigns could be done on a recurring basis.  
f. Pamphlets could be distributed. However, respondents felt that 
pamphlets were just a waste of money.  
g. Available internal radio channels could be utilised. 
h. Community Forums could be utilised more to spread the message, as 
these would be more successful than the recorded show.   
i. Crime lines for whistle blower purposes could be utilised and 
propagated more, currently the success was not as expected. 
j. A reward or incentive system could be widely used. Transnet appealed 
to the public to assist in the fight against crime. Rewards of up to R25 
000 would be paid to individuals who provided positive information 
which led to the recovery of Transnet property or to the arrest and 
conviction of the perpetrators (Fin24.com 2006:1). 
4.4.2 Physical guarding, integrated security systems and technology 
4.4.2.1 Physical Guarding  
Conventional physical guarding was still the main method used to protect 
copper cable theft. Billions of rand lost later, it was clearly not effective and at 
best unreliable. Alternatives were constantly and frantically being researched 
but nothing had surfaced at the time of this research. There was a place for 
physical security and it could work, but only at static places like depots with 
clear logistical lines, perimeter integrity, and quick operational support when 
needed. Copper cable theft, however, mostly occurred in areas which were too 
far away for conventional physical security to be practical, manageable or cost 
effective. Communication and transport were always as big a problem as the 
terrain where copper cable theft occurred was not only remote it was also 
hazardous to drive, and to make matters worse only limited cell phone 
reception was available in these remote areas.  
The securities mentioned were ineffective at best. The only conclusion is that 
physical guarding should never be the best solution, as the crime arena is just 
impossibly big for effective physical security coverage alone. The respondents 
confessed that they even ignored certain areas and hoped for the best, which 
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was a question of taking calculated risks. However, the copper cable theft 
phenomenon continues to escalate and security budgets keep increasing to 
accommodate the appointment of more guards.   
4.4.2.2 Integrated security systems   
The Technology that everybody wanted was a technology which would stop 
copper cable theft; a technology that would make expensively manned 
guarding obsolete; a technology which could be successful as a stand-alone 
capacity. However, technology can never be regarded as a stand-alone 
protective function, it will always have to be managed, controlled, monitored 
and reacted on by humans. Technology is very dependent on support and 
maintenance. It is expensive, even more so than physical manpower, 
especially if not understood. Currently, no singular technology is available to 
effectively curb copper cable theft in Gauteng. CCTV, GIS and integrated 
security systems have become the buzz words in the copper cable theft 
security industry. However, „integrate‟ means integration between all types of 
security systems, methods and strategies. Such a process implies a very high 
level of security management capacity, not just a technical capacity. It also 
implies intelligence, analyses, investigative and specialist reactive applications, 
to name just the basics. This strategy is the compilation requirement, which 
would be best suited for a Crime-IDO protocol.   
Besides physical security methodologies this research found no other 
substantial security protocol used as a main stream strategy, apart from ad hoc 
crime intelligence driven experiments or smaller capacities. No system or 
capacity was utilised as a specific alternative, or continuous standard, other 
than physical manned guarding. However, the researcher found many „stand-
alone‟ tested technologies, with just as many abandoned systems, for 
example, on the railway lines old RFID systems were evident; and a very 
expensive integrated security platform, at a National Operations Centre (NOC,) 
was seen, but the application thereof was undeveloped at best. CCTV cameras 
and monitoring equipment were in limited use and if not managed effectively 
could become nothing more than expensive image recording facilities, which, 
according to the respondents seemed to be the case. It was clear that 
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technology concepts were regularly piloted, but a lack of qualified human 
resources to run, to manage, or to control such complex systems eventually 
shuttled these projects. The respondents acknowledged that the integration of 
security systems was usually too advanced for the current operators, and 
usually became an IT driven application, maintained by IT managers rather 
than a security tool utilised by security experts to achieve the desired 
outcomes.    
According to the research findings the basic requirement for an integrated 
security capacity was to have a control panel displaying a visual Geographical 
Information System (GIS) that could immediately be interpreted by qualified 
operational risk control personnel in for example, a central Risk Control Centre. 
Such a Risk Control Centre (RCC) should be the hub to which all security 
related incidents were reported for remote control and/or assistance. All such 
incidents should be analysed in real time to identify possible patterns and 
profiles. The respondents all had some level of such a capacity, but none could 
demonstrate a total integration from where valid data could be derived for 
immediate warning through clear patterns and profiles. Some of the 
respondents stated that they were in the process of building a NOC/JOC to 
centralise and to control all operations and operational incidents.  
All the respondents indicated that their greatest limitation, in making such an 
integrated security capacity work, was the lack of specialised personnel, or 
security experts who understood what technical integrated systems were all 
about and who could assimilate and interpret what was being projected for real 
time operational action. Another important requirement in such a capacity was 
a crime analyst for the dedicated gathering of crime intelligence, which could 
be profiled and patterned. Such an integrated system, if it was implemented 
and maintained correctly, would produce the much needed data, which would 
have to be analysed continuously. The respondents believed that from such a 
capacity they could identify the risk/threat/vulnerability profiles that could 
impact, with probability variations, on their work environment. This would 
provide the guidelines for best practice in reacting, combating and preventing 
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of copper theft via the Crime-IDO methodology. In doing this, they believed 
they could fully protect, prevent and prepare their enterprises sufficiently.  
However, whilst a clear strategy for integrated security systems was absent, 
such a capacity would not get off the ground, in which case, manned guarding 
would still be the only real option. Possible future stand alone technologies will 
be discussed next.    
4.4.2.3 Technologies designed and/or applied to combat copper cable theft  
All respondents indicated that technology was urgently needed to protect, 
replace, and to change copper so that all gain from stolen copper was 
diminished and in the process the „market‟ was taken away from the thieves. 
This Technology had to make melted stolen copper invaluable or it had to be a 
replacement technology that made the less valuable conductors such as, 
aluminium more favourable and copper obsolete.  
„Kwena-Flex‟ and „Tigre Wire‟ are technologies that provide these attributes. 
Unfortunately these hybrid systems and material are very expensive and not 
always practical. It must also be realised that to replace all copper immediately 
is not be possible, only that which has been should be replaced with this new 
technology. These replacements will, however, not dissipate copper crimes 
immediately as there are 25 000km‟s of rail lines and 360 000km‟s of power 
lines in South Africa that would have to be replaced.   
The respondents within their limited capacity would use any means possible to 
make accessibility more difficult for the perpetrators of copper crimes. Within 
the restrictions and the enormity of the copper theft onslaught, the respondents 
mainly utilised standard security capacities, for example, special alarms on 
specific cables and networks with armed reaction in support where it was 
practical. Le Roux (2007:1) stated that the Telkom technology measures 
primarily included the installation of alarm systems that were activated when 
cable transmissions were interrupted. Areas declared as hotspots were 
hardened with more security measurements that incorporated physical 
guarding together with high level surveillance equipment, for example, night 
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sights. Other activities included a more direct hardening of structures by 
embedding cables in concrete, installing more alarms and putting extra cable 
ties in more controlled environments.  
Where the theft occurrence was grave or a pattern of reoccurrence emerged, 
respondents employed specialised investigative resources that applied high 
tech equipment and professional personnel for surveillance and monitoring. 
The respondents seemed to be more trusting of this solution of apprehending 
the thief before he did something and if he was caught, to arrest him as soon 
as possible, and thus be directly involved in the process of investigating, 
arresting and prosecuting for maximum effect. This in essence was an 
integration of security systems, according to the Crime-IDO way.  
Another technological option was to identify copper cables by marking these as 
part of the manufacturing process. However, the respondents had not yet 
decided on marketing the implementation of such technology as a main crime 
prevention measurement. High voltage and heat made these technologies 
vulnerable and unstable. It was also not crime preventative in the real sense of 
the word, merely reactive at best.   
Singh and Omar (2011:1) argued that the South African government had at its 
disposal the technologies to embed markers in copper. The microdot system 
was first proposed to the government in 2009, but nothing has yet been done. 
They even priced such an exercise as to be approximately 0.03 cents a metre. 
According to Naidoo (2011:1), a microdot manufacturer and Data-Dot Senior 
Strategic Analyst, the first step should be to start looking for solutions that 
could be deployed at the copper manufacturing level, and to embed such 
technologies in the raw state of copper. He believed that technology, including 
microdots, could be used as a cost-effective method of identification because 
cables were; „devoid of an identity once the casing had been removed. And by 
the time it reaches the foundry or for export, it is in its raw state and the 
individual who has it in their presence can claim ownership‟.  
However, marking all newly manufactured copper cables would only be of 
value to its owners and to law enforcement, and only if it was stolen. However, 
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the inability to properly identify stolen copper cables remained one of the main 
reasons why copper cables were so easily reintroduced in the recycling 
industry. According to Van Dalen (2009:1) everyone had to, as a matter of 
urgency, lobby their councils to start marking all items that were prone to theft 
with Micro-dots. This would also help law enforcement agencies to identify 
stolen goods. At the Copper Theft Conference, Leeburn (2011:18-25), 
mentioned that the following technologies, to prevent and/or detect stolen 
copper cables did exist:  
i. Cable break-identifier.  
ii. Copper wire with metallurgic contamination.   
iii. Earth clamping. 
iv. Wireless CCTV feed. 
v. Aluminium replacing copper. 
vi. Various marking and identifying technologies. (Embossing – 
 Embedded Tape – Etched wire – Microdot – DNA Trace). 
vii. Wire hardening procedures.  
The researcher and respondents experienced of all of the above-mentioned 
applications and found that not one of them stood out as the solution that could 
stop copper theft. They all had limitations and many were still in the research 
and developmental phase.  
Alternative technologies other than copper markers had also been used. 
According to Singh and Omar (2011:1), the eThekwini municipality resorted to 
alternative measures between September 2010 and February 2011, when it 
had incurred more than nine million rand expenditure related to network theft. 
They employed additional task teams and specific technologies with which to 
combat unauthorised entry into the substations in an attempt to curb the 
copper cable theft problem. Pepper gas systems were installed in sixty four 
substations that had been identified as hotspots; alarms were also installed on 
overhead lines. 
The respondents all stated that the capacity to manage such technicalities 
would either make or break the successful implementation thereof. Telkom, as 
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an example, had been lambasted after many years of copper losses which 
seriously impacted on essential communications. In Moneyweb, (2012:1). 
Telkom responded, emphatically stating that to counter the scourge of cable 
theft, it had adopted various interventions, including alarming critical and 
sensitive cable routes; employing the services of armed security firms; 
deploying various wireless technologies as an alternative to copper; assessing 
vulnerable aerial cable routes and where feasible burying these cables 
underground.  
Notwithstanding this Telkom‟s losses are still close to one billion rand per 
annum. This shows that all the technology and resources in the world will not 
alleviate the problem if the right strategy is not scientifically designed, 
implemented and maintained by an accredited security specialist.  
4.5 THEME D FACTORS LIMITING THE SUCCESSFUL MITIGATION OF 
COPPER CABLE THEFT  
4.5.1 Weak collaboration and leadership 
4.5.1.1 Collaboration needed and the current status 
One of the most frequently mentioned findings of this research was that the 
respondents of Gauteng experienced the lack of proper leadership when it 
came to a unified and facilitated capacity between all role players. They had 
reached their limit a long time ago, they wanted to be rescued.  
Copper theft could only be beaten through a collaborative approach. 
Collaboration is commonly defined as: „A cooperative arrangement in which 
two or more parties work jointly towards a common goal‟ (Arendse. 2011a:1). 
In his presentation at the conference; Policing in South Africa: 2010 and 
beyond, General Pruis from the SAPS, suggested that  
The answer to South Africa's problems may be to put people from 
different disciplines in a room, throw problems at them and ask them to 
come up with solutions, that there was a lot of information available and 
that if people started working together they would find solutions.  
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A measure for success in combating copper cable theft can be found in close 
networking with the SAPS and other role players (Vecchiatto, 2009:1). Van den 
Berg, who is also a senior consultant in Eskom's corporate security risk 
management department, said that he believed that continued concerted 
efforts to deal with the crime of copper cable theft was the only sure way of 
having positive results (Fin24.com, 2007:1). The Cape Chamber of Commerce 
ran a Copper theft summit in April 2012 under the banner of using a 
collaborative approach to beat copper theft. The role players included; the 
MEC for Safety in the province, the South African Police (SAP), Parastatals 
such as Eskom, Transnet and Telkom, Business Against Crime (BAC), Agri-
Forum, NPA, second-hand dealers, SARS, the City of Cape Town and other 
relevant participants. This conference came at a time when copper theft had 
reached epidemic proportions in our country, with losses running into billions of 
rand.  
The challenge was the fact that the copper cable crimes were not separately 
reported, despite the significant impact it had on the economy and more 
specifically on industries and on the communities that were targeted by this 
type of crime.  
BACSA (2009:1a), stated that the information flow and analysis to enhance the 
work of the NFCCC (Non-Ferrous Crime Combating Committee), depended on 
receiving reliable information from all the role players with regard to incidents, 
arrests, prosecutions and the issuing of certificates in terms of the old Second-
Hand Goods Act (no 23 of 1955). The analysis of the collected statistics would 
not only allow accurate indicators to be developed, it would also provide the 
necessary information to indicate the prevalence of the crime and any 
associated results in reducing the crime. A centralised analysis of the national 
statistics would give a monthly assessment of the effectiveness of the 
implemented strategy initiatives used to combat and to prevent this type of 
crime. This was precisely what the respondents were asking for and what 
should have been an automatic outflow from the BACSA facilitation process.  
According to the respondents, a few years ago, such a Non-Ferrous Theft 
Combat Committee (NFTCC) did exist. It was run professionally by 
143 
stakeholders under the auspicious of Business Against Crime, South Africa 
(BACSA), - the watch dog for businesses and a body to help further the 
interest of businesses. It consisted of approximately 130 persons. All decision 
making processes were done at national conferences, 35 area committees 
kept everything relevant. In fact a clear operational strategy was in place. 
Everything was kept central, all members plus the Police were part of this 
strategy making body. When needed, the NFTCC utilised an external facilitator 
for big decisions and the role players conducted counter copper theft 
operations together. But in 2009/2010 the reins were handed over to the SAPS 
and all such co-ordination went astray. According to the respondents, the 
SAPS role players and structures were unknown because they frequently 
changed, with the result nobody seemed to be in control. What worried the 
respondents was that the SAPS‟ capacity regarding infrastructure, experience 
and knowledge to counter this specific crime was very low. The general 
consensus was that after the SAPS had been handed the reins by BACSA in 
2009/2010 everything came to a standstill and a similar meeting, with all role 
players present had not yet been scheduled.  
Another aspect of concern was that even though the different approaches used 
to combat copper cable theft were clear, they did cause some confusion 
because it seemed as if each Gauteng area and province in South Africa still 
operated in silo‟s - each with different approaches, and each with their own 
custom made operational methodologies with which they combated similar 
crimes. Gauteng participants were basically ignorant of what went on across 
national and international borders; they were too busy fighting their own war 
against copper cable theft. Some respondents did not even know about other 
organisations, networking opportunities and forums regarding copper cable 
theft mitigation that took place in the rest of South Africa. This was even 
happening between role players within Gauteng. The bottom line was role 
players might know about each other and have limited or per chance contact, 
but basically it was a case of everyone for himself.   
The main role players in Gauteng were the Telkom, Eskom, Transnet and 
PRASA stakeholders. These also were the sample unit that was the area of 
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focus in this research. The respondents were all in accord that they had 
expected leadership and facilitating roles from BACSA and the SAPS, for the 
mitigation of non-ferrous metal theft. However, the current situation was in a 
continuously fluctuating process and the respondents felt that collaboration had 
effectively come to a standstill.  
4.5.1.2 The NFMCCC rated in the copper theft environment  
A relevant sample questionnaire was distributed amongst role players within 
the NFMCCC Western Cape to determine the perceived level of collaboration 
within the NFMCCC initiative. The feedback received was analysed in order to 
draw a conclusion (Arendse, 2011a:10). The questionnaire sought to ascertain 
the perceived level of collaboration, amongst this group of eleven role players. 
The questionnaire required participants to, rate their perceived level of 
collaboration on a scale of 1 – 5 based the following key:  
 1 - very poor = needs serious attention;  
 2 - poor = not on effective standard;  
 3 - average = meets only the minimum level of collaboration;  
 4 - good = achieves an effective standard witnessed in successes;  
 5 - excellent = collaboration is optimally functioning and securing major 
successes.  
The following data outcome was achieved: 63% of respondents returned with 
relevant feedback. 37% preferred not to participate in the questionnaire. The 
analysis of this data from the 63% of the respondents revealed that an 
overwhelming 71% perceived collaboration to be on a level rating of three, 
meaning it met only the minimum level of collaboration. It was clear that the 
members engaged in the copper cable theft initiative believed that, regarding 
effective collaboration, the NFMCCC left much room for improvement 
(Arendse, 2011a:1).  
The respondents in this research were even more negative in their perception 
of the current NFMCCC.  
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4.5.1.3 Leaders and initiatives within the copper cable theft combating 
environment.  
Van Dalen (2009:1), a Member of Parliament (MP), stated that shared 
knowledge was power. In his opinion the only alternative way forward was the 
empowering of the NFTCC and/or NFMCCC type Combating-Committees by 
means of legislation to give advice, enforce compliance and to make 
recommendations at Parliament, in an attempt to combat non-ferrous metal 
crimes. The NFMCCC should report to the Portfolio Committee of Safety and 
Security on a quarterly and an annual basis regarding the theft of non-ferrous 
metals on a provincial and on a national scale. The NFMCCC had to be 
granted its own budget in terms of legislation, and operate as an independent 
body within the Safety and Security Cluster. It was Van Dalen‟s proposal that 
this should be chaired by the highest-ranking police officer responsible for the 
enforcement of the Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009). What was needed 
was an influential, official leadership body that could make decisions and 
enforce them.   
Collaboration between all role players was essential for fighting copper cable 
theft. However, it seemed as if the direct opposite had transpired with regard to 
what Van Dalen and Van den Berg had suggested. Pillay-van Graan was of the 
opinion that the successful Non-Ferrous Theft Combating Committee 
(NFTCC), the forerunner of the NFMCCC, was no longer the industry led body 
that had been created in 1993 to represent business and to watch and to lead 
the police. It was instead a government led body chaired and controlled by the 
police. According to Pillay-Van Graan this had to be seen as a major 
achievement as it would instil the governance structure at the level where it 
was required, and specifically obtain the required buy-in and co-operation from 
the South Africa Police Service and other law enforcement organisations that 
had not been available in the past. (Venter, 2008:1) 
The respondents, however, saw this as a noble idea; the research had shown 
that the reality was that the SAPS did not have the capacity or capability to 
take up this responsibility. Industry needed a BACSA type of organisation to be 
the facilitator between the industry led body NFTCC/NFMCCC and the SAPS. 
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The respondents felt that since the NFTCC was not driven via BACSA, 
facilitation had stopped and members were isolated.  
The respondents all stated the need for a qualified facilitator - the only way to 
combat copper cable theft effectively. This could only happen where all role 
players were manoeuvred to become collaborative partners. Since the SAPS 
had taken over this role, the whole collaboration workgroup had become 
leaderless and the respondents were on their own. When the respondents 
were contemplating the CRIME-IDO concept, they stated that if costs were 
shared between victims of copper cable theft, the resources could be shared 
and operations could be planned. The respondents saw the breakdown of 
collaboration and no formal leadership as possibly the major reason as to why 
the Crime-IDO concept would not take off.   
The senior managers in Gauteng manager‟s knew about the international 
phenomenon of copper crimes, they even supported other countries as 
consultants. However, in SA each stakeholder focused on his own problems 
and, therefore, was not very interested in what the other stakeholders and 
provinces were doing.   
The singular most significant point in the research of this phenomenon was the 
fact that a combined effort in the fight against copper cable theft was non-
existent in Gauteng. The main reason being no effective leadership structures 
were in place. It also became clear that the respondents had been caught 
totally off-guard by the change of leadership - from the BACSA to the SAPS. 
The fact that the SAPS per se, was now the supposed leader was not the 
problem, the biggest issue was that such a move had been done singularly, 
without involving the role players‟, without handing-over procedures, without 
proof of concept and without a pilot period. It had just been done, with no clear 
plan or project management. The outcome was that every organisation was 
now separately fighting the same enemy with limited resources resulting in a 
lot of duplication taking place, which in turn could result in millions of rand 
being wasted.   
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Bindemann (2011), called on all municipalities to become involved in a singular 
forum, with, for example; the SAPS, SACCI and BACSA, and to join hands with 
all role players to form a united front against copper cable thieves. He also 
stated the need for a political champion. As the SARPA representative in 
combating copper cable theft, Bindemann had an in-depth understanding of 
copper cable theft and its requirements from an operational viewpoint, which 
also encapsulated the training of police officers, judicial staff members and 
municipality officials. This training material would be incorporated in the 
national law enforcement training material. SARPA was closely involved in a 
National Rationalized Specifications (NRS) initiative to develop a new guideline 
to combat utility metal thefts (NRS, 101). This intended drive was a very 
positive movement in the right direction. However, the mandate was still with 
the SAPS.    
At a copper theft conference (Copper Theft Conference 2011), Yusuf 
Abramjee, the Head of Crime-Line, a Prime Media Radio 702 initiative, stated 
that Crime-Line is the first tip-off line in the world to utilise SMS technology in 
the fight against crime. Crime-Line is an anonymous crime tip-off service that 
gave members of the public a safe platform to pass information about criminal 
activities to the police. This initiative was launched in June 2007 and had since 
yielded phenomenal success with close to 40 million rand in seizures and over 
1 000 arrests. He proposed that all copper cable theft victims should support 
this initiative not only as a matter of urgency but also to empower collaboration 
efforts, it should be a prime instrument in fighting copper cable theft.  
4.5.2 SAPS and legal framework roles in combating copper theft 
4.5.2.1 SAPS  
The SAPS as institution was respected by all respondents. However, the 
capacity of the SAPS and what was expected of them in combating non-
ferrous metal theft was regarded by most respondents as disappointing and it 
caused high levels of frustration.   
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However, according to Singh and Omar (2011:1), the Natal police were 
threatening to take a hard line after they had identified copper cable theft as a 
priority crime in the province. A special task team had been set up to deal with 
this matter. The Natal SAPS, Brigadier Aaron Robert Harry, provincial head of 
visible policing, said they were taking a tough stand and would not hesitate to 
prosecute offenders. He said cable theft was brazen, with suspects not 
hesitating to steal whenever they had an opportunity. „We mean business and 
are treating this as a priority crime. We want every resident who sees this to 
report it to us. We want dodgy scrap yard dealers to know that we are coming 
after them.‟  
According to Advocate Simi Pillay-van Graan, the Business Against Crime 
South Africa executive of strategy, copper cable theft had been declared a 
high-priority crime that would receive the focus and the attention it required as 
government was at last realising the impact of copper cable theft on the 
economy. The organisation was engaging with the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) to incorporate more stringent legislation that would see stricter 
regulation of import and export processes, which would ensure that the 
exporting of stolen goods, including copper, was punishable by a prison 
sentence of 10 - 15 years (Naidoo, 2011:1).  
Singh and Omar (2011:1) cited Adv Pillay-van Graan stating that the SAPS 
had been very proactive not only in the provinces but also nationally. She also 
mentioned that high level plans would be developed for each province and 
more vigorous policing would be in place. What was most critical, however, 
was that „business needed to get its house in order‟. Pillay-van Graan 
explained as follows: „It is very easy to say there is a reliance on law 
enforcement organisations to do the policing, but we believe most of the risks 
exist within businesses. There is a need for businesses to unpack their value 
chain and to clean up their houses‟. Pillay van Graan further stated that 
business also needed to identify internal risks throughout their own value 
chain, from financial investment to security, skills and capabilities of staff, 
including the outsourcing of services.  
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This was, however, not the same message the respondents from Gauteng had 
received. The respondents stated that they were more on their own than ever 
before. They did not expect any help. They perceived the SAPS as being 
clueless; dockets got lost, and cases took months and even years to be 
finalised. Copper theft was clearly not a priority of the SAPS. Crawley (2011:1) 
stated that the SAPS considered cable and copper theft as a non-priority 
crime, and they used their resources to combat higher crime priorities. 
Emotional and sensational crimes were supposedly more important. The 
capacity and competence in the SAPS were rated as being very limited 
because they did not have the knowledge, the capacity or the resources with 
which to fight copper cable theft. Specialist security functions could not be 
expected of smaller sections such as the railway police as they did not have 
the capacity to fulfil these functions.  
They seemed to have disappeared in the justice system, according to Crawley 
(2011:1). The basic requirement for visible policing was not achieved as had 
been expected. For example, the uncertain situation regarding the railway 
police had led to a decrease in the security capacity of all related respondents 
because they had budgeted for a better response and more support from the 
railway police. The service which had been promised, did not realise, thus the 
respondents who had budgeted for this support found them in an even worse 
situation.  
According to the pre-2009 respondents a specific SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal 
Unit had been operational; but this function was handed over to the Organised 
Crime Unit at the end of 2009 under the auspicious of the new SAPS 
restructuring. In this process, a lot of expertise and capacity had been lost. The 
respondents were in agreement that copper theft on the ground level was not a 
priority of the SAPS. At most the SAPS patrolled scrap metal dealers three 
times per month, but no real effect had been noticed as the SAPS members 
were not adequately trained and nor were they vigilant enough. The SAPS with 
its limited manpower, knowledge, vehicles, etc., missed the bigger picture 
altogether. The respondents even mentioned that the SAPS were only there to 
process the crime statistics for CJS records, not for protecting essential 
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infrastructures from criminal activities. Some of the respondents were not even 
sure if the police had a protection function, or if they were only to be perceived 
as being reactive. One respondent went so far as to obtain a special 
authorisation to have his security managers empowered as Peace Officers to 
police the scrap metal industry. But it was accepted by most that the 
constituted duty of the police was to protect the life and the property of all 
citizens. According to Dianne Kohler Barnard, MP (Safety & Security) and Adv 
Hendrick Schmidt, MP (Minerals & Energy), unless decisive action was taken, 
it was likely that metal theft would cause more needless pain and suffering and 
place even further strain on the economy. They strongly believed that there 
was a great deal that could be done to deal with this scourge if the police and 
business were better equipped to combat metal theft (DA Discussion 
Document 2008:1).  
The research clearly showed that on all levels the SAPS was regarded as 
uninvolved, untrained, ignorant, and under resourced. In general, the research 
showed that senior security managers felt alone in their fight against copper 
cable thieves. The crime of copper cable theft was not a priority of the SAPS. 
Since BACSA had handed over the NFMTCC leadership responsibility to the 
SAPS in 2010, the SAPS had been unable to take this very high priority crime 
and fight it.   
This SAPS‟ situation was underlined by Van Dalen (2009:1), a Member of 
Parliament, who had outlined the following three requirements for the SAPS to 
become what they were expected to be:  
i. The South African Police Services (SAPS) had to reinstate the SAPS 
Crime Code for copper related thefts. In the past, there used to be a 
separate code for the theft of copper, but as a result of internal 
management restructuring this was done away with. The code was used 
to capture crime information in general and, therefore, all incidents of 
copper theft had used the same code. Thus the copper cable theft was 
recorded in various different ways, from malicious damage to property, 
to unspecified theft, making it impossible to generate specific national or 
provincial statistics on copper cable theft.  
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ii. Without a central means to collate and to compile all crime information 
on copper theft, it was impossible to properly engage in the investigation 
of theft trends and syndicate operations across South Africa. 
iii. Van Dalen (2009:1) further stated that the SAPS needed to reinstate the 
specialised unit that used to deal with non-ferrous metal theft. The old 
truck-theft unit had been responsible for this specialised work. But this 
unit was closed down a few years ago as part of the general move to 
shut the specialised units and to transfer critical skills to station level. 
Given the nature of copper cable theft, which required the involvement 
of organised criminal activity, it was imperative that a specialised unit 
was set up to focus on these criminal activities as part of the drive to 
arrest and to convict perpetrators. Such a unit could report to the 
organised crime branch of the SAPS. The failure to maintain specialised 
units within the police was an indictment of their ability to fight crime in a 
focused manner. 
City Power, according to its CEO, Silas Zimu, was taking action to have certain 
installations classified as national key points in terms of the National Key Point 
Act (EE Publishers, 2010). This could possibly be the best idea if all the issues 
with the SAPS were taken into consideration. However, essential service 
networks should all be regarded as key points. 
It was clear that combating copper theft did not depend on one solution only. 
Therefore, a multi-disciplined, multi-specialist, high level management body 
was necessary that knew more than the criminal master minds, and had the 
dynamics to hunt copper cable thieves down with a vengeance. If law 
enforcement did not show this capacity and commitment to erode copper cable 
theft, it would become part of the problem. A new Second-Hand Goods Act (No 
6 of 2009) had been designed to empower law enforcement to combat copper 
cable theft.   
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4.5.2.2 The legal frame work (Acts, Laws and Processes)  
Every South African had the constitutional right to have access to food and 
water and essential services such as electricity and telephone lines. 
Unfortunately there were too many criminals crippling these networks, leaving 
communities and businesses without electricity and telephone lines.  
Van Wyk (2011:9) mentioned that no separate crime code for copper cable 
theft existed even though in 2008, it was the third most stolen commodity in 
South Africa after clothes and cash. He mentioned that copper theft should in 
actual fact take first place if the unreported cases were taken into account. The 
unavailability of statistical data on the rate of copper cable theft detection and 
conviction, made it impossible to draw an inference relevant to the success in 
this fight. The reluctance to communicate these statistics could subsequently 
bring thieves and the broader public under the impression that this crime was 
low risk, which in turn could lead to an increase in incidences (Arendse, 2011).  
In general the respondents felt that currently the law was sufficient, even 
though a new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) was about to be 
implemented. Much hope had been placed in this new Act being able to 
change the copper theft situation through better regulation and stiffer 
sentences. The new Act was very clear and was at first sight lauded by the 
respondents, the public, the CJS (Criminal Justice System) and the SAPS 
alike. This research, however, found a great deal of scepticism did exist 
regarding the successful implementation of this new Act and the expected 
SAPS capacity to enforce and to maintain it, especially as this new Act 
required even more SAPS involvement than the old Second-Hand Good Act 
(no 23 of 1955). 
The respondents believed that the current problem did not reside with the old 
1955 Act; they firmly believed that the law enforcement role players just could 
not enforce the „old‟ Second-Hand Act. According to the respondents the old 
Act was not properly policed and neither would the new one be. The capacity 
to process, enforce and responsibly manage this new Act operationally was 
still very unclear. The copper cable theft market could not be controlled without 
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proper law enforcement patrolling the new Act in full. Currently the law 
enforcement agency (SAPS) had demonstrated that it did not possess the 
capacity and competence to enforce it. Non-ferrous metal theft in general and 
copper cable theft in particular was and had never been seen and treated as a 
priority crime.  
Geldenhuys (2008:1), states that because the legislation that regulated the old 
Second-Hand Goods Act (no 23 of 1955), was outdated and inadequate it was 
difficult to police the scrap metal market effectively. This Act had not been 
designed to deal with scrap trading in the modern day environment.    
The respondents felt that in the justice system the prosecutors and the 
magistrates should be sensitised and supported by expert witnesses. Some 
were informed, but most were clueless. Their statements were supported by 
Van Dalen (2009:1), who emphatically stated that a comprehensive training 
module on non-ferrous metal theft, in particular copper cable theft, was 
urgently called for on a national scale, to sensitise all the judicial officers –the 
public prosecutors and the judges, in the court system. Without this training, 
the public prosecutors and judges frequently did not know how to proceed with 
the effective prosecution and judging of such cases. There also had to be a 
comprehensive training module for the SAPS members, in particular for 
detectives. Detectives had to be trained on how to analyse and to detect 
evidence that could be used at the scene of copper cable theft. The same 
module also had to be incorporated in the basic training for all new SAPS 
recruits.   
BACSA (2009a:2), mentioned that a training manual and a series of workshops 
would assist law enforcement officials to effectively carry out their mandate in 
the successful arrest and prosecution of criminals engaged in the theft of non-
ferrous metals. Specialised training would include the focus on the 
management of dockets, intelligence and prosecution-driven investigations, 
court processes and the application and enforcement of relevant legislation, 
including the Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009).  
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Van Dalen (2009:1), stated that the new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 
2009) had to be enforced. The Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) 
contained several measures that contributed to the fight against copper cable 
theft, such as; traders in copper (non-ferrous metal) had to obtain a license to 
operate, they had to keep accurate records and were subjected to site 
inspections by the SAPS. He also argued that the backlog of dealer licenses 
was a great problem. Many dealers in non-ferrous metals had applied to the 
SAPS for licenses, in terms of the Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009), but 
to date they had not been issued with their licenses because of delays within 
the SAPS. This meant that many dealers were operating illegally, as they only 
had a receipt from the SAPS, indicating that they had applied and were waiting 
for the license. Such interim measures made it impossible to hold dealers 
accountable instead these created an opportunity to be involved in crime. The 
necessary administrative capabilities within the SAPS needed to be improved 
to ensure that all applications for licenses were dealt with, within a maximum 
period of three months.  
Adv. Lorinda Nel, from Business Against Crime SA, stated that it was 
inconceivable to think that legislation drafted more than 50 years ago, would 
still be relevant in today‟s modern and technologically advanced society. For 
many years the Second-Hand Goods Act (no 23 of 1955) had been the only 
legislation available with which to regulate the business of second-hand goods 
dealers. The major problem with this Act was the difficulty to identify the origin 
of copper cable once it had been stripped of its plastic casing. As a result, 
scrap metal merchants, caught with stolen copper cable, were often charged 
with being in possession of suspected stolen material, (a lesser offence than 
theft) for which the current penalty was only a maximum of one year 
imprisonment. The original Act (Act 23 of 1955) had definitely become 
outdated (Kempen, 2009:1).  
Hess, Telkom‟s head of network field services, summed the new Act up as 
follows, „Under the Act, copper is declared a “controlled metal” and a number 
of limitations are placed on its trade and possession‟ (My Broadband, 2012:1).  
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Arendse (2011a:1), mentioned that although the new Act sought to promote 
self-regulation it still lacked the necessary regulations to achieve this. Although 
the new Act brought some hope, if it was not going to be well regulated there 
would be little benefit in it for the parastatals that lost hundreds of millions of 
rand per year because of copper cable theft and vandalism. Hess, Telkom‟s 
head of network field services, put it simply „The principles of the new Act are 
solid but much depends on the efficiency of compliance and implementation‟ 
(My Broadband, 2012:1).  
Adv Lorinda Nel, of BACSA, dissected the new Act to show, in a nutshell, what 
it wanted to achieve (Kempen 2009:1); 
The aims of the new legislation 
i. Regulate the business of pawnbrokers and dealers in second-
hand  goods; 
ii. Limit the trade in stolen goods and 
iii. Promote ethical standards in the second-hand goods trade. 
Important to the Non-ferrous Metal Industry  
i. Legitimate dealers would benefit. 
ii. Dealers in or recyclers of metals such as copper and aluminium 
had to be registered. No recycling equipment could be kept on 
any premises other than on those of registered recyclers. 
iii. Provision for routine inspections during working hours. 
iv. Warrants for search and seizure. 
v. Empowering law enforcement officials to search, to seize and to 
seal off premises. 
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vi. Provision to extend powers in the Act to public entities, to assist 
with enforcement e.g., Spoornet, Telkom and ESCOM. 
vii. Acquisition, possession and disposal of burnt cable was an 
offence. 
No dealer could: 
i. Acquire or accept pawned goods from any person under the age 
of 18  years. 
ii. Take into his possession goods if he was not convinced that the 
 person was the owner or titleholder and was authorised to 
dispose thereof. 
Recommendation of respondents: any copper without a purchase 
record must be confiscated. Even better, make it unlawful for any 
person to possess or to transport specified quantities of non-
ferrous metals unless in possession of a specific permit.  
iii. Goods could not be changed or altered within a period of seven 
days. 
Recommendation of respondents: 
No cash payments, must be via cheque payments 
Sellers with more than one sale record had to register as a non-
ferrous metal vendor.  
 A dealer could only buy a certain amount of copper per month, 
from small deliveries.   
iv. If the information provided seemed suspicious, in that the goods 
might be stolen, it was their duty to report it to the police. 
v. Reports to be noted in the prescribed manner and the 
complainant issued with an acknowledgement. 
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vi. Criminal offence if not reported. 
vii. Identity and particulars of all acquisitions or disposal of goods. 
viii. Description of goods. 
ix. Signature/ name/ identity number of client. 
x. Copies of identity document or passport. 
xi. Retain documents for 5 years. 
Disqualifications for dealing with sellers: 
i. Previous conviction- sentenced to imprisonment without option of 
a fine for certain offences.  
ii. If in preceding 10 years, convicted for an offence in terms of the 
1955 and/or the 2009 Act‟s on Second-hand Goods. 
iii. Un-rehabilitated insolvent.  
iv. Under 18 years.  
v. Does not permanently reside in RSA.  
vi. Any other law that disqualifies a person from carrying on with a 
business. 
vii. Business in which a person with an interest, a partner or a 
beneficiary of trust had been disqualified. 
According to Van Dalen (2009:1), Member of Parliament, the Act on managing 
Second-Hand Goods had to make it difficult for people to steal property. Some 
communities covered up criminal activities for fear of reprisals, or to protect 
friends or family members. The Act needed to make the consequences so 
clear, that no one would want to keep quiet. He further stated that Government 
needed to appoint a judicial enquiry to address flaws in the law enforcement 
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system. Non-ferrous theft had to be classified as a serious organised crime, so 
that the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Scorpions/Hawks could be called in at 
any given time. 
The promulgated Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) had clearly brought 
into play relevant capacities with which to regulate the dealing of second hand 
or stolen non-ferrous metal. There was, however, still a lot to be done and this 
Act had to be seen as the first step in the right direction. This Act had to be 
incorporated by all the user role players, only then would it grow to its full 
potential. The NPA recently secured the conviction of two people accused of 
stealing copper cable from a municipal store. The sentences passed were 11 
and 12 years‟ imprisonment respectively; emphasising for the first time the 
severity of the crime (Planting, 2011:1).  
The new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) would be a very strong tool, if 
successfully implemented and maintained by law enforcement, and if the self-
regulating expected by the copper vendors, for example the Metal Regulations 
Association (MBA), happened. The core problem area, namely, the internal or 
local copper market would then be under control. However, if the success of 
any Act promulgated was based on the expectation that industry would follow 
the rules and regulations through self-regulation, it would be tested to the hilt. 
The copper cable theft phenomenon needed an ethical approach, but because 
the problem did not seem to reside with the bigger vendors, where self-
regulating was easier to implement, the same problem with smaller vendors 
might be much tougher to mitigate. The crux of the success of the Second-
Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) would not be in the contents but rather in the 
implementation and enforcement thereof. Scrap metal dealers were the group 
most implicated in the new Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009). 
Business Live (2012:1) reported 72 533 incidents of copper cable theft in 2011, 
but only 10 736 arrests were made. In the same report SACCI mentioned that 
the sentences recently passed had become harsher. Sections of the new 
Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009), dealing with the accreditation of the 
government Second-Hand Goods Dealers Associations, had been 
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implemented. It was gazetted 9 December 2011, that President Zuma had 
authorised the implementation of the following sections of the Act. 
 Define a controlled metal 
 Criminalise dealers not reporting suspicious transactions, and 
 Criminalise the dealing in, or possession of, non-ferrous metal (e.g. 
copper) of which the cover has been burnt.  
These provisions regulated suspicious transactions as well as the possession, 
acquisition and disposal of metal cable of which the covering had been burnt. 
The full implementation of the Act would be based on the promulgation of 
outstanding regulations that were due at the end of April 2012 and on the 
training of designated second-hand goods police officers. On 13 January 2012, 
the President proclaimed that the parts of the Act of 2009, specifying maximum 
prison terms for offences, would come into force on 16 January 2012. This in 
effect would mean that anyone guilty of the crimes listed above might be 
sentenced to a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. In some cases, where 
offences were on-going, a court might declare the goods in question to be 
forfeited to the state, or further penalties could be imposed. SACCI said that 
police stations also had to be mobilised and capacitated, so that the full 
implementation of the Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 2009) could take place 
in the second phase. (The new Second-Hand Good ACT, no 6 of 2009, would 
have been be promulgated in full by the time this research was completed.  
4.5.3 The scrap metal dealers‟ role in copper theft 
It costs South African utility providers more than 20 million rand per month to 
replace stolen copper and copper cables, while local metal dealers amassed a 
fortune from copper exports fetching more than 350 million rand per month 
(Singh & Omar 2011:1). 
All aspects of this research found the scrap metal vendors were the real 
culprits responsible for the dire situation in which the respondents found 
themselves in. The respondents stated clearly that scrap metal dealers 
controlled the market for stolen copper, as all stolen copper had to go through 
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the hands of scrap metal dealers and the recycling process. The scrap metal 
dealers were regarded, on the one hand as the key to the successful mitigation 
of copper cable theft, and on the other hand the core institution that kept 
copper theft alive and well. Some respondents even stated that „all‟ scrap 
metal dealers should be regarded as suspect.  
The reasons were that scrap metal dealers were unrestricted in their dealings 
as they were not being sufficiently policed. There were so many loopholes in 
the system that they in a way had become untouchable and were able to get 
away with buying and selling stolen copper. When the presenter of a copper 
theft workshop in 2001 asked a scrap metal vendor why he bought material his 
answer was simple; „If I don‟t the next man will, it‟s a business‟. A respondent 
stated that whilst demand and supply currently depicted the market she 
believed that 95% of all metal merchants would buy stolen copper if they were 
presented with it. 
The number of legal scrap metal dealers in SA was about 5000, with just about 
as many bucket shops (bucket shops were mini and informal scrap metal 
dealers mostly unregistered with a mobile/nomadic capacity). They created the 
market. Bucket shops and scrap metal dealers were often one and the same, 
even working with and for each other. Together they found loopholes in the 
system, for example, they moved the copper around and made it difficult to 
determine the origin of the copper, especially as the declared amount was the 
same as the amount that had been found on inspection. A scrap metal dealer 
could make copper unidentifiable within minutes. 
Transnet, Eskom and Telkom by agreement, used only one service provider for 
their scrap metal. Everything involving aluminium and copper was done on site. 
But the respondents stated that at best, only about 25-50% of their copper was 
channelled through such a service provider, the rest still went the illegal route. 
It was, however, difficult to prove differently. This agreement was frequently 
inspected for 100% compliance, and accordingly the respondents had to 
ensure that the copper was marked, it had to be as unique as possible. The 
scrap metal dealers were trained to identify this. A receipt plus a poster system 
was in place at all scrap metal dealers, no excuses were tolerated. Other scrap 
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dealers were not allowed to have on their premises any copper with the 
prominent markings of Transnet, Eskom and Telkom. If these inspectors found 
suspect copper on the premises of these scrap metal dealers they would act 
according to the law especially if the copper in question was suspected of 
being stolen.  
The respondents were basically despondent with the current situation; some 
even demanded that all copper scrap dealers should be closed immediately. 
The CEO of City Power felt the same, but he stated that closing the scrap 
dealers would not work as they would simply open somewhere else (EE 
Publishers, 2010). A request was frequently made for a product that would 
formulate a device that would make copper reduce or even diminish its value if 
recycled or melted by scrap metal dealers.  
The majority of the respondents stated that it was an accepted fact that scrap 
metal dealers would buy any copper regardless of its origin. It was, therefore, 
very difficult to monitor and to ascertain if compliance was met without the strict 
control of the SAPS. However, the SAPS manpower was not sufficient to cover 
all the scrap metal dealers, even though, according to the SAPS Journal 
(2007:1) the SAPS was going to crack down on second-hand dealers who 
bought stolen goods from the criminals and who were not compliant with the 
Second-Hand Goods Act. The effect of this 2007 promise had in effect come to 
nothing.   
The question remained who and what could control the scrap metal dealer? 
According to Nefdt (2007:1) there should be a minimum requirement to closely 
monitor the municipal depots and the scrap metal dealers with mandatory 
CCTV at all times. This was an idea that had come up in many of the 
discussions with the respondents. However, the management of such an 
application would have to be managed by a high level well qualified capacity.   
The general feeling of the respondents was that if there was a strict and clear 
acceptable policy that controlled all scrap merchants they would have to work 
together. They knew what was expected of them, but they ignored compliance 
because of bad controls, weak law enforcement, and untrained police.  
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Nancy Strachan, CEO of the Recycling Association of South Africa, was of the 
opinion that the recycling industry could play a vital role in effectively reducing 
copper and aluminium theft in South Africa. This they could effortlessly do by 
not purchasing stolen goods. If they were alerted timely of which materials had 
been stolen and from where they had been stolen they could then refuse to 
purchase these goods and in the process prevent it from being sold in the 
market. If an item could not be sold in the market, it would eventually lose its 
value - even to the criminals. Strachan further stated that scrap yard dealers, 
however, were often unfairly blamed for creating a market for stolen copper. 
According to Strachan the scrap metal recycling sector had worked actively on 
preventing and reducing the problem of cable theft in South Africa, but this 
deduction did not seem to be supported by those that were affected most. She 
said the industry was regulated and legitimate dealers had to comply with 
criteria set down by the association when accepting scrap metal (Singh & 
Omar 2011:1). But then again, not all scrap dealers were legitimate. 
However, even with all the Acts, law enforcement resources and scrap metal 
dealers under control, it would still not come to anything if the will and capacity 
of leadership did not inspire and change people to adopt a culture of zero 
tolerance to crime.  
4.5.4 Political will, effective counselling and SA crime culture  
The research revealed that generally there was a political will to combat copper 
theft effectively. The most recent political support encountered was by 
Sikhumbuzo Eric Kholwane, chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Communications, who stated that his portfolio committee 
needed to engage in the Telkom copper theft matter, to find alternatives and 
solutions (MoneyWeb, 2012:1). But the incapacity of politicians to support their 
promises with corresponding deeds seemed to be at the order of the day. The 
general crime culture in South Africa had to be phased out before copper theft 
would be seen by the general population as being wrong. This, according to 
Bruce and Gould (2009:19), had to be the primary task and ownership of the 
state in addressing the socio-economic, political and historical factors that 
contributed to the high levels of crime.   
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a. Political will. The progress in fighting copper theft was slow, but as 
reported by Leedy (2011:1), there did seem to be a new political will to 
eradicate the copper theft phenomenon. This will had been verbally 
demonstrated and supported by decisions to be taken at the highest 
level of political will at Government and at the State President‟s level. 
The SA Police Service was moving from a reactive to a proactive 
methodology to combat this type of theft. However, the capacity was still 
not there to realise the political will and/or decisions. A minister even 
proposed that copper should be declared a precious metal. But after 
much debate it was concluded that this proposal was not practical. The 
respondents felt that political commitment was there, which was good, 
but no operational capacity to support this commitment had ever 
materialised. Political powers should understand that where it was 
lacking in delivering on promises it was in fact necessary to act.. 
b. Effective counselling. Respondents felt that effective counselling to top 
echelons in industry, regarding the copper theft phenomenon was 
imperative. Unfortunately security had become a dumping ground for 
„connected‟ appointees who did not understand the problem, or the field 
of security as a science. These individuals then struggled to get the right 
message across. 
c. The crime culture. Throughout this research there was not one person 
who did not denounce the current situation caused by copper crimes in 
this country. Every law enforcement agency and political party will 
collaborate with any enterprise or entity that wished to help and to 
attribute. The enormity of copper cable crimes was staggering, and it 
impacted directly on essential services, infrastructure and economic 
stability on micro and macro environments. Calls for new laws and calls 
to grade cable copper theft as acts of terrorism and to deal with 
offenders as saboteurs were rife. Why then did it go on unabated? 
According to Coetzee and Horn (2006:1) the only deterrent against 
becoming involved in crime was the mindset of the worker. The 
company should therefore strive to create, in the workers corps, a 
culture of responsibility and loyalty towards their employer. Social 
development was an important method to holistically counter crime. The 
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respondents experienced that the citizens did not realise their role in 
building the country. Everybody was just there for themselves, and the 
need for immediate gratification was evident without considering the 
future legacy. It was clear that there was a deeper meaning to be read 
into this problem; many respondents mentioned that South Africans had 
become used to crime. Historically it was used to try and overthrow an 
apartheid regime; lawlessness was encouraged, and crime became an 
acknowledged way of life. Now, after getting their freedom everyone 
was expected to change. What had remained was that South Africans 
had become more lenient towards crime, especially victimless crimes 
and crimes against the establishment. Crime had become a way of life 
and it was judged on a case by case principle rather than on ethical 
principles. Within this mindset it should not be a surprise that a crime-
culture was tolerated and even sometimes supported. 
d. Combating copper cable theft originated from the stakeholder 
environments, organisations, corporates or parastatals. There were 
internal challenges within these environments that had an impact on 
combating copper theft.  
4.5.5 Internal organisational challenges in combating copper cable theft   
4.5.5.1 Challenge: The threat, risk and vulnerability as experienced by top 
structures  
All respondents stated that the perceived threat was Management 
Board/EXCO driven and was based on holistic risks, threats and vulnerability 
parameters as perceived by the top structures. The security manager would 
understand how to minimise the impact by choosing between treating, 
transferring, tolerating, and terminating decisions that needed to be made and 
understood. The only aspect that was taken into account was the impact and 
the probability of the threat as perceived by the victim; the perspective of the 
crime or threat as perceived by the business thus always had to be clear. The 
question was: What was the risk or the threat of copper cable theft to 
businesses, and what was the clearly defined appetite for risk parameters? If 
this status was known, security could commence to protect, prevent and 
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prepare the environment it was responsible for, and then eventually 
successfully control the risk within the stated parameters. More important was 
that if the appetite for risk was clear then success could be measured. 
Respondents largely stated that they were expected to contain the current 
situation, with the current limited resources and management, but that they had 
to guess what the stakeholder‟s sentiment or appetite for risk was. This in 
essence stated that industry only portrayed the direct losses they considered 
important, and that consequential losses, endured by the broader community, 
were not a real threat or a bother to them.  
4.5.5.2 Challenge: Costs and internal impression regarding security costs 
The respondents confirmed that the cost to mitigate and to counter copper 
cable theft ran into millions and even then it was still clearly not enough, to be 
completely successful. Outside of paying for security services, the largest cost 
component was for full-time personnel to check on the service providers for 
compliance. Every year the threat seemed to grow, the losses were more and 
the risks were higher. A clear increase in the required capacity was a given 
and the inflation decimated budget increased. Security budgets as non-core 
expenditure were cut first. Effectively, security departments continuously had to 
do more with less. This situation required a much more specialised security 
function which could provide new efficiencies in a changing environment with 
constant financial restrictions.      
Some respondents even contemplated that it was financially better to carry 
their own insurance, as it was a cheaper option, and then to just accept the 
losses as they occurred. However, in most cases this option was regarded as 
unpractical. The best way to render security, whilst being most cost effective, 
coupled with the best possible efficiency, was to deliver best practice based on 
minimum quality standards.  
4.5.6 Quality standards required to improve copper theft security 
The respondents emphasised that specific minimum standards were needed to 
ensure that copper cable theft mitigation was combated effectively and 
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efficiently. The following areas were in need of these quality minimum 
standards:  
4.5.6.1 Challenge: Quality through training and specialisation  
Externally the standardised training of law enforcers was urgently required, 
especially for the NPA, SAPS and the courts. The Metal Regulations 
Association (MBA), under whom the scrap metal industry was regulated, was 
seen by the respondents as a good standard originator. But it was not the 
scrap metal dealers that abided by these regulations and subscribed to the 
MBA requirements, that were the problem; it was those outside of this 
regulating body.  
Internally, knowledgeable security managers were needed with a high level of 
technical capacity to understand security integration measurements and its 
applications. The operational training of security managers was needed 
especially in the art of intelligence gathering and out flowing analysis, which 
would provide profiles and patterns of direct and indirect copper cable theft 
factors. It was clear that the problem the respondents had; was fighting copper 
cable theft with the wrong people and with the wrong tools. A specialised 
capacity was especially needed for intelligence gathering and for forensic 
investigations. This capacity had in most instances been outsourced, 
especially for organised crime. Regarding CRIME-IDO‟s, most respondents 
stated that they did not have sufficient internal resources to manage or to 
deliver such a capacity.   
4.5.6.2 Challenge: Quality through measure and audit.  
Respondents made use of different measures and quality standards to ensure 
that the outcome of their services would satisfy their customer; the employer. 
Standards that were mostly utilised were based on the general ISO processes. 
But security in particular was found to be non-standardised. The researcher 
found that these standards had been based on internal audit requirements and 
were mostly just a paper action. Corrective security actions were seldom 
required through a formal security audit process. The respondents did quality 
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measurements through one or more of the following: analysing and interpreting 
crime statistics to do with losses, client feedback and behaviour, negative 
reactions or occurrences, surveys, SLA performance management, technical 
and electrical provisions and the KPA‟s/KPI‟s of agreed upon security 
processes. 
However, best practice and clear customer requirements were not found to be 
formally stated, measured and reported on. What had been done was mostly 
just of theoretical value, no specific projects, emanating from any analysis or 
measurement, was mentioned. A recognised standard for security, for 
example, ISO 28000 was not found or mentioned or implemented.    
4.5.6.3 Challenge: Quality awareness through an integrated security and 
monitor capacity.  
The respondents‟ decisions to combat copper cable theft were entirely 
dependent on information which had been derived from their monitoring 
capacity. Monitoring, for example; was diverse and encapsulated the copper 
cable theft scenario closely through incident reports, survey communication, 
patrols, CCTV, informant networks, investigations and crime analysis. The 
dedicated integration of all these capacities was not noted. Visible policing was 
still regarded to be the best source of information through its continuous 
physical presence. The reliance on technical monitoring systems from a cost 
efficiency perspective was preferable; however, supportive systems for 
technical monitoring required highly skilled supervision and interpretation. The 
lack of these prerequisites, however, rendered most of the technologies that 
had been implemented; limited stand-alone systems.    
An important finding was that because of the limited knowledge levels within 
the security environments, most of the security technology force multipliers 
were designed and run by other (for example IT) functionaries. Security 
officials were usually not involved and any such technology was therefore not 
understood, fully utilised or integrated in the total security strategy of the 
stakeholder.   
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4.5.6.4 Challenge: Quality security through a proper strategy design  
One of the most popular requirements this research encountered was that of 
„integrated security systems‟ showing a real-time image of all copper theft 
patterns and threats. However, a mature early warning, or pro-active crime 
analysis capacity was not found in the stakeholder environments. The 
respondents were yearning for real-time information and the reliable 
interpretation thereof, which could only be provided by an integrated security 
system. Most respondents stated that such a capacity would only become 
viable in conjunction with a Crime-IDO function. Such a capacity was in two 
security service providers, one more localised and the other with a national foot 
print. Both were found to be selectively utilised by some of the respondents, 
but the ad hoc utilisation of these service providers implicated that long term 
goals and the continuous follow up operations could not be achieved.    
What become evident was that a comprehensive security strategy was needed 
that would have a lasting impact on mitigating copper cable theft. According to 
the respondents a clear security strategy in generally did not exist, let alone 
one for copper cable theft. Planning was mainly reactive, with little leadership 
and management guidance. What was needed was leadership and guidance 
emanating from a promulgated strategy plan with which to counter copper 
cable theft in a dedicated manner. In some instances the concept of a strategy 
was misunderstood by senior management who saw it as being a secretive 
document or only for strictly confidential planning. The respondents were of the 
opinion that a strategy was needed that focussed more on the Crime 
Intelligence Driven Operations (CRIME-IDO) concept and especially on the 
training of the CJS role players. The implication in realising such a strategy 
depicted that dedicated and knowledgeable security specialists had to be 
sourced and appointed, or if they were already there, to empower them to 
design and to implement an appropriate strategy.  
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4.5.6.5 Challenge: Quality through proper SLA management and selection of 
security providers  
The role and impact of security service providers in the mitigation of copper 
cable theft was vast. Many respondents felt that security was outsourced to 
guarding mercenaries. Security was thus handed over to privateers who 
steered this process, and it was mentioned, influencing it to keep them in 
business. There real interest of service providers was to make money through 
the provision of as little as possible for as much as possible. In general, the 
respondents felt that service delivery was weak on all levels and 
unprofessionally managed. The respondents were all of the opinion that 
outsourced physical security only delivered results under close and continuous 
supervision by the client. Internal compliance checks had become the order of 
the day as respondents felt that they could not trust the service provider to 
perform on his own. Some even stated that utilising security providers would 
only work if penalty clauses were clear and continuously enforced. The 
respondents also felt that security service providers had to be held responsible 
for damages and losses, where they had been entrusted with specific security 
responsibilities. They felt that blame had to be accepted by the clients or the 
stakeholders and when negligent, consequential liability was not only a must it 
was the only way to keep security service providers on their toes. However, 
this area was very difficult to manage.   
Security managers mostly worked without a clear scope or mandate, coupled 
with limited security experience, management and leadership. This created, 
within the organisation, the opportunity for security service providers to deliver 
sub services and get away with it. The organisation‟s operational security 
managers in general did not even understand the problem or business 
requirements. This lack of knowledge also impacted negatively on correct 
tender procedures regarding security service providers, bill of quantities, 
requirements and ensuring SLA deliverables as required. It was mostly 
expected of the service providers to provide the plan and to self- audit them for 
best performance. What aggravated the situation was the professional jealousy 
between organisation security managers and service providers, who saw each 
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other as a threat. The respondents were of the opinion that on operational 
management level, service providers mostly had more knowledgeable and 
leadership capacity than the stakeholder‟s internal operational security 
managers. 
4.5.6.6 Challenge: Quality through qualified manpower 
The respondents felt that the current bona fide security manpower and 
operational managers appointed were not sufficient to effectively mitigate 
copper cable theft as they lacked experience and security knowledge. These 
security managers were mostly from a non-security environment and security 
for many of these managers was just an ad hoc task. Very limited qualifications 
regarding security in particular and managerial expertise in general was found 
among people directly responsible for security. It was, therefore, difficult to say 
if the manpower was insufficient or not, maybe the numbers were right but the 
output capacity clearly was found to be insufficient. A disturbing finding was 
that the few knowledgeable security professionals had become disgruntled and 
over worked at a time when even more creativity and leadership was needed.  
4.5.6.7 Challenge: Quality through proper command and control 
The CSO (Chief Security Officer) as the highest level security manager 
reported directly to the CEO. The CSO position could be regional or national, 
depending on the size of the organisation. The CSO, in some instances, had a 
seat on the EXCO and all other senior security managers were subservient to 
the CSO. Some respondents were unsure regarding the role of their CSO, for 
most it was a politically influenced appointment and for others it was 
functionally sound regarding leadership and guidance. The most common 
experience of the respondents was that it was difficult to communicate 
problems to top management as guidance from the top was unsure at best and 
not worth the effort of waiting for feedback.  
According to most respondents top management should be responsible for 
security. The lack of a clear command and control chain was a contentious 
issue with most respondents, especially from middle management down to 
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operational level. The reason was that so many people, appointed as security 
managers, did not have the credentials or the experience which resulted in 
priority issues being handled inefficiently. The frustration level of people 
reporting to the respondents was extremely high, because they could not be 
trusted to deliver on job requirements, let alone supervise or manage 
subordinates.  
Where the respondents were content, the researcher found copper cable theft 
was the responsibility of a dedicated body residing at the Corporate Head 
Office. This body directly strategizes and advises all other regions and/or 
areas, and also operates as a research department that provides guidance, 
and shares the latest technology information on how to adapt as the threat 
changed.  
The most successful senior managers succeeded in the basic integration of all 
operational capacities to make it not just a physical security problem. The 
successful senior managers had personnel that were capable and competent 
and who collaborated with specialists in commercial, technical and security 
environments.  
All senior security managers stated that in general the CRIME-IDO concept 
was the best solution, but they had their doubts if it could be managed within 
their own organisation, as this capacity required a fluid and executive 
command and control capacity. Until then such a capacity would have to be 
outsourced.  
4.5.6.8 Challenge: Quality through risk analysis and standards to support 
business requirements 
During this research a risk analysis template was not ever mentioned that 
consisted of a process to uncover the total security function, capacity, 
applications and requirements against the risks, threats and vulnerabilities. The 
researcher found that the risk related terminologies were differently used and 
interpreted among the respondents. However, the respondents were 
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knowledgeable regarding the expectations and the fields of risk, vulnerability 
and threat measurement.  
The research mostly found that where a proper risk analysis capacity was 
weak the following aspects were indicative: 
i. A risk analysis on operational level was not done or understood.  
ii. Very limited training existed, regarding this aspect, if at all.  
iii. A monthly report was required but a quarterly product at most 
would be received. 
iv. This report was then also handled very „secretively‟ and as such 
the lack of transparency, regarding the risks identified, saw to it 
that the risk remained.  
v. Copper theft was a high priority but no clear answer or reasons 
had been given.  
Where a proper risk analysis capacity was found the following was noted:  
i. Structured research, analysis and reports. 
ii. Showed risk constantly to relevant process partners.  
iii. Custom designed risk assessment. 
iv. SOP‟s for each capacity that was measured through internal 
audits. 
v. Standards important for clear application. 
vi. All members that worked within the copper theft environment 
were fully briefed and trained. 
vii. Copper theft was fully understood and could be answered and 
rationalized, usually copper theft was less disastrous 
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4.6 COPPER THEFT SECURITY, SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION AND THEORY  
This research constantly inquired about models or theories that could be 
considered, used or contemplated in combating copper cable theft in particular, 
or crime in general. No such models or theories were mentioned by 
respondents, and when asked about such models they did not altogether 
understand what was meant by a specific security model or theory.   
After testing the knowledge of the respondents about CPTED it was evident 
that they had a very basic knowledge to no knowledge at all of other crime 
prevention theories and criminology. Nothing unique with which to mitigate the 
copper theft phenomenon was offered to design a specific model for this 
phenomenon. For the respondents, copper cable theft was but a crime and 
should be prevented by any means possible, means that were based on 
practise and experience. Knowledge from academic publications or any other 
research was perceived by the respondents as not necessary. They regarded it 
as historical knowledge and of no value. If the respondents had utilised the 
formal knowledge sources to define and to develop their counter copper theft 
methodologies, a more functional result would have been found by the 
researcher. Most of the respondents implemented a version of Crime-IDO‟s 
which indicated that a total crime prevention solution was urgently required. 
This did not come via their own research but rather by following the successes 
and the solutions implemented by other service providers..     
4.6.1 Understanding the role of social involvement within security  
Communities with active Community Police Forums (CPF‟s) were increasingly 
successful in preventing copper cable theft pilferage. CPF‟s were generally 
well organised, funded and knowledgeable. All the respondents endeavoured 
to get the community involved; from doing patrols to being whistle blowers. The 
respondents agreed that one of the biggest threats in SA was the general 
crime culture and that the only way to deal with it was to engage and to 
educate the communities. They reported that they had encountered a lot of 
goodwill and support from these communities in general, which fully realised 
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that community awareness was an important mitigation tool in the fight against 
copper cable theft.  
Road shows in these areas were frequently launched at schools and 
community centres to educate the general population on copper theft issues. 
At certain dangerous areas, especially where a large gangster presence was 
encountered, awareness activities were presented under protective 
measurements. In order to encourage participation Van Dalen (2009:1) 
recommended that a national reward system should be instituted that provided 
monetary rewards for information that led to arrests and in so doing get 
communities more involved in combating copper cable theft. 
Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA, 2009a:1) reported that a 
National Communications Task Team had been established for Non-ferrous 
Metal Theft. The aim of this Communications team was to build a general 
community support network that would help them to close down the illegal 
markets supporting the theft of non-ferrous metals. Interestingly the 
respondents did not have any knowledge of such a task team. Greater 
community involvement, together with a social marketing approach, would 
encourage the people to report these crimes and any information related to the 
work of syndicates and illegal operations, which had an impact on the general 
functioning of the country in terms of electricity, transport, communications and 
other services. 
The general feeling was that local authorities and communities should not be 
left alone in the prevention of copper cable crimes.  
4.7 CONCLUSION 
In the first theme the respondents‟ experiences were unique with regard to the 
extent and impact of the copper theft phenomenon. Their feelings of frustration, 
not only concerning the presiding status of copper cable theft, but also about 
the real operational problems, limitations and restrictions to function effectively 
in this environment came through very strongly.  
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The second theme showed that the nature and modus operandi of the copper 
offender was extensively generalised in publications, whereas the respondents 
were more selective in reporting their specific experiences. The result of this 
was a deep and wide knowledge based understanding of the nature and 
modus operandi of the copper offenders, as was uncovered in their complete 
variety and operational configurations.  
The third theme concerns the measurements utilised and available to counter 
copper cable theft. The specifics of each method were provided by both the 
respondents‟ experiences and the published sources on this topic. Based on 
the feedback of the respondents, and from published sources, it was clear that 
the problem needed multi-disciplinary approaches. They agreed that it had 
become necessary to implement crime intelligence operational methodologies. 
Unfortunately the Crime-IDO methodology had not been well defined or 
structured and had only been partially tested and implemented by the 
respondents. 
The fourth theme covered the critical factors within the respondents‟ work 
environment and all the related external influencers, which limited copper cable 
theft from being properly combated. The published sources gave a lot of 
information regarding the external factors that limited the Criminal Justice 
System (law enforcement, proper Acts, collaborations and courts). These were 
also supported by the respondents‟ personal experiences. They mostly gave 
an insight into the internal critical factors regarding organisational issues that 
they struggled with on a day to day basis, issues such as; the quality of 
personnel and service providers; problems with the organisational perspectives 
of security and risk; and the lack of strategy and leadership support without 
defined specific outcomes. The general risk factors that were uncovered were 
found to have reached a level of saturation through the amalgamation of the 
respondents and the published source mix.  
The most essential findings in this chapter will be carried over to Chapter 5 
where final recommendations for the identified themes of this research will be 
put forward. The achievement of the objectives, general recommendations and 
the identification of future researchable topics will also be discussed.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The recommendations made in this chapter are based on the essential findings 
of this research. The achievement of the objectives, general recommendations 
and the identification of future researchable topics will also be forthcoming. 
5.2. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
This research investigated the copper theft phenomenon in Gauteng. No 
studies have previously been recorded on this topic. The relevance of this topic 
to society in general, and to executives of industry and business in particular, is 
to create an awareness of the seriousness of copper theft and also to 
emphasise what the needs of the security practitioners are. This realisation 
must nurture a common understanding and a vision of the problems facing 
business and industry and suggest how these problems should be tackled.  
In order to create an awareness of the needs of security practitioners, 
combating copper theft meant that the copper cable theft phenomenon had to 
be investigated and dissected to the bone. This research was conducted with 
the intention of documenting the effect and impact of copper theft on society, 
industry and business and to identify the perceptions and requirements of the 
individuals responsible for securing society, industry and business against 
copper cable crimes.   
This was an empirical qualitative study. The stipulated research procedures 
were followed for an investigative and descriptive study. The investigative 
objectives of the research were to uncover the copper theft phenomenon 
regarding its impact, extent, the nature and modus operandi of the offenders, 
identify all the role players and all the possible related factors involved.  
The descriptive objective of the research was to describe the experiences and 
requirements of the senior security practitioners responsible for combating 
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copper cable theft and then to recommend probable interventions as deducted 
from this research. All of the research objectives have been met. In Annexure 
A the essential findings, with specific recommendations per finding, have been 
tabulated.  
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.3.1 Portray the correct extent and the impact of copper theft in Gauteng  
An intelligence gathering institution for copper cable theft needs to be created: 
An institution, which provides comprehensive statistics with a crime analyses 
capacity showing relevant patterns and profiles. The city‟s chambers of 
commerce: local governments, municipalities, the MBA, SAPS, and the NPA, 
to name a few, should present their copper related losses to a centralised, 
suitable, knowledgeable and transparent forum. This endeavour will make it 
possible to understand the copper cable theft phenomenon in all of its facets. 
SACCI, BACSA and/or the ISS could facilitate this process with accreditation.  
5.3.2 Understand the nature and modus operandi of copper theft in 
Gauteng  
If the enemy is not known in all of its facets, a war cannot be won. The 
research recommends that copper theft must be identified for what it is, namely 
a multi-faceted threat from all spheres of life in need of a multi-facetted 
approach. This approach should encapsulate a joint effort between; legal and 
security (physical and technical integration); a dedicated law enforcement 
capacity under clear command and control utilising counter terrorism tactics 
and strategy. It is recommended that a much more formal approach to an 
integrated CRIME-IDO strategy within the CPTED methodology should be 
considered. 
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5.3.3 Alleviate specific factors that impact negatively on the copper theft 
mitigation environment. 
5.3.3.1. Collaboration and leadership 
All role players and stakeholders, within the environment where copper cable 
theft is encountered, must get together to work together as a team, sharing 
resources and intellectual capital. Respondents stated that a knowledgeable, 
experienced, qualified and an accredited leader body were urgently needed. 
That should be officially appointed and empowered by the government, to lead 
all role-players and to escalate the seriousness when needed. The first choice 
to combat copper theft would be the SAPS - if they were capable of leading 
and actually managing the collaboration between all the role players. However, 
according to this research this suggestion would be unattainable for the 
foreseeable future. The only realistic recommendation is; the victims must 
measure precisely what they require and expect from the SAPS, and then do 
the rest themselves through either appointing contractors, or using their own 
personnel, or they can train SAPS members (if they can get any) to work under 
strict professional guidance. The best immediate solution for such a necessary 
capacity would, however, be for government to put a tender out through an 
open recruitment process.  
The current leaders in the fight against copper cable theft are the parastatals, 
who should set the example for collaboration and standards for the whole 
country. But they are currently failing dismally. These parastatals should be 
measured against performance management targets as set by the highest 
authority. This implies that a parliamentary committee as well as regional 
committees, for non-ferrous metal crimes, should be brought to life; their 
accountability should be clear and transparent. The country allegedly suffers 
between 7 and 16 billion rand of damages per annum; this surely warrants 
special circumstances and urgency from the highest level.  
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A knowledgeable, experienced, qualified and an accredited person is required 
who is officially appointed and empowered by the government, to lead all role-
players and to escalate the seriousness of this crime. Government should 
tender for such a capacity through an open recruitment process.   
 
5.3.3.2. Criminal Justice System 
A lasting impression of the respondents is their frustration with the current 
criminal justice situation. The reason is mostly that the respondents want the 
law enforcement environment and the criminal justice system at large, to be 
involved and to act according to the seriousness of this crime. Respondents 
felt as if they were witnesses to a serious crime but nobody was there to help 
or support them, regardless of making continuous alarm. Laws are made; 
people are tasked, but nothing substantial filters through to where it matters. 
Effective and efficient policing and prosecuting actions, regarding the new 
Second Hand Act (no 6 of 2009) will only work if these are supported with a 
proper policing capacity. A specific training course should be presented to all 
NPA and Policing members before they are allowed to get involved in the 
copper cable theft environment. No cable copper theft case should be 
processed without expert witness counselling to the prosecutor and magistrate 
figure. A centre of excellence should be created for this specialised field and it 
must be ensured that the level of experience and continuity is not broken by 
personnel turnover - natural or otherwise. A separate crime code for non-
ferrous metal must be formulated.  
5.3.3.3. Scrap metal dealers 
The general recommendation is for the SAPS to focus purely on the scrap 
metal industry. If they control the metal merchant in the copper cable theft 
supply chain and scenario, then they will control all the second hand copper 
trade, inclusive of illegal trading. In this instance the SAPS members can then 
saturate the scrap metal traders, which will be easier to manage and to police 
than the current challenges to combat copper cable theft over a vast area with 
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limited resources and capacity. This capacity would also successfully support 
the SAPS in their leadership or collaboration facilitator role. 
Bucket shops need to be outlawed immediately as they are the network 
through which subsistence thieves‟ work. They are regarded as the criminal 
extension of the scrap metal dealers where copper is „washed‟ before it is 
brought to the main dealership. 
The most common solution would be to declare the trade of any second hand 
copper unlawful, except centralised state owned copper recyclers. This act will 
effectively render any second hand copper useless and of no value. If that can 
be achieved, the whole copper cable theft problem will be solved. Until such a 
decision is formulised and implemented as a law, copper vendors hold the key 
to controlling illegal copper trade as they are the eventual buyers.  
5.3.3.4. Social involvement 
All social groups fighting copper crimes should be in collaboration. This 
response is also supported by Shaftoe, Turksen, Lever and Williams 
(2007:301-306), who all agree what is needed is a top down approach where 
chief executives reinforce partnerships within their administrations (emergency 
planning and community safety) as well as outside city halls (police, NGO‟s, 
business community, citizens and social society). This must be followed up 
with the reinforcement of civil leadership and the empowerment of communities 
that have skills, competencies and responsibilities, to observe or to report 
abnormal behaviour. Community interaction should make it easier for citizens 
to understand the role of local agencies and agents through signposting, 
leading and more open explanations. The building of communication strategies 
and the modernisation of its infrastructures are also important. Special 
communication networks; prior and during crisis and structured communication 
in general should aim to reassure the public and restore their confidence while 
maintaining their vigilance. The most appropriate options recommended are 
mainstreaming prevention actions throughout local safety strategies, for 
example; through education, youth services, community development and 
planning.  
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According to Shaftoe et al., (2007:301-306) a mandatory risk assessment must 
be introduced by all local authorities and communities, and non-ferrous metal 
theft should be added to all existing criteria. The participation of citizens should 
be promoted at all times by making them feel co-responsible for joint activities 
through the risk assessment process.  
5.3.4 Internal management and controls  
5.3.4.1.  Capacity of security personnel: 
Security in modern times should be run by security specialists who have the 
necessary qualifications and accreditation and they should be incorporated in 
business structures. If this happens then security will not only become a value 
added business but also a role player that can make a positive impact at 
ground level. CPTED and Crime-IDO‟s, as recommended in this research, can 
only work if completely understood and managed by bona fide security 
practitioners. 
5.3.4.2. Knowing the risk, a strategy and quality measurement:  
With regard to the specific respondent environments, the appetite for risk and 
its implications must be officially shown. And the organisation must publicly 
state that it either accepts or rejects the threat and risk analysis regarding 
copper theft. This is an absolute must to enable the proper planning of a 
relevant strategy to mitigate copper cable theft, which with clear timelines and 
deliverables must state what needs to be done. It is strongly recommended 
that the deliverables and the quality thereof must be measured against set 
targets on a continuous basis.  
5.3.4.3. Training of security personnel:  
All security officers and other functionaries to do with combating copper cable 
theft, whether in preventative security, investigations, arrest or prosecution 
environments, must be trained in the copper theft threat and the unique 
requirements to combat it successfully. This can be formally done through the 
SASETA process, or through tertiary institutions such as the UNISA 
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Department of Security Science. The ASIS accreditation courses, CPP and 
PSP are recommended for security managers, on all levels, as a prerequisite 
for being appointed in any security managerial capacity.   
5.3.4.4. Integration of security measures: 
Monitoring and surveillance capabilities should be firmly embedded in the 
technology platform of an institution‟s central Risk Control Centre. A valuable 
part of an operational control centre function is that many other related 
applications can be interfaced and integrated here for a quick overall status, for 
example; a whistle-blowers capacity; law enforcement movement and liaison in 
emergency situations; crime analyses; GIS and other type dashboard 
functions; biometric access and egress control; transport management; even 
fire and building management systems can be integrated here; etc. This 
recommendation is firmly imbedded in the belief that only specialist security 
exponents should design, implement and manage such an integrated system 
platform within a Crime-IDO methodology. 
5.3.4.5.  Security Service Providers:  
Outstanding security provider companies are found in the top five private 
security service proivders of South Africa. They will ensure that standards are 
created, where necessary, that will comply with the SLA requirements. These 
companies also provide many supportive and value added services and 
sureties for example; riot control; CPO protection; internal training schools; risk 
analyses; investigations; helicopter fleet; etc. Many of these functions are at a 
higher level than what even the SAPS can provide. The respondents 
recommended that the client firstly interviews all the prospecting bidders at 
their home base and does not go for the cheapest provider as this is a recipe 
for disaster. It is also important to ensure that the security management does 
support the potential service provider and that they will strive to ensure best 
practises via a clear performance measurement system. Management should 
not be compelled to tender for a new service provider every three years, if the 
present service provider understands what is expected and if they deliver as 
expected - then continuity should be kept.   
183 
5.3.4.6  Internal knowledge base: 
The respondents reported that they had lost knowledge, experience and 
capacity, which they had been investing in for many years, after such services 
had been outsourced. Outsourcing lower level security personnel 
responsibilities is a recommendation, but middle and higher management 
personnel should be permanently employed for authority and security reasons. 
Internal personnel must be trained continuously to create a confident and 
valuable knowledge based team.    
5.3.5 Measurements to combat the copper theft phenomenon in Gauteng 
5.3.5.1  Technology: 
It was clearly stated that technology in the copper cable theft environment 
could only support and not lead security methodologies, as there were just too 
many unforeseen variables impacting. Technology should focus on enhancing 
real time monitoring and reacting, based on early warning networks and 
profiling, to counter any existing threat, whenever or wherever, it may occur. 
Technology should be utilised as force multipliers and to make reactions 
quicker than what the copper cable thieves can plan and operate in. This 
recommendation implies control centres linked and uploaded with real time 
information (digital and visual) which will be collated, assimilated and profiled 
for pattern analyses and pro-active activities that can be directly utilised for 
early warning and detailed planning and proper reactive operations.  
Technology must be regarded as an ever changing medium, thus maintenance 
and upgrading should continuously be budgeted for, if not, it will become 
obsolete and redundant. 
5.3.5.2 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design:  
Copper cable theft and related criminal acts are crimes because of deviant 
human behaviour. The criminological CPTED methodology is recommended as 
the design template with which to explain crime opportunities and to provide 
crime prevention methodologies to combat copper cable theft crimes through 
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the design of a totally integrated counter copper theft strategy. All the 
recommendations made in this research can be accommodated in the first and 
second generation CPTED framework, with the goal of changing or removing 
opportunities to do crime, or more specifically, to make copper cable theft not 
such a viable option.  
5.3.5.3 Crime IDO:  
Where theft occurrence is grave or a pattern of reoccurrence continuously re-
emerges, specialised intelligence and investigative resources should be 
implemented for surveillance and monitoring, that apply high-tech equipment 
and employ professional personnel. This recommended CRIME-IDO solution is 
focused on derailing the thief before he can commit a crime and if he does to 
arrest him as soon as possible. This implies the direct involvement of 
exponents to do with investigations, intelligence networks, informant handlers 
and crime analyses with arrests and prosecutions out flowing. This security 
recommendation, preferred by all respondents, was found to be a realistic 
capacity that could totally eradicate copper cable theft. The respondents 
recommended that a security strategy had to be implemented, which would 
incorporate such a crime intelligence driven concept (CRIME-IDO) within the 
total operating environment of the copper cable theft phenomenon.   
5.4 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS  
This research exposed the copper cable theft phenomenon. The requirements 
to design a proper strategy with clear tactical guidelines to mitigate copper theft 
were shown, the findings of this study offered insight in terms of crime 
prevention, the science of security and the security management needed to 
create a copper theft free environment. A successful crime preventative plan to 
protect, prepare and prevent copper theft from impacting on an organisation 
could be designed with the knowledge uncovered in this thesis.  
The following areas both small and large, where more insight and clarity are 
needed were highlighted in this research: 
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1. Urgent research is necessary regarding the status of copper cable theft 
within the municipality. A national copper theft and copper loss picture of 
all copper users is needed, to show the real consequential impact 
thereof, in South Africa.   
 
2. The research should also incorporate the criminal perspective. A 
qualitative research on copper cable offenders is proposed, to fully 
comprehend the cause of this disease. The status and the role of illegal 
immigrants should especially be looked at. 
 
3. Research into the reason for vandalising essential infrastructures is 
especially important, so that preventative programmes can be 
established for high risk environments because commodities are going 
to become even more valuable in the future. It is not just about copper 
cable theft and the theft of all other non-ferrous metals, but also water 
and its systems must be protected from mindless vandalising and 
lawlessness.  
 
4. A risk factor that must be researched is the extent and impact of 
unqualified and untrained security officers, police officials and other 
criminal justice system role players; people who are expected to have 
the knowledge and experience to guide corporate enterprises and even 
governments, to better understand and to counter current and future 
crime onslaughts.  
 
5. In the absence of a recognised security theory and a supportive crime 
prevention methodology in combating copper cable theft, a theoretical 
environment for opinions and solutions should be created. This aspect 
needs to be researched and rectified. This thesis identified CPTED as 
becoming a potential crime prevention model for value added security 
services and to function as the basis for all security related planning. 
What is needed is a measuring standard or model for security and 
CPTED may be the answer. The role of how security can become a 
valuable asset to businesses should be researched, especially when 
186 
uncovering and mitigating the risk, threat and vulnerability in a qualified 
function, and the design of an early warning capacity, which is 
embedded in crime prevention. The CTPED theory and the Crime-IDO 
models offer excellent research opportunities to this extent.   
 
6. Furthermore, research on the impact of the Second-Hand Goods Act 
(Act 6 of 2009) needs to be conducted in South Africa, especially to 
measure its successes or failures in preventing copper cable theft.  
 
7. The need for collaboration and a unified structure within which to 
combat copper cable theft should also be researched.  
 
8. The drive for technology to become a stand-alone crime prevention 
capacity should be researched closely.  
 
9. The role of the SAPS in complying with crime prevention requirements 
of copper cable theft by both business and citizens needs very urgent 
attention.  
 
10. Research should be done in parliamentary involvement to get crime 
prevention off the ground.  
 
11. Throughout this research it has became clear that only one side of the 
problem has been investigated. The metal recycling industry and more 
specifically, the scrap yards are the other side of the problem. They are 
accused of being the major reason for copper cable theft, therefore, 
their experiences, opinions and participation should be core to any 
solution for a strategy to mitigate copper cable theft.     
5.5 CONCLUSION   
The end result of this research indicates that copper cable theft crimes seem to 
be out of control, and costing the country and its citizens dearly. Copper cable 
theft is a dynamic phenomenon, this research was not just about capturing 
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data; it was also about witnessing a reality. No other such research implying 
that the deductions and assumptions made about copper cable theft in 
Gauteng are original, has been conducted to compare the findings with. 
Themes for further research, especially the municipality environments, are 
recommended.   
This research succeeded in opening vistas to understand; the extent and 
impact copper cable theft crimes have in Gauteng and on the rest of South 
Africa, the nature of the offender‟s environment, their operational 
methodologies, and what is being done by the defenders to try and stop these 
activities. 
An overall consensus exits that copper cable theft can be successfully 
mitigated if all the copper victims collaborate by sharing resources and 
intelligence. The requirement to make this collaboration successful is; 
leadership that is knowledgeable and sustainable, which can facilitate and 
manage the collaboration of all role players and that will ensure the 
implementation of the strategy and tactics mentioned in Annexure A.   
The final words to frame this research will be left to the last copper theft victim 
before this research had been completed: „We are massively frustrated to once 
again fall victim to this sort of crime. The problem of cable theft in South Africa 
is far bigger than just Gauteng, it is a national scourge tantamount to economic 
sabotage,‟ spoken by Kelebogile Machaka, spokeswoman for the Bombela 
Concession Company, which operates the Gautrain (Seale & Cox 2013:1).  
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Annexure A  
This Table illustrates the essential findings of the research within its main 
theme format. Each theme finding is also supported with parallel 
recommendations.  
1. IMPACT AND EXTENT OF COPPER CABLE THEFT 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Extent and impact of copper cable theft 
is crippling. 
 Consequential cost to South Africa 
varies between ZAR7bn and ZAR16bn. 
 Seriousness does not seem to be 
recognised. 
 Current measures not suitable. 
 Victims wait to be rescued. 
 Requires qualified and experienced 
government intervention and guidance. 
 Capacity to fix this problem as identified 
seems to exist externally.   
 Dedicated Intelligence and analyst 
forum to be formed. 
 Accredited leader to be appointed. 
 Go out on a national tender for a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) to 
mitigate copper cable threat. 
 Appoint a qualified and accredited 
managing capacity that will report 
with transparency.  
  
2. NATURE AND MODUS OPERANDI OF COPPER CABLE THEFT 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 The nature of copper cable thieves is 
multi-faceted. Subsistence criminals 
up to organised criminals operate in 
various configurations. 
 The total criminal behaviour spectrum 
is involved. 
 Criminal activities have terrorist and 
saboteur profiles. 
 Only level of opportunity depicts 
approach and scale. 
 Gauteng consists of the master minds 
behind copper crime. 
 Combating copper theft should be left 
to security and criminology experts. 
 A pro-active and early-warning 
mindset and methodology for 
identifying patterns and profiles must 
be cultivated.    
 A multi-faceted CRIME-IDO approach 
is a proven success.  
 Utilise CPTED, as a model guide to 
describe and instruct relevant crime 
prevention methods against various 
opportunity crimes. 
3. MEASUREMENTS TO COMBAT COPPER CABLE THEFT 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Counter measurements utilised are 
random, area too big, not enough 
communications, transport and 
personnel. Meaningless drop in the 
ocean. 
 Current security is not based on 
measurable and required 
deliverables. 
 Outdated physical guarding methods 
are constantly applied.  
 The professional Integration of human 
+ technology according to the CPTED 
and CRIME-IDO methodologies.  
 See technology as an integrated force 
multiplier and not as a total solution. 
 Gather knowledgeable CRIME-IDO 
exponents for consultation and 
coaching. 
 Never place CRIME-IDO concepts in 
205 
 Available technology not integrated. 
 A CRIME-IDO capacity is required. 
 Low knowledge and low experience 
levels are not conducive to 
successfully run a full CRIME-IDO 
internally.    
 A constant hope for a stand-alone 
technology solution exists. A miracle 
cure?   
 A reactive and not a pro-active 
mindset reign.  
the hands of non security specialists. 
4. COLLABORATION 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Collaboration is absent between 
victims. 
 Leadership is nonexistent. 
 Too much duplication occurs. 
 Everyone for himself. 
 BACSA has failed to remain the 
facilitating body between copper 
cable theft victims; the SAPS can‟t 
currently fulfil this position 
successfully.  
 
 Identify an accredited and 
knowledgeable leader to facilitate. 
 Appoint the best person through 
interview and tender process. 
 Clear deliverables/KPI`s must be 
agreed upon.   
 Implement a central statistical hub 
from where all copper crimes can be 
reported and analyses for profiles and 
patterns. 
 Have the central statistics centre also 
man a Crime-Line for whistle-blowing.  
5. SAPS 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 SAPS are not as involved as 
expected. 
 SAPS are regarded as not having the 
capacity to deliver on promises. 
 SAPS do not provide leadership as 
handed over to them by the BACSA. 
 SAPS members are untrained in 
copper theft issues. 
 SAPS members are suspected of 
being involved in copper theft. 
 SAPS senior command is willing to be 
involved, however, the under study is 
not committed or qualified. 
 High turnover in SAPS members 
make an investment in the SAPS 
capacity unattainable.  
 SAPS disbanded the dedicated 
copper theft unit. 
 Understand SAPS limits, create 
alternatives. 
 Don‟t budget on the SAPS getting it 
right soon. 
 Copper theft victims should accredit 
and certify internal personnel to act as 
peace officers. 
 Employ contractors who have the 
capacity to act as peace officers. 
 Find leadership through collaboration 
and implement a Crime-IDO capacity 
for all role players.   
 Coach and train the SAPS when and 
where needed. 
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6. SCRAP METAL ROLE PLAYERS 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 The scrap metal industry is regarded 
as the causal crime factor. 
 Little to no integrity is expected from 
scrap dealers. 
 They are powerful and affluent role-
players who buy their way out of 
trouble.  
 Hope the Second-Hand Goods Act 
(no 6 of 2009) to be implemented will 
regulate the industry. 
 Bucket shops are in general regarded 
as an extension of larger scrap yard 
dealers and are utilised to wash illegal 
copper.   
 
 
 
 The SAPS must focus primarily on this 
role player. 
 Control the scrap market and copper 
theft will be under control.  
 Don‟t leave the patrolling for 
compliance of scrap metal in the 
hands of „self regulators‟ like the MBA. 
 General recommendation is to have 
only one authorised recycler to deal 
with copper, preferably State run 
where 2nd hand copper has no value. 
Basically to nationalise second hand 
copper not belonging to the original 
owner.   
 Immediately close or restrict bucket 
shop operations from selling copper. 
 Implement a biometrics capacity and a 
standard software programme to 
ensure information is uploaded at all 
scrap metal merchants.      
7. LEGAL FRAMEWORD DEALING WITH COPPER CRIMES 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 The whole CJS is regarded as being 
dysfunctional and open to bribery. 
 Prosecutors, Magistrates and Judges 
are mostly ill-informed on the 
phenomenon of copper theft.  
 Some stakeholders have dedicated 
professional‟s training the NPA 
officials and even specialist 
witnesses. 
 Some role players have specialist 
investigators who carry dockets on 
behalf of inept SAPS members.  
 The Second-Hand Goods Act (no 6 of 
2009) is expected to be a fresh 
approach only achievable through 
training and collaboration.  
 Compulsory training of all CJS officials 
dealing with this phenomenon on 
copper theft.  
 Training and utilisation of specialist 
witnesses. 
 A dedicated copper crime code must 
be implemented. 
 A dedicated centre of excellence in 
combating copper theft should be 
brought to life which is transparent 
and can measure all copper theft 
cases.  
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8. POLITICAL WILL AND SUPPORT 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 The copper theft phenomenon is 
discussed on parliamentary level.    
 Political support is regarded as only 
being lip service. 
 Nothing positive has emerged from 
political involvement.  
 Copper theft is not sensational 
enough for politicians.  
 Copper theft is too big a problem and 
is steered away from or is a matter of 
passing the buck. 
 Political leaders have not been 
successful in addressing the crime 
culture in South Africa.  
 A parliamentary committee 
accountable just for copper theft in SA 
should be brought to life. 
 Each regional province should have 
the same capacity and methodology. 
 Accountable and qualified leadership 
must be provided.  
 Parastatals should be supported and 
measured to perform within targets.  
 A National CPTED and Crime-IDO 
capacity should be propagated and 
implemented.     
9. INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES IN COMBATING COPPER 
THEFT 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 The internal operational security 
capacity of stakeholders is not 
knowledgeable and/or capable of 
utilising a broad integrated approach 
in combating copper theft, they only 
understand guarding. 
 Security is blamed for losses; 
however, security requirements are 
scoffed at.  
 Security is not regarded as a 
business process partner, nor is it run 
to become a value added asset, or a  
core business. 
 
 Security must be regarded as adding 
value to business. 
 Security must continuously show its 
value to business and strive to 
become indispensable. 
 Security must not be operationally 
managed by non security 
functionaries, especially if they are 
primary HR, IT or Finance inclined. 
 Security must state and justify its 
requirements through scientific models 
and processes, e.g. CPTED and 
Crime-IDO‟s.   
10. RISK APETITE 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 The bigger threat of copper theft gets 
lost in the „unknown‟ appetite for risk 
in business. 
 The bottom-line prescribes. 
 Consequential losses, not impacting 
on the organisation, are discarded; it 
is not their problem.   
 A clear security strategy must be 
developed. 
 Risk appetite and boundaries must be 
clearly shown with potential 
implications clearly mentioned.  
 Clear KPI‟s must be stated for security 
performance within the 
abovementioned parameters. 
 Appointment of an accredited risk 
consultant to facilitate such process.  
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11. COSTS OF MITIGATING COPPER THEFT. 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Security is grudge expenditure. 
 Security is under resourced. 
 Security is continually expected to 
achieve more with less; it has become 
unrealistic and even ridiculous. 
 Security operates on the edge of 
collapsing, constantly balancing 
limitations v/s threat. The Nett result 
is a dramatic crime increase. Clearly 
penny wise and pound foolish. 
 Dedicated security management must 
oversee security budget. 
 Get the message out to the right 
executive on the right level; make it 
become his problem to solve. 
 Pass on the clear risk, if it is not 
compliant to the decision maker have 
it, and the accepted implications, on 
record. 
 CPTED and Crime-IDO will create a 
saving through proper controls.  
 
12. TRAINING AND SPECIALIZATION. 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
Copper cable theft training and security 
specialisation in high demand for: 
 For the NPA, SAPS, Courts and 
Scrap metal environments.  
 Operational security managers. 
 
 Compulsory copper theft specific 
training must be designed and 
promulgated for all role players in the 
Criminal Justice System, with an e-
learning capacity to maintain such 
levels. 
 For security managers, as a minimum 
requirement, it should be compulsory 
to be certified by ASIS in completing 
the CPP and PSP certifications or 
similar.  
13. MEASURE AND AUDIT. 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Capacity to show success and failure 
through a transparent system and 
quality standard is mostly absent.  
 ROI in the security environment is a 
strange concept; security is regarded 
as an insurance type cost element.  
 The continuous measurement and 
audit of security KPI‟s/deliveries is not 
witnessed.  
 Best practise and customer 
satisfaction are not formally measured 
and reported on.  
Make security a value add to business 
through: 
 Continuous standard measurement. 
 Reporting on KPI‟s as deliverables. 
Show clearly problems and challenges 
and what support is needed. 
 Utilise accredited standard bodies, 
ASIS/ISO. 
 Stakeholders must define customer 
satisfaction, and then empower 
security to deliver through a 
professional and measurable 
approach.  
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14. INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE AND MONITOR CAPACITY. 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Offsite monitoring of all assets is an 
ambition of all role players. 
 The integration of surveillance within 
the copper theft mitigation processes 
is not clear.  
 Surveillance is mostly seen as a tool 
which will increase reactive activity.  
 A control-centre capacity is not seen 
as part of an early warning capacity 
with direct control over operations, a 
control centre is regarded more as a 
monitoring, communications and 
recording capacity.  
 A dedicated surveillance model that is 
adaptable to threat change is not 
witnessed.  
 Control centres and surveillance 
capacity is mostly designed by non 
security specialists, mostly IT 
designers.  
Integrated surveillance should involve: 
 Designed for best practise by a 
security specialist.  
 Clear standard, scope and mandate, 
per surveillance unit, must be known. 
 Continuous reporting on serviceability 
and compliance is a prerequisite. . 
 Dashboard and GIS integration must 
be functional and simple. 
 Dedicated surveillance specialists with 
clear standards to manage and to 
operate the surveillance capacity. (Not 
guards!!!) 
 An artificial intelligence engine / 
dashboard that can continuously 
measured KPI‟s for compliance.  
 Incorporate in the control-centre the 
emergency and crisis management 
team, a type of „war-room‟.  
15. STRATEGY 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 A specific strategy to combat copper 
theft was not found.  
 Copper theft is regarded as just 
another theft in the general security 
strategy.  
 A phased security plan to combat 
copper theft and to eradicate this 
phenomenon progressively is not 
found. 
 In some instances the concept of‟ 
„strategy‟ was confused with 
„confidential or secret‟ some did not 
want to discuss their strategies, if it 
existed at all. 
 Proper corporate governance requires 
such a strategy. The clear acceptance 
of accountability is not generally 
found.  
 A strategy with a step by step 
roadmap or plan to achieve a certain 
goal, with a wish list of requirements, 
which must be accepted by the 
executive from where it becomes 
policy; standards also need to be 
promulgated.  
 Security must have such a plan. The 
plan must provide specific core areas, 
with guidance information to establish 
and to implement CPTED and Crime-
IDO. 
  All plans must be tested by the 
following controls:   
 Is there a clear programme and 
scope supported with clear 
deliverables? 
 Is there clear management and 
supervision? 
 Are there clear internal controls? 
 Are there clear instructions?   
 Are there clear standards?  
 A strategy and its controls must be 
presented on demand with clear 
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parameters regarding progress 
and status; it is not a „secret‟ 
document.  
 A security manager who cannot 
provide such a basic requirement 
must be removed and/or retrained 
in basic security management.  
16. SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Security providers are the object of 
much negativity mostly because of 
non compliance.  
 Security providers are regarded as 
being opportunists with no real care 
or reason to eradicate crime.  
 Security providers are seen as being 
a necessary evil, and involved, in one 
way or another, in many copper theft 
cases. 
 Security providers are managed with 
strong arm penalty tactics and they 
are not retained for more than one 
period of service (3 Years).  
 It was also found that many security 
providers know more about security 
than their clients and the law 
enforcement partners.  
 The stakeholders can‟t control such 
security providers and want them to 
be replaced regularly.  
 Security providers eventually manage 
all aspects of security in an 
organisation except the top security 
management environment. 
 Stakeholders eventually will 
outsource the risk control function in 
totality.  
 Some security service providers were 
continuously praised for their role in 
copper theft mitigation.   
Security service providers most possibly 
have the most experience and most 
knowledgeable security management 
structures within South Africa. Select the 
best. 
 Appoint a security provider with a 
clear RFP/Q process, this process 
should be in place before a bidders list 
is finalised. Pick and justify the best, 
don‟t let procurement dictate/bully as 
they are not the specialists.   
 The ensuing SLA should clearly state 
performance parameters and KPI‟s 
which must be delivered.  
 A security provider is as good as the 
SLA agreed upon. If he can‟t perform 
he must go.  
 Ensure that the service provider has 
the right profile and capacity to deliver. 
Even if it implies a single justification. 
 Refrain from cheap fly by night 
organisations and politically connected 
pressures.  
 Don‟t change a service provider if he 
can do the job, extend the contract 
period rather and work on efficiencies. 
 Don‟t outsource, if the capacity to be 
crime preventative resides within the 
organisation. However, the capacity 
must be qualified and experienced.   
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17. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 Security is a specialist function, from 
operational to management level, 
mostly run by non security specialists 
on all levels. 
 It is found in many instances that 
security operational personnel are to 
fill the BEE requirements and 
management to justify some political 
contacts.  
 As security has no place to hide, it 
quickly shows who can perform and 
who can‟t. Especially since 
headcounts are reduced and 
managers need to do more and to 
work more clever.  
 What is found is that the wrong 
people are now also tired and 
disgruntled. The implication is that it is 
unknown if there is a genuine 
shortage or just a competency 
problem. 
 Ensure the right man for the job, be 
specific in recruitment.  
 If security is at risk because of the 
wrong manpower it must be put on 
record for action or acceptance.  
 Require security managers to obtain 
the ASIS CPP/PSP within 24 months 
of appointment, as a suspension 
clause to their employment contracts, 
which they must keep current.  
18. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
Security managers were found to have a 
mixed capacity regarding their command 
and reporting level. Most felt they could 
make it work regardless. However, two 
senior respondents felt close to resigning 
as their top management was totally 
clueless regarding security and their line 
managers were appointed without any 
experience. Command and control clearly 
is not effective, or even possible.  
 To ensure the right message goes up 
and down the command line requires 
that such command and control 
responsibilities and accountabilities 
must be clearly defined and placed on 
record. 
 Keep all orders and discussions on 
record and then use non performance, 
supported by records, to set non 
compliance security right.   
 The Security function and command 
line must be headed by a 
knowledgeable and experienced 
security specialist, e.g. a CSO as per 
the ASIS standard. 
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19. RISK ANALYSIS 
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 This research found that the 
terminology and concept of „risk 
analyses‟ is mostly misunderstood 
and a proper risk analyses template 
for copper theft does not exist.  
 A risk analysis is mostly understood 
to be a document completed once per 
year to show the threat to the 
organisation at a high level. 
 A risk analyses did not consist of a 
process to uncover the total security 
function, capacity, applications and 
requirements and the risks shown. 
 Complete a risk analysis to support 
the security strategy and vice versa. 
 Base a security analysis on an 
accredited template.  
 A risk analyses should consist of:  
 a capacity survey,  
 security assessment,  
 offender factors, 
 quality controls, 
 vulnerability matrix,  
 risk matrix,  
 security design,  
 implementation plan and  
 quality measurement 
 After a risk analysis has been 
completed a security manager 
should be able to formulate a 
security model and a theory to 
base a strategy on. This will further 
progressively help with compiling a 
security manual.  
 A security analysis should not be a 
problem for a qualified security 
specialist.     
CRIMINOLOGICAL MODEL AND THEORY  
Essential Finding Recommendation 
 In no instance could this research find 
a security model or a specific theory 
on which security is founded and from 
where copper theft crimes is 
researched and planned. 
 Security is planned from the reference 
frameworks of ex-police and ex-
soldiers  
 The latest science of CPTED and 
criminology in general was not 
acknowledged, or understood. 
 The fixation on guarding and the 
inability to combat copper theft 
successfully was made clear by the 
abovementioned finding.   
 Utilise CPTED as a crime prevention 
model to counter opportunity crimes. 
 Study opportunity crimes. 
 Study space based security solutions. 
 Study criminal behaviour. 
 Study socio ecology and crime 
relations. 
 Study CPTED as a total solution 
capacity to crime, the „all in one‟ 
theory for crime prevention exponents.  
 Test current security measurements 
and strategies and risks analysis with 
the abovementioned.  
 Implement Crime-IDO through the 
CPTED framework. 
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Informed consent shared and agreed upon by the respondents of this 
research. 
A CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF COPPER THEFT 
My name is Lyon Pretorius and I am conducting research for my MA degree in 
Criminology at the University of South Africa. I would appreciate it if you would 
participate in my study on the risk factors that have lead to Copper theft and to 
a better understanding of the Copper theft phenomenon. My study aims to 
identify these risk factors so that some understanding of such behaviour can 
be gained and possibly prevented. 
Voluntary participation 
I would like your permission to be interviewed by me during a session that will 
take roughly an hour. You can withdraw from the study at any point by telling 
me that you no longer wish to participate. Your participation in the research will 
have no effect on your participation in the programme and there will be no 
consequences if you choose not to participate. No one in the programme has 
to know if you choose to participate, or what you answer in the interview. The 
interview is confidential and your name will not be written on anything or used 
in the final report writing. Only my supervisor, Prof. J. Prinsloo and I will have 
access to your responses. Your responses will, if permitted, be recorded in 
written notes and or recorded on audiotape. The recordings, dictations and the 
interview schedule will be stored for archiving purposes only. 
Risks 
There are no direct risks in participating in this study. 
Benefits 
There are not any perceivable benefits to you. However, your responses can 
help inform us about possible risk factors and, therefore, help us mitigate 
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copper theft in the future. Such information may also have an influence on 
addressing current mitigation programmes so that the programmes can be 
enhanced in future. 
Confidentiality 
As already stated, all information will be kept confidential and only those 
involved in the research will have access to it. Any information (e.g. structured 
interview schedule) relevant to you will have a number on it and not your 
name. On completion of the research, all audiotapes and documentation 
relating to your participation will be stored and then destroyed after the 
University of South Africa‟s mandatory storage period. 
Sharing of information 
The information gathered in this research will be documented in the form of a 
dissertation and in scientific articles, so that other interested parties may learn 
from the research. 
Right to refuse 
You have the right to refuse or to participate in this study.  
Who to contact 
You may ask any question that you may have at any stage of the research.  
Please contact Lyon Pretorius, (wlyonpretorius @gmail.com or 082 525 3662) 
should you want to enquire about the research project. You may also contact 
my supervisor Prof. Johan Prinsloo (prinsjh@unisa.co.za or 012 429 6003 / 
6574) in this regard. Please note that the Ethics Committee of the University of 
South Africa, that must ensure that all participants are protected from harm, 
has approved this research project. 
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C Coetzee 
Freelance Copy-Editor Proof-reader and  
Language Practitioner 
P.O. Box 21073 Valhalla 0137 
Tel: 012 651 3931 Cell: 074 116 9188  
Email address: renac@mweb.co.za 
SATI membership No 1002211 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
         11 June 2013  
 
I, Catherine Coetzee, am a member of SATI; membership No. 1002211 and 
also a member of The Professional Editors group (PEG).  
 
In 2009 I successfully passed, with distinction, the certificate Course: 
Programme on Editing Principles and Practices presented by the University of 
Pretoria.  
 
I have edited the dissertation on Criminological analysis of copper cable theft 
in Gauteng,’ submitted by William Lyon Pretorius, Student number 4572297 in 
accordance with the requirements for the MA degree in Criminology at UNISA. 
 
The detailed edit includes: 
1. Assistance with overall presentation; layout, organization of 
components, rearranging material and rewriting certain components of 
the text in Plain English. 
2. Detailed editing for sense to make sure the meaning of the author is 
clear. Correct use of punctuation, correct language and grammar usage, 
and correct spelling. 
3. Checking for consistency especially with numbering system, use of 
quotation marks and consistency of references cited in the text and in 
the Reference List.  
 
However, the final responsibility for the correctness of facts and the references 
referred lies with the student; Mr Lyon Pretorius. 
 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Catherine Coetzee 
 
